












Spacious Minds, Empty Selves: Coping and Resilience in the Tibetan Exile Community 
 
 















Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
under the Executive Committee 






























Sara E. Lewis 
All rights reserved 
 
ABSTRACT 
Spacious Minds, Empty Selves: Coping and Resilience in the Tibetan Exile Community 
Sara E. Lewis 
Mental health in the Tibetan refugee community has been studied extensively; but like most 
research on political violence, these studies focus almost exclusively on trauma. We know little 
about those who manage to thrive and what kinds of sociocultural practices enhance their 
resilience. This dissertation, “Spacious Minds, Empty Selves: Coping and Resilience in the 
Tibetan Exile Community” investigates how Buddhism and other sociocultural factors support 
coping and resilience among Tibetan refugees living in Dharamsala, India. In contrast to other 
work that focuses exclusively on trauma, the aim of this project was to examine the broad range 
of reactions to political violence, exploring how people thrive in the face of adversity. Drawing 
on 14 months of extended participant observation and 80 in-depth interviews conducted in the 
Tibetan language, this project investigates how communities through social processes cope in the 
context of political violence and resettlement. The study draws upon and aims to extend theory in 
three distinct but overlapping areas: 1) trauma and resilience; 2) the anthropology of memory and 
temporality; and 3) the transferability of interventions across cultures. The dissertation argues 
that the Tibetan concept of resilience is more an active process than a personality attribute. 
Seeing emotions as impermanent and changing, Tibetans living in exile are reticent to dwell on 
distress, which seems only to stagnate or prolong suffering. Rather than processing the details of 
traumatic events, members of this community attempt to transform distress through cultural 
practices that emphasize compassion and impermanence. Many forms of coping in Dharamsala 
work to create a greater sense of spaciousness, openness and flexibility within the mind—
qualities associated with resilience and wellbeing. In practicing flexibility, the durability of 
 
negative emotions is diminished, such that the encoding of trauma is derailed and disrupted. The 
contribution I make involves using a “resilience imaginary” as a fruitful site for pushing the 
boundaries of how we understand human freedom and agency.
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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION 
Most Tibetan scholars use a method of transliteration called the Wylie system, which 
corresponds to the spelling rather than pronunciation of Tibetan words. For example, the word 
“Kagyu” (a school of Tibetan Buddhism), is shown below in Tibetan. The Wylie transliteration 
is: bka' brgyud. Wylie is a standardized and convenient method for those who know Tibetan. For 
non-Tibetan speakers it is largely unintelligible. Therefore, in this dissertation I use a mixture of 
Wylie (bka' brgyud) and transliteration based on pronunciation (kagyu), preferring the 
pronunciation-style when citing or describing actual conversations in the field. I will use Wylie 




Gesturing to the brilliant blue sky overhead, Tashi Lhamo explains, “you see, it is like this. Like 
the vast, open sky, the mind is completely calm and peaceful. Feelings and emotions, like clouds, 
can sometimes cover the brilliance of the sky, but they don’t change the nature of the sky no 
matter how much they obscure it.” Now in her late twenties, Tashi Lhamo travelled to 
Dharamsala, India from Eastern Tibet with her mother when she was 21-years old. She attended 
school in rural Tibet up until grade 3, but has no formal education beyond that. I met her in the 
daily Buddhist philosophy class at the Tibetan Library, given by the resident lama. After class 
we often walk back up the steep, poorly paved road to the town of McLeod Ganj where we both 
live. Today we stop at a tea stall on the side of the road to rest and drink a small glass of peppery 
Indian chai. Tashi Lhamo zips up her purple hooded sweatshirt, the Autumn weather, sunny but 
chilly, and squints back at me. “These problems you always want to discuss,” she teased, holding 
my hand, “it’s better to ignore the problems in your life. Don’t pay them any mind. Instead, we 
should try to have sems pa chen po (big or vast mind) and not focus on problems.” 
  Like many of the Tibetan refugees I interviewed, Tashi Lhamo, although very open, was 
reticent to discuss specific details of hardship and difficulties in her life, claiming that others had 
it much worse than she. Despite spending 8 months in a Chinese prison after being caught by 
border police, she does not consider herself an ex-political prisoner, or even a political activist. 
“Ex-political prisoners, these are people who suffered very badly,” she explains. “When difficult 
things happen in life, we should just to do our best and move on. Or we can become very upset 
and make things even worse.” For Tashi Lhamo, and others, the disturbing emotions that are 
occasioned by circumstances such as imprisonment, are considered more dangerous and toxic 
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than the actual events. While difficult, many Tibetan refugees note that the most resilient people 
remain calm on the inside, no matter what is happening on the outside. 
  In 1959, a Tibetan monk named Palden Gyatso was imprisoned at the outset of the 
Chinese occupation of Tibet. Upon his release 33 years later, Gyatso said that his greatest fear 
during his captivity was not torture or death, but that he might lose compassion for his torturers. 
Gyatso’s story and others like it are often recounted by Tibetan refugees as examples of how this 
community has remained resilient in the face of collective trauma. These sentiments raise 
important questions about suffering, resilience, and the role of cultural beliefs and practices in 
the study of political violence.  
  While a large body of anthropological research addresses “social suffering,” or the ways 
that systematic social, economic, and political oppression and inequities contribute to individual 
distress, less attention has been paid to exploring the ways societal forces and cultural beliefs 
bolster health, wellbeing, and resilience. As Scheper-Hughes reflects, “anthropological 
references to vengeance, blood feuds, countersorcery and witch hunts are many, ethnographic 
descriptions of individual or collective rituals of remorse and reparation are few indeed” 
(2007:179). 
  Studies investigating the effects of political violence on Tibetan refugees, focus mostly 
on the prevalence of mood and anxiety disorders (Evans et al. 2008; Holtz 1998; Keller et al. 
2006), validation of trauma instruments (Hussain and Bhushan 2009; Lhewa et al. 2007), 
classification of torture experiences (Hooberman et al. 2007; Ketzer and Crescenzi 2002), and 
the “cultural presentation” of PTSD (Benedict et al. 2009; Hussain & Bhushan 2011). As with 
treated-patient bias that makes for the “clinician’s illusion” (Cohen and Cohen 1984), such 
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research tends to concentrate on those who meet the criteria for mental disorders, or who present 
for treatment. We thus know little about those who manage to thrive in the face of adversity.   
  A smaller subset of studies among Tibetan refugees mention that resilience seems to be 
drawn from cultural and religious factors (Holtz 1998; Hussain and Bhushan 2011; Shrestha et 
al. 1998). Some researchers argue that levels of psychological distress are extremely low, 
suggesting that coping activities (primarily religious) appear to mediate the effects of trauma 
exposure (Ruwanpura et al., 2006; Sachs et al. 2008; Terheggan et al., 2001). These studies cite 
testimony from Tibetan refugees who claim their religion allows them to thrive. But this working 
hypothesis that a Buddhist way of life supports suffering in the context of resettlement remains 
poorly documented. Researchers have yet to adequately investigate how Buddhism informs 
resilience and coping. Nor have these studies accounted for alternative sources of resilience. 
Many researchers also fail to look for differences across groups within the Tibetan exile 
community, mistakenly conceiving of members in a rather static and uniform manner.  
  This project challenges the status quo, calling into question perspectives that focus on 
psychopathology. This research also aims to move beyond paradigms that limit the study of 
resilience to individual measures, which often miss the relational aspects of recovery (Saul 
2014). Instead, this project investigates how communities through social processes cope in the 
context of political violence and resettlement. Within the Tibetan community, social spheres of 
medicine, religion, politics and education are often overlapping, making for a unique case study 
of how communities approach violence and displacement. 
  This ethnographic study asks many of the same questions that Bourdieu (1999), Farmer 
(2003), and Das (1997) consider in their studies of structural violence and social suffering. But 
while these researchers were concerned with how poverty, racism, sexism, and marginalization 
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contribute to individual experiences of suffering, here I explore plausible means where by 
societies through cultural practices and social cohesion can “institutionalize” stability and 
resilience. How do communities continue to thrive in a context of displacement? More broadly, it 
asks: how—as with suffering and violence—are resilience and coping social experiences?  
  Through a 14-month ethnographic study of Tibetan refugees in Dharamsala, India, I 
investigate how community members cope with adversity, asking which factors are most salient 
in promoting coping and strengthening resilience. To effectively explore this research problem, 
the project had three principle goals: a) to conduct an ethnographic "domain analysis" to 
determine what counts locally as resilience, b) to establish what kinds of coping methods are 
salient in this community, and c) to investigate how, in practice, Tibetan political refugees cope 
positively in the context of resettlement, paying particular attention to the role of Buddhism. 
  This project did not rely on wellbeing scales or other clinical instruments to measure 
resilience. Rather, my aim was to investigate how Tibetans living in Dharamsala themselves, 
identify resilience. At the same time, although many concepts and practices I describe in the 
dissertation are culturally-specific to Tibetans, outside readers may very well feel the empirical 
reality of resilience among my interlocutors. Although I do not claim that all Tibetans are 
resilient in the face of traumatic events, I believe there may be a quality to the narratives, which 
allows us to identify resilience, as such. 
  I wish to note that I bring to this anthropological study my background and training in 
clinical social work. Having worked as a psychotherapist in psychiatric hospitals and in 
community mental health settings, my understanding of trauma is shaped not just by reading 
studies, but through intensive clinical engagement. As this project is in some sense a study in the 
efficacy of therapeutics, I mention my background to contextualize my assessment and 
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understanding of resilience. This project explores the Tibetan concepts of resilience; it does not 
assess resilience in individuals. However, my clinical background was useful in reading 
nonverbal cues and other signs of instability. This project is an anthropological one, but my 
training in how to assess mental status and my learned sensitivity in exploring traumatic events 
with people, undoubtedly influenced my methods and interpretive frame. It is not an uncommon 
occurrence for researchers working on torture and political violence to experience what is known 
as “vicarious trauma,” where they become emotionally distressed upon exposure to horrific and 
upsetting narrative. As a social worker, I received specialized training in how to manage such 
reactions, which I found useful in conducting this long-term ethnographic research project.  
  In addition, I want to make clear that this project is not built as an attack on Western 
psychotherapy. I, myself, worked intensively with some individuals for up to two or three years 
in community mental health and witnessed the powerful and transformative effects of talk-
therapy. My anthropological understanding of mental disorders and the methods used to treat 
them as culturally-constructed does not diminish the legitimacy of mental health practices for 
Euro-Americans—or, for that matter, Tibetans.  
  To theorize my findings, I engage literature in medical anthropology, the anthropology of 
religion, global health, and Tibetan Buddhist studies. In the sections below, I give a brief 
introduction to the literatures within which this project is situated, including how it builds upon, 
challenges, or advances current paradigms.  
  
Trauma and Social Suffering 
Studies elsewhere demonstrate how structural violence can institutionalize destabilizing 
emotions such as fear, anxiety, and depression (Das 1997; Farmer 1997; Jenkins, 1998; Martin 
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2008). Anthropologists have effectively reshaped an individualistic paradigm on suffering within 
the social sciences with theoretical concepts such as structural violence (Farmer 2007) and social 
suffering (Bourdieu 1999; Kleinman et al. 2007). These perspectives emphasize not only the 
structural sources of suffering, but also how bureaucratic responses to social violence intensify 
and produce suffering (Kleinman et al. 2007). Informed by but departing from this perspective, 
this project investigates the converse hypothesis, that resilience (like suffering) is not solely 
dependent on individual attributes, but is rather rooted deeply in social processes and cultural 
ethos, an approach which has found favor in “risk and resilience” research (Schoon, 2006) in 
social work (Walsh, 2006; 2007), and public health (Weine, 2008). 
  In an ethnographic study of New Orleans residents who were displaced by Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita, Adams et al. (2009) coin the term, “chronic disaster syndrome” to connote 
long-term stress at the individual, social, socioeconomic and political levels. They argue that 
personal trauma cannot be separated from the broader social forces of inequity and vulnerability. 
Likewise, Saul (2014) investigates the concept of “collective resilience,” the “shared injuries to a 
population’s social, cultural, and physical ecologies” (2014:1). But unlike in typical disaster 
interventions that are led primarily by clinicians
1
, Saul argues that the adaptive capacities and 
resilience of families and communities may be the single most important aspect of successful 
recovery.  
  Studies on trauma within medical anthropology have largely been concerned with 
critiquing biomedical diagnostic categories. Is Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) a 
universal mental illness? Are the physiological bases of trauma responses universal, with varied 
cultural “presentations?” Is trauma completely dependent on cultural construction? 
                                                        
1
 Saul acknowledges that “capacities for recovery may be enhanced through the structure and support provided by 
outside practitioners, may be initiated from within communities themselves, or may be driven by various 
insider/outsider collaborations” (2014:2).  
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Anthropologists working in public health, psychiatry, and other more applied settings have also 
struggled to interact and collaborate with colleagues who may not recognize the role of culture in 
mental health. Like other mental disorders, PTSD is considered by many to exist independent of 
culture. Studies that identify causal links in the brain influencing memory and behavior in the 
context of traumatic events and their after-effects (e.g. Brewin and Burgess 2014; Shiromani et 
al. 2009), are cited as evidence that trauma responses are universal. In looking at the National 
Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) priorities, for example, it is clear that the dominant paradigm 
within trauma research is centered on “basic science.” Studies that isolate particular areas of the 
brain, such as investigating the mechanisms of the amygdala in fear conditioning, as well as 
“genetic targets implicated in the pathophysiology and course of disorder” (NIMH Traumatic 
Stress Research Program 2014) are competitive for funding. 
            Although research within psychological and medical anthropology tends to focus on the 
sociocultural aspects of trauma, this does not mean that it is necessarily positioned in opposition 
to biomedicine. Rather, biomedicine is understood to be one form of knowledge (an “ethno-
medicine”) that has been shaped by historical and contextual forces, just like any other system of 
knowledge (Good 2010; Lutz 1988; Sharp 2006, 2007). A major contribution
2
 more broadly has 
been in the area of narrative medicine. Early work on illness narratives (Kirmayer 1989; 
Kleinman 1985, 1988; DelVecchio Good 1994) was positioned against the old culture and 
personality schools (Benedict 1989 [1934]), which posited that particular kinds of neurosis in 
individuals could be reduced to the neurotic “personality” of their culture. The illness narrative 
paradigm shift also replaced older schools that focused on “culture-bound syndromes” such as 
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 It is becoming increasingly common for training programs in psychology, medicine and social work to teach a 




koro and amok (Devereux 1980, Simons and Hughes 1985), which treated cultures (and their 
respective illnesses) as if they were timeless and discrete entities.             
             These early paradigms did not adequately consider how forces such as colonialism 
(Smith 1999) and the hegemonies of biopower (Foucault 1980) influence fieldwork and the 
interpretation of data. They also implicitly demarcate these disorders as “cultural,” which seems 
to contrast that which is natural and universal. They suggest that only “primitive people,” or 
“non-White people,” or “non-English speaking people” have culture. As Kleinman argues in the 
New England Journal of Medicine, “[t]he term ‘culture’ is often misused. In its early 
anthropologic usage, culture referred to the shared patterns of life that define social groups. This 
usage tended to portray cultures as bounded, fixed entities, neglecting crucial differences among 
and within groups, and it risked reducing culture to an autonomous variable” (2004:952). With 
what is sometimes referred to as the postmodern turn came the understanding that concepts of 
health and illness are intimately shaped by cultural context and structural forces. 
But while anthropology as a discipline has moved largely beyond conceptualizing illness 
across cultures as culture-bound, Farquhar acknowledges there are still looming questions to be 
posed: “to what extent, and why, is any disorder that interests us ‘culture bound’? What is the 
culture in question? What is the nature of the constraints that bind a pattern of symptoms to a 
wider world of cultural practice?” (2013:107). Through collecting and analyzing narratives, 
anthropologists attempt to situate studies of illness within a broader social world (Mattingly and 
Garro 2000), showing how illness is at once a medical fact, a social fact, and historical fact.  
            Scholars engaged in critical studies of health and illness have investigated the ways that 
oppression and structural violence produce illness (Farmer 2003; Link and Phelan 1995). The 
study of the “social determinants of health” is a robust and rapidly growing perspective within 
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public health and related disciplines. A related, but distinct perspective argues that disease or 
adversity (Adams 2012; Bourgois 2009) serves as an indicator for social inequity. Some argue 
that illness can be “read” as a metaphor for resistance (Biehl 2005; Mol 2002; Sontag 1978). 
However, in many scientific circles, disease and disorders are seen merely as natural categories 
of pathology. 
  Increasingly, researchers across disciplines frame their investigation of culture and 
mental health in terms of  “idioms of distress” (Kirmayer 1991; Nichter 1981, 2010), which can 
be religious, medical, or political in nature. Cultural idioms of distress are “shared, culturally 
distributed sets of symbols, behaviors, language, or meanings that may be used by people to 
express, explain, and/or transform their distress and suffering” (Hollan 2004:63). This approach 
recognizes that idioms are dynamic and contextual and does not automatically place suffering 
within the medical model. Exploring cultural idioms of distress can also reveal generational, 
regional, and other kinds of diversity within cultures. A number of studies investigate Tibetan 
cultural idioms of mental distress, such as srog-rlung, a traditional diagnostic category, which 
means literally “life-wind” imbalance (Clifford 1994; Millard 2007; Samuel 2007).  
  Anthropologists in particular have written on rlung disorders as an emerging “epidemic” 
in exile communities (Adams 1998; Janes 1995; Prost 2006), suggesting that traumatic distress 
becomes subsumed into this culturally-constituted category of illness. To fully understand 
cultural forms of coping and resilience, it is important to have a sense of the explanatory models 
the community employs to understand mental distress. However, unlike Benedict et al. (2009) 
and others who attempt to “match” culturally-constructed forms of suffering among Tibetan 
refugees with biomedical disorders, such as PTSD, I focus only on the ways that Tibetan exile 
community members conceptualize mental distress and coping.  
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  Within biomedicine, trauma is understood as a specific set of reactions to a stressful 
event (e.g. nightmares, hyper-vigilance, flashbacks), and importantly, it is marked by prolonged 
debilitation and impairment. One criterion for PTSD in the DSM-V is that symptoms last for at 
least six months following exposure to a troubling event. As Young remarks, “PTSD is a disease 
of time. The disorder’s distinctive pathology is that it permits the past (memory) to relive itself in 
the present, in the form of intrusive images and thoughts and in the patient’s compulsion to 
replay old events” (1995:7). Within the Tibetan psychiatric nosologies, there is no particular 
gloss for such a disorder
3
. This is not to say that refugees never experience prolonged and 
intractable mental distress, but the production and cultural value of “trauma,” as a category 
understood in the Western fashion, or a mode of experience, is not particularly salient among 
Tibetans.  
  While violence in Tibet increases, studies suggest that Tibetan refugees show 
comparatively high levels of resilience. Researchers conclude that despite a high prevalence of 
potentially traumatizing events (imprisonment, torture, religious and cultural persecution, mass 
displacement), levels of psychological distress are extremely low, and that coping activities 
(primarily religious) appear to mediate the psychological effects of potentially traumatizing 
events (Holtz 1998; Ketzer and Crescenzi 2002; Lhewa et al. 2007; Ruwanpura et al. 2006; 
Sachs et al. 2008; Servan-Screiber et al. 1998). However, the evidence is cross-sectional and 
selective: these inquiries have been short-term projects using mostly biomedical diagnostic 
screening instruments. While these findings are intriguing, it is important to note that distress 
measured using biomedical constructs may not accurately reflect Tibetan constructs. The 
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 Some have argued that rlung disorders, particularly among torture survivors, are a suitable gloss for PTSD 
(Benedict et al. 2009). However, this gloss is problematic, in that many core features of PTSD (e.g. hypervigilance, 




problems with using biomedical constructs in non-Western contexts has been well documented 
by anthropologists (Kirmayer 1989; Young 1995). Even instruments such as the Harvard Trauma 
Questionnaire that have been translated into Tibetan (see for example, Ketzer and Creszenzi 
2002; Lhewa et al. 2007) are highly problematic, remaining captive to such biomedical 
constructs of mental disorders as PTSD.  
  Other researchers argue that the appraisals of trauma severity are also culturally 
constructed. This further limits the use of biomedical concepts of health and illness. When 
researchers (Terheggan et al. 2001; Sachs et al. 2008) asked Tibetan refugee respondents to rank 
stressful life events, witnessing the destruction of religious temples and being forced to denounce 
one’s religion is considered more traumatic than even imprisonment and torture, raising 
important questions about measurement. In offering what she calls a “critical anthropology of 
trauma,” Lester argues that trauma is “traumatic precisely because it sheers us off from our 
expected connections with others, from our perceived social supports, from our basic sense of 
safety, however locally construed” (2013:754). While Young (1995) argues that PTSD is a 
disorder of time, Lester (2013) suggests that trauma might better be understood as a relational 
problem; what she calls, a relational injury. 
             A related argument made by Saul (2014a) suggests that studies of disasters, political 
violence and other forms of collective adversity overemphasize trauma as the source of distress 
rather than loss. In interviews with nuns who were survivors of torture, Saul found that their 
most painful experience in life was often missing their parents now that they were living in exile 
and would likely never see them again (2014b). In my study, as well, I found this to be a 
widespread source of distress across a diverse cross-section of the community. Recognizing that 
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they would likely not make it back to Tibet before their parents die is an experience of loss, not 
of trauma.   
  Within Tibetan culture, death is extremely important in that it is not only an ending, but it 
marks the beginning of the transition into one’s next life. Families play an important role in the 
death and dying process by engaging in intensive merit-making practices on behalf of their 
relative (e.g. prostrations, nyung ne [fasting], pilgrimages). During the 49 day period that the 
deceased is in the bardo state between this life and the next, a great mass of negative karma can 
be purified through this dedication of merit. In expunging negative karma, the deceased 
improves the odds of taking a favorable rebirth. And while these merit-making practices can be 
done from afar, many Tibetans in Dharamsala worried about the efficacy of their efforts. There 
were practical concerns, as well, such as not being aware of a death in the family. It is not 
uncommon for telephone communication in some parts of Tibet to be restricted by technological 
infrastructure and in some cases, political concerns. In areas that are politically fraught, wire-
tapping is not uncommon and it does not take much to rouse suspicion about a family’s political 
involvement if they receive frequent phone calls from India. These distressing experiences are 
not accurately captured by trauma perspectives. Following Saul’s (2014) assertion, an important 
future direction will be to use alternative framing (such as loss) in studies of political violence 
and disaster, which more accurately captured the lived experience of such events.   
 
Resilience and Coping 
The term "resilience" is often defined as one's ability to thrive or maintain equilibrium in the face 
of adversity (Walsh 2006; Walsh and McGoldrick 2004), and thus more than the simple absence 
of psychopathology. In fact, Bonanno (2004) and others argue that resilient individuals may 
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experience transient periods of intense suffering but that ultimately they maintain an ongoing 
capacity for healthy functioning across time. Within community psychology, social work and 
public health, studies of resilience and coping have long been centered on the individual 
personality attributes of children, particularly those who manage to thrive in contexts of abuse 
and urban poverty (Ungar 2008). More recently, studies on resilience have broadened their scope 
to consider how families (Walsh 2006) and communities (Weine et al. 2006) strengthen 
collective healing. 
  Researchers have also made efforts to differentiate “resilience” from “coping.” 
Psychologists define coping as “[c]onstantly changing cognitive and behavioral efforts to 
manage specific external and/or internal demands that are appraised as taxing or exceeding the 
resources of a person” (Folkman and Lazarus 1984:141). Coping styles are directly linked with 
stress appraisal (Lazarus 1999), or the interpretation of the severity and longevity of stress. As 
Beasley et al. (2003) note, coping is not necessarily equated with good outcomes. Substance 
abuse and other harmful behaviors can be effective ways of coping. But while coping can be 
understood as “healthy” or “unhealthy,” resilience always refers to positive and adaptive 
processes. A related concept is “cognitive hardiness,” which describes the adaptive behaviors of 
resilient individuals (Kobasa 1979; Beasley et al. 1999). This project systematically identifies 
both the salient features of coping among Tibetan refugees, as well as broader local concepts of 
resilience, both at individual and community levels.   
Within psychology and public health, resilience is understood as defying the odds and 
showing positive outcomes (Wexler et al. 2009:566). Therefore, prevention and intervention 
have mostly targeted those presumed to be “at risk,” in attempts to increase protective factors. 
While intending to explore the more adaptive sides of human behavior, in many cases, resilience 
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research has “simply meant looking at the inverse of risk factors” (Kirmayer et al. 2011:84). 
However, much research on resilience does not adequately articulate the “reciprocal processes 
taking place at the intersection of personal and community meaning-making” (Wexler et al. 
2009:566; see also Unger 2003). Older research has framed resilience “as a fixed state that can 
be assigned to a person or group of people based on: 1) a status that confers risk, such as non-
dominant group membership, and 2) better-than-expected outcomes based on a matrix of time-
limited criteria (e.g. graduation, self-esteem scores, absence of substance use/abuse) that are 
defined and allotted to participants by researchers” (Wexler et al. 2009:566). This separates 
people into two groups: those who are resilient and those who are not. Newer paradigms 
challenge this notion, instead understanding resilience as a process that is dynamic and changing 
(Kirmayer et al. 2011), as well as finely attuned to context.  
For instance, researchers as part of the Circumpolar Indigenous Pathways to Adulthood 
(CIPA) project investigated life history narratives of youth in five regions within the Arctic. The 
study seeks to understand their various life stressors, but notably, the “resilience processes” that 
ease young people into adulthood, as well (Allen et al. 2013). As a function of differences in 
worldviews and value systems, resilience is not a universal experience but one intimately shaped 
by local culture. The work by Allen and colleagues (2013) demonstrates how the definition of 
what it means to “be resilient” changes across contexts; even within the same cultural context, 
there are multivariate understandings and experiences.  
Whereas graduation from high school is often uniformly considered a positive outcome 
and indicative of resilience, Wexler and colleagues (2009) challenge researchers to be more 
finely attuned to cultural specificity. In Native communities, where schools are sometimes 
considered sites of colonialization, graduation, while desirable, might also be synonymous with 
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submitting to the dominant group. Likewise, many LGBT youth experience school as dangerous 
and unsafe. Therefore, in some cases the act of leaving school may actually reflect the extent to 
which one is empowered to make healthy choices (albeit not costless nor necessarily heading for 
a good outcome). The public health research community has long recognized the roles of 
discrimination, institutional structures, and unfair economic practices in health disparities. But it 
has largely missed the ways in which the interpretation of these structures can orient people in 
overcoming them and achieving positive outcomes in their lives. Wexler and colleagues (2009) 
argue that group identity--as expressed through affiliation with an oppressed group--can itself 
prompt meaningful role-based action. 
To promote more culturally appropriate research on resilience, Kirmayer and colleagues 
suggest that researchers make better use of narrative in that: 
autobiographical narratives typically make reference to core cultural values as well as to 
particular construals of personal and historical time. People may make sense of their own 
predicaments and map possibilities for adaptation and a positive vision of their identity 
and future prospects by drawing on collective history, myths, and sacred teachings. 
[2011:85-86]  
 
For example, they found that among Aboriginal groups in Canada it seems commonplace and not 
noteworthy among community members that “much of what seems to promote resilience 
originates outside the individual” (2011:89). Such perspectives are also reflected in Saul (2014) 
and Hernández-Cordero and Fullilove’s (2008) accounts of recovery in lower Manhattan post-
9/11. It seems that across many contexts the effects of potentially stressful events are largely 
mediated by “the meaning these experiences hold for the individual and the particular group to 
which they belong” (Wexler et al. 2009:567). Although such perspectives are taken for granted 
by those “on the ground,” researchers have not been as attuned to the sociocultural aspects of 
resilience as they could be. 
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  Anthropological studies of resilience tend to focus on meaning-making. Green (1994), for 
example, concludes that community-level discourses on suffering among Xe’caj have been 
instrumental in bolstering and rebuilding a robust community in a post-war Guatemalan 
community. More recently, in another Guatemalan village, Foxen (2010) shows how the K’iche, 
through the construction of collective memory, not only heal the contemporary and historic 
wounds of violence and social exclusion but also resist victimization through discourses of hope. 
Likewise, Nordstrom argued that creativity and ritual can “unmake violence,” as exemplified in 
Mozambican communities whose members, “by rebuilding and replanting in the face of repeated 
attacks, defied the war…[and] the assault on the present to construct their own future” 
(1998:117). A number of anthropologists have also worked in the African American community 
in Harlem, articulating how identity and social collectivity act as pathways to resilience in a 
context of structural inequity (Jarrett 1997; Mullings and Wali 2001).  
Older theoretical models tended to use metaphors that likened psychological resilience to 
the hardiness of physical materials (such as the ability to return to its original state after being 
stressed or damaged). Kirmayer et al. argue that such metaphors do not work because they are 
too static and ahistorical; they fail to “capture the nature of human adaptation and development 
across the lifespan. In biological systems, resilience usually does not involve simply springing 
back to a previous state but is a dynamic process of adjustment, adaption and transformation in 
responses to challenges and demands” (2011:85). The current study takes a particular interest in 
the transformational aspects of what is sometimes referred to as “post-traumatic growth” 
(Tedeschi and Calhoun 1996), the process of coming through a difficult life-changing event with 
increased insight, compassion, and resourcefulness. 
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  Researchers including Fullilove (2004) have shown how systematic collective trauma 
within neighborhoods leads to increased violence, social fragmentation and mistrust. This study 
demonstrates how it is possible for a community to purposefully disrupt the factors leading to 
social disharmony. I explore how daily life in the Tibetan community in exile may constitute its 
own form of “defiance”; producing resilient citizens in the face of trauma, violence, and 
displacement. Some recent research suggests that the displacement crisis itself, can midwife 
extraordinary examples of solidarity, such as in Columbia (Perez 2008), Ghana (McGadney-
Douglass & Douglass, 2008) and Sahrawi refugees in Cuba (Fiddian-Quasmiyeh, 2009)—though 
how durable these effects are remains to be seen. Too, the Durkheimian notion of collectivity 
itself promoting healing suggests that societies can come together in a challenge, affirming group 
cohesion, cultural identity and belonging ([1899]1951).  
  After more than 50 years in existence, Dharamsala has become home to multiple 
generations of Tibetan migrants. Tibetans fleeing their homeland arrive to a relatively thriving 
and stable community where they are free to educate their children in Tibetan, practice their 
religion, seek education, and establish informal businesses, often in the tourism industry. 
However, some newcomers—particularly those migrating for economic reasons and those who 
have been educated in Chinese schools—are treated with derision. Older generations of political 
refugees have questioned the extent to which these newer generations raised in Chinese-occupied 
Tibet are even really culturally Tibetan. The cultural solidarity which might support resilience 
and coping among older generations of political refugees may be less salient for newer 
generations. Because so many studies have mistakenly considered the exile community to be 
uniform and static, an exploration of the differences between newcomers and long-time residents 
adds depth and complexity to an understanding of the resettlement process over time. But while 
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it is important to note that not all Tibetans are resilient (and that there may be marked differences 
across sub-groups), at the cultural or population level, there seems to be a remarkable geography 
of resilience. 
            I borrow the idea of a “geography” or “landscape” from Angela Garcia (2010) who noted 
in her ethnographic research among heroin addicts in New Mexico, that the place overall seemed 
marked by hopelessness and a quality of melancholia. Rather than looking to individual 
psychology, she considers how the “geography of addiction” has been built, and subsequently, 
how such a geography shapes and molds a lived world where extraordinary numbers of people 
succumb to drug addiction. A consideration of a different kind of geography is articulated by 
Biehl (2005) in his ethnography of zones of abandonment. Such landscapes “determine the life 
course of an increasing number of poor people who are not part of mapped population” (2005:4). 
While it has been demonstrated adequately in works such as these how social structures produce 
subjectivities marked by despair and hopelessness, there are few studies that investigate the 
potential for landscapes, zones, or geographies of resilience. Although the Tibetan exile 
community is not without problems, this dissertation considers why people seem largely to 
thrive. More broadly, it presents a case study of “social resilience”; a landscape of hope and 
dignity. 
To explore the makings of this “resilience imaginary,” I consider how cultural concepts 
of memory and temporality frame the experience of recovery and resilience—both at the 
individual and cultural level. I borrow the notion of “social imaginaries” from Charles Taylor, 
which he understands to be: “our whole world, that is, our sense of our whole predicament in 
time and space, among others and in history.” The imaginary exists above moral order; perhaps it 
might be said that moral order hangs in the atmosphere of the imaginary. This is the “context of 
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action,” or “what makes norms realizable” (2007:174). Through early socialization, the notion of 
what “one ought to do” in the face of difficulty lives in such imaginaries.   
It is through my articulation of this resilience imaginary that I challenge researchers such 
as Landau-Stanton (1990) who argue that traumatic events, by definition, cause a discontinuity to 
“transitional pathways,” or coherent connections of one’s past, present and future. Here, I 
consider the ways that a rupture in life trajectories may not always be a catastrophe. In this way, 
my project elucidates a cultural theory of self, which I argue allows Tibetan exile members to 
actively train in, and build resilience.  
 
Anthropologies of Memory and Temporality 
Around the time of what is sometimes called the “critical turn” (Scheper-Hughes 1994; Singer 
1995), medical anthropologists began thinking very explicitly about political economy and the 
reification of hegemonic knowledge. Scholars challenged earlier paradigms that stressed the 
“neutrality” of research by asserting that all knowledge comes from particular vantage points and 
does not exist “out there” waiting to be discovered. Anthropological works were also informed 
by critical theorists across the humanities and social sciences engaged in feminist scholarship 
(Butler 1990; Haraway 1989, 1991; Rubin 1975). Feminist theory for anthropologists working on 
trauma became increasingly important because of the veritable explosion of interest in repressed 
memory, abuse, and dissociation (Haaken 1998; Hacking 1998,1995).  
            Today, feminist scholars such as Hirsch (2011) conceptualize aspects of trauma as a kind 
of postmemory, asking how legacies from the past shape public and private identities of the 
present. How, in diasporas for example, do acts of reparation, nostalgia, and reclaiming, fashion 
a desire for “the return”? (Hirsch and Miller 2011). Just as Young (1995) argues that PTSD is a 
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“disease of time,” so too, are these scholars fundamentally concerned with time and temporality 
through an exploration of a past revisited.             
                To understand the function of traumatic memory in the context of coping and 
resilience in the Tibetan exile community, I draw on studies that engage questions related to 
suffering, temporality, and memory. In the present study, I argue that the flexible and spacious 
minds that Tibetans describe as “resilient,” are made possible through cultural understandings of 
“emptiness” and “impermanence”—qualities of space and time. Scholars concerned with 
memory and narrative must necessarily grapple with questions of temporality (DelVecchio Good 
et al. 1994), often an unquestioned system. The work or project of constructing narratives 
(traumatic or otherwise) is a means by which to organize and make sense of the past: what 
Ricoeur (1981) might call “narrative time.” I grapple with how an anthropology of time and 
temporality might be instructive in understanding processes of healing. For example, I found that 
many of my interlocutors seemed to resist constructing solid interpretations of the past. Rather 
than seeing this as repression, I consider how this resistance bolsters a shared sense of resilience 
and wellbeing.  
            The anthropology of temporality and its relationship to trauma, memory, and personhood 
has been investigated in recent ethnographic work. Garcia (2010) understands her interlocutors 
who struggle with heroin addiction to live in a space and time—a landscape—marked by the 
quality of melancholia. In Mourning and Melancholia, Freud articulates a theory of melancholia 
as profound despair and loss of interest in the outside world, juxtaposed with what it means to 
mourn. For those in mourning, the bereaved finds the world “has become poor and empty; in 
melancholia it is the ego itself” (Freud 1917:245) that feels emptied out. With the ego fatally 
unable to love and relate to the outside world, suffering is understood as justified and 
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permanent—a heart so miserable, deserves nothing less. Whereas grief, sadness and anger are 
usually connected to specific events, and thus they fade with time, the hopelessness of 
melancholia is so toxic because it is timeless. It neither begins nor ends.  
            To theorize the melancholy of her interlocutors, Garcia (2010) draws on Nietzsche to 
understand the liberatory uses of forgetting. The heroin addicts in Garcia’s ethnography are so 
immersed and entrenched in both personal and social suffering, that there seems to be no other 
way to live. “[T]he melancholic subject is trapped in affect and incapable of sublimating the pain 
of past loss so that he may live meaningfully in the present” (Garcia 2008:740). She describes 
how they long to hold on to relationships, perhaps the only way to maintain some sense of 
meaning outside of heroin. In this New Mexican town plagued by rampant drug addition, there 
are a great mass of descantos, grave markers found not just in cemeteries, but along the sides of 
the road, near the river and outside homes; the sites of death are everywhere. Such objects are 
crucial to “memory work” in that they provide a tangible link to the past. 
             In her recent studies on the “everyday,” Das (2007) invites readers to consider the 
possibilities of time in a different sense. Her concern is with the “work” of temporality in the 
creation of the subject. She notes that anthropologists have long considered ways of reading 
culture through a study of time, investigating “the relation between natural rhythms and social 
rhythms, synchrony and diachrony, cyclical time and linear time, and repetition and 
irreversibility” (Das 2007:95). Anthropologists, and indeed, philosophers, have also written 
extensively on differences between phenomenal time and personal time—an area, which for Das 
(2007), is ripe with potential for exploring experience. She states, “[t]he attempt to give a 
structure to these differences often revolves around the difference between the time of 
occurrence and the time of telling, sometimes conceptualized as the difference between historical 
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truth and narrative truth” (2007:96). These differences reveal the fluidity of memory and the 
impact of structural factors on personhood, identity and experience. 
            In the current study, to understand the health and healing systems in this community, it is 
necessary to explore how the Tibetan medical system fits together with Buddhist beliefs and 
practices. As anthropologists working in Tibetan communities attest (Adams 2001; Craig 2010), 
distinctions between "religion," and "science" are blurred. Indeed, Buddhism completely infuses 
traditional Tibetan cultural ethos, such that it would be difficult to try and distinguish that which 
is “religious” from that which is “secular.” And while some ailments and conditions fall clearly 
into the expertise of amchis (Tibetan doctors), “mental distress,” makes for an interesting case in 
that it spans the scope of both medical and religious practitioners. In Buddhist medical 
philosophy, mind and body form an integrated unit (Ketzer & Crescenzi 2002). Although this 
may be changing with exposure to biomedicine, Tibetans experiencing mental distress normally 
consult first with a lama (Benedict et al. 2009; Clifford 1994) or ritual healer (Craig et al. 2010) 
whereupon prayers and rituals involving the entire family will often be performed at the house of 
the patient. Lamas in Dharamsala also sometimes make “referrals” to the Mentsikhang 
(traditional Tibetan medical center) in addition to performing rituals aimed at mitigating distress. 
            Many anthropologists have articulated the inaccuracy and artificial separation Western 
researchers tend to make between that which is “medical” and that which is “religious” when 
examining healing practices (Csordas 2002; Hopper 1991; Kleinman 1989). As Adams (2001) 
argues, the science or logic behind Tibetan medicine stems directly from Buddhist philosophy 
and maps onto the everyday; what might also be called the “popular religious imagination” 
(Pandolfo 2007:340). The concept of karma, or, “understandings of causality” (Craig et al. 
2010), has particular salience across medical, scientific, and religious spheres. And while 
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average community members often lack knowledge of technical medical concepts, karma is an 
integral aspect of everyday ontological concepts of reality—even if its metaphysical workings 
cannot be articulated.  
  While not all Tibetans actively maintain a religious practice, its influence—particularly in 
the realm of health and healing—is deeply infused in concepts of body, mind and personhood. 
Some community members who deem themselves very secular and do not engage in overt 
practice, at the same time may believe in karma and rebirth, concepts which are undoubtedly 
Buddhist. But while many previous studies have used the term "Buddhist" in a rather generic 
way, this project acknowledges that there is a wide range of beliefs and practices in this exile 
community. Both through participant observation and interview methodologies, I seek to 
investigate how these key features of Buddhism are re-enacted in everyday life.  
  With 30,000 monastics in exile, many living in the 14 monasteries and 3 nunneries in the 
greater-Dharamsala area (Central Tibetan Administration 2013), I collected data related to both 
the "high religion" of monks and nuns (Ortner 1989) as well as the more "vernacular" practices 
and beliefs of lay people. Generally only monastics engage in meditation and philosophical study 
of scriptures, whereas most lay Tibetans practice Buddhism through devotional practices 
(Harvey 2001; Martin 1994). But as Primiano warns, scholars who juxtapose "official" religion 
with "folk, 'unofficial,' or 'popular'…imply that religion somewhere exists as a pure element 
which is some way transformed, even contaminated, by its exposure to human communities" 
(1995:38-9). Taking heed of this pitfall, rather than conceptualizing Buddhism as something 
static and unchanging, I account for its dynamic and contextual influence. Through the use of 
extended observations and open-ended interviewing techniques, I allow my understanding of 
religious practice in this community to emerge from these data. In particular, I explore how these 
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various concepts and ideologies are expressed as “community” level ethos, and how these 
particular ethos might occasion resilience and coping among political refugees. These questions 
are explored through a multi-tiered ethnographic study.  
 
Study Design and Methodology 
Both qualitative and quantitative researchers might well be considered bricoleurs (Denzin and 
Lincoln 2000; Levi-Strauss 1966) who piece together myriad interpretations to craft a cohesive 
story. A highly reflexive and iterative process serves to help researchers engage directly with 
their interpretive frames, rather than trying to hide, minimize, or deny bias. As Linda Tuhiwai 
Smith (1999) has argued, the practice of “research,” itself is difficult to unravel from a 
colonialist project, particularly when collecting, analyzing and “writing up” knowledge about so-
called indigenous people around the world.  
  While living in this community, I conducted 14 months of extended participant 
observation in health clinics, social service organizations, political meetings, religious teachings, 
and community spaces. Much of my data was collected through everyday interactions, joining 
Tibetan neighbors and friends for meals, shopping, and accompanying them on daily visits to the 
Dalai Lama’s temple—the heart of Dharamsala where many community members gather to 
practice and socialize. Alongside participant observation I conducted semi-structured interviews 
with 80 Tibetans to better understand how in practice, exile members cope with adversity. 
Within this sample, 58 were community members who had experienced a range of difficulties in 
Tibet and during their subsequent journeys into exile; 22 were expert informants who helped me 
to understand the variety of help-seeking practices in Dharamsala. 
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  Community sample participants' ages range from 17-84 years old and includes equal 
numbers of men and women. Half the participants are "new arrivals," meaning they left Tibet 
less than five years prior to my arrival and half had been living in exile for a longer period. To 
capture the diversity within the greater Dharamsala area, home to 13 monasteries and 4 
nunneries, the community sample includes equal numbers of monastics and laypeople. 
Participants were recruited through personal contacts and modified snowball sampling 
techniques. Semi-structured interviews within this sample were conducted in Tibetan and 
focused on how community members understood and coped with difficulties in their lives. To 
avoid potential bias, participants were not prompted to discuss Buddhism, but rather were asked 
open-ended questions about leaving Tibet and the resettlement process. If participants mentioned 
that religion helped them cope, this topic was explored in more depth.  
            Expert informants were individuals whom community members visited for help in times 
of difficulty. The sample includes a group of religious practitioners, such as high lamas, oracles 
and lay tantric practitioners (ngakpas) (n=9), and a group of medical experts and social service 
providers such as allopathic doctors, traditional Tibetan doctors, nurses, and leaders of 
community organizations (n=13). Expert informants were recruited using purposive sampling 
procedures to capture a cross-section of “helpers” in the community. These semi-structured 
interviews focused on local idioms of mental distress, as well as coping methods and help-
seeking behaviors. Interview guides also engaged an open-ended discussion related to resilience 
in the exile community. Through employing multiple methods I sought out texture, depth and 
richness, in many cases, further engaging complexities as opposed to proving a hypothesis. 





Throughout this 14 month study I endeavored to learn how Tibetan exile members, in practice, 
cope in the face of adversity. I examined the potential pathways to resilience in the community, 
not only through asking people about their experiences but by observing, through social 
interaction, how Tibetans manage distress and hardship in the context of resettlement. I was 
interested in individual experiences, but also in resilience at the “community” level, both in 
terms of how cultural ethos shapes resilience and how this exile community itself has remained 
in existence for over fifty years. But as many anthropologists will attest (e.g. Briggs, 1986), 
simply asking informants to describe something like “cultural ethos” is likely to elicit only vague 
or misleading responses.  
  Participant observation allows researchers to collect data on what Bourdieu famously 
called habitus, those unarticulated areas of cultural life seen simply as "self-evident and 
undisputed," (1977:164), thus requiring methods capable of tapping these more implicit cultural 
beliefs. As Sanjek (1990) notes, one of the core strengths of participant observation is unusual 
attention to validity: day after day for a long period of time, ethnographers are presented with 
innumerable opportunities to test, refine, and if need be, modify their working hypotheses. 
Segmenting my sample allowed me to better understand how refugees at different stages in their 
resettlement, cope with adversity. These data and those collected through interviews informed 
one another; also serving as concurrent checks on working hypotheses, thus establishing a high 
degree of triangulation (Sanjek 1990; Wolcott 2001).   
  I spent extended time in the community, engaging with people in daily life—in tea shops, 
restaurants and other informal spaces. I also spent time at key community locations including: 1) 
the Dalai Lama’s temple complex, 2) daily “Dharma,” (Buddhist philosophy) teachings at the 
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Tibetan library, 3) the Khora (a half-mile loop leading to the Dalai Lama’s temple where 
practitioners circumambulate, chanting mantras, working with malas [prayer beads], prayer 
wheels, and performing prostrations), 4) political meetings and demonstrations, 5) waiting rooms 
and public spaces in clinics and social service organizations, 6) refugee reception center, and 7) 
market/tourism spaces. These spaces allowed me to participate in social interaction in an 
informal or everyday context. The Department of Health was open to me conducting observation 
at the Tibetan Torture Survivor’s Program; however, during my 14 month stay, it was more or 
less inactive. But while these specific observation sites provided crucial data, I also took 
seriously Lederman’s call for “proficiency in the informal” (2006), and developed close and 
meaningful relationships in the field.   
 
Sampling and Recruiting of Interviewees 
Having established rapport at the outset of the study through participant observation and more 
informal communication, I described the aims of the interviews, along with study procedures at 
key locations in the community. All Tibetans living in Dharamsala, India who: 1) were born in 
Tibet, 2) were at least 16 years-old, and 3) had the capacity to give assent and/or consent, were 
eligible to participate in interviews. While the initial intention for this project was to focus on 
community members who self-identify as political refugees, I quickly learned that this 
distinction makes little sense from the local point of view. For example, I interviewed many 
community members who had been arrested and imprisoned, and yet they did not consider 
themselves “ex-political prisoners,” a term that seemed to be reserved for very severe sentences 
(however even torture-survivors often expressed that others were much worse off). Those who 
came for economic and educational reasons also saw this as inherently political, claiming that 
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business opportunities are heavily controlled by Chinese who would not hire Tibetans. As well, 
many see the conversion of Tibetan schools to Chinese-speaking and run schools as cultural 
persecution.  
  While previous researchers have done little to account for differences across the Tibetan 
exile population, mistakenly conceiving of the community as rather static and uniform, I 
constructed my sample to reflect the diversity within Dharamsala. There were differences, both 
in terms of trauma exposure and in coping methods, between newly arrived refugees and those 
who have lived in exile for some time. Therefore, roughly half my sample included members 
who migrated less than five years ago, and the other more than five years ago. Half the sample 
were men and the other women. The sample includes a mix of laypeople, monks and nuns to 
accurately reflect the unique makeup of this population. Through a modified snowball sampling 
technique, I relied heavily on my community affiliates to help in the recruitment of this diverse 
sample. The recruiting strategy was developed collaboratively with my local research assistant
4
 
to ensure the process was culturally appropriate and of limited intrusiveness. For instance, he 
stressed the importance of describing the study and asking permission from the abbots of 
monasteries and nunneries before conducting interviews. All the abbots with whom we spoke 
were enthusiastic about the study, and introduced us to prospective participants. As will be 
described in detail below, interview data were collected in two phases. While participants were 
sampled along the same matrix (see table 1), participants in phase one were different from those 
recruited to participate in phase two.   
 
 
                                                        
4
 I do not name my research assistant. He has been in Dharamsala for nearly 18 years and has applied for, and been 
denied, a Chinese visa numerous times at the consulate in New Delhi. He hopes to return to Tibet before his parents 
die. Association with a foreign researcher could rouse suspicion that he is engaging in “political activism” against 
the Chinese. Although I wish to acknowledge his excellent work, I promised I would not identify him by name. 
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Table 1: Sampling Matrix  
 
Expert Informants 
Religious Experts/Leaders 9 
Medical/Social Service Practitioners 13 
Community Members 





















TOTAL   80 
 
Data Collection 
The aim of interviews was to better understand processes of resilience and coping in this 
community. I conducted interviews in two phases: 1a) Through a free-listing methodology, I 
conducted a cultural “domain analysis” with approximately 36 participants to determine what the 
term “resilience,” means in this context, 1b) In these same interviews I also identified salient 
coping methods and behaviors; 2) through these data collected in Phase 1, I constructed a semi-
structured interview guide. Using this guide I conducted interviews with 46 additional expert 
informants and community members to learn about experiences of resilience and coping in the 
context of resettlement. The interview guide was developed to investigate not only individual 
experiences, but also to explore how cultural ethos could shape community resilience.   
  Data collection for Phase 1 took approximately 5 months. The remaining 9 months in the 
field were devoted to Phase 2. I reviewed the study objectives and the informed consent 
procedures before starting the interview, including the right to decline participation, or decline 
tape-recording. The Columbia University IRB as well as local study sponsors, allowed me to 
waive usual consent procedures with minors, such as obtaining the consent of guardians. Consent 
30 
 
of guardians was not obtained because of infeasibility; many newly arrived youth come to 
Dharamsala alone, while their guardians remain in Tibet. Instead, verbal consent was obtained 
from school principals or monastery/nunnery abbots, along with assent of the minor. Interviews 
were tape-recorded. 
 Interviews were conducted in Tibetan by myself and my Tibetan research assistant. The 
help of my local assistant was useful in making sure my use of Tibetan language was adequate, 
but his presence was also helpful in making participants feel more comfortable. Unlike in some 
other settings, Tibetans seemed uncomfortable with very private interviews, and often preferred 
semi-private settings with others present or nearby. Some monks and nuns asked if their 
roommates could stay in the room. As well, many laypeople requested their spouse or children 
remain present. The presence of my assistant facilitated more of a relaxed group discussion, 
rather than a “sterile” or overly “professional” one-on-one interview—which some may have 
experienced as too much like police interrogation. As Csordas et al. (2010) assert, the context of 
interviews to a great degree, shapes the depth and authenticity of conversations.  
 
Phase 1a:  At the beginning of the study I conducted a cultural “domain analysis,” to determine 
the variety of meanings of “resilience” in this community. While this project engages current 
resilience and coping literature in anthropology and related disciplines, it was important to 
explore actual “emic,” or local constructs, which I did through a free listing method. Free listing 
is a basic ethnographic tool for defining semantic domains that is particularly useful during 
exploratory phases of research (Bernard 2005; Brewer 2002; Thompson and Juan 2006). 
Semantic domains are defined as “an organized set of words, concepts, or sentences, all at the 
same level of contrast, that jointly refer to a single conceptual sphere” (Weller and Romney 
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1988:9). This method is particularly useful in eliciting “cultural knowledge” (Handwerker 2002; 
Thompson and Juan 2006); in this case, how Tibetans define resilience, and how they would 
identify someone who maintains a sense of wellbeing despite potentially destabilizing life 
events. I constructed a sample of 36 informants, which included expert informants (N=12) and 
community members (N=24). Expert informants included a representative sample of medical 
practitioners, expert religious practitioners, social service workers, and Tibetan NGO workers.  
  I asked each participant to respond to the following question: “Many people experience 
different kinds of suffering in life. But what would lead you to believe that someone is doing 
okay, despite their problems?” The kinds of responses that one might expect in Euro-American 
contexts, such as: “They are able to work.” “They are able to care for their children.” “They 
maintain friendships,” were not salient responses among study participants. In other words, 
idioms and concepts of resilience are not necessarily the same across cultures.  
  I encouraged participants to generate an exhaustive list in responding to the question 
above, as experts in free listing argue that informants often do not list exhaustively. To combat 
these issues, I utilized three supplementary techniques as outlined by Brewer (2002): 1) 
nonspecific prompting, 2) reading back to informants the items free listed, and 3) using free 
listed items as semantic cues.   
  Researchers who use free listing methods cite different ways to determine saliency across 
respondents. Through the use of the computer software ANTHROPAC, I used an analytic 
technique which takes into account both the frequency and priority of listed items. Items with the 
greatest salience are those that respondents list most commonly and that respondents tend to 
recall more immediately than other items (Borgatti 1992; Thompson and Juan 2006). After 
entering responses into an Excel spreadsheet, this software allowed me to systematically identify 
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the most salient features of this construct, “resilience,” within the cultural domain (Borgatti 
1996).   
 
Phase 1b:  Within this same sample and during the same interview, following the free list 
exercise I asked participants to complete one more task related to specific coping methods.  
“Coping” refers to behaviors or practices one relies on to mitigate the effects of suffering and 
hardship (Lazarus and Folkman 1984). These methods were developed specifically to avoid 
dichotomous questions, which tend to shut down expression (Patton 2002:354). When asking 
something like: have you experienced trauma? Tibetans will almost invariably say “no.” To 
avoid this, I asked them to describe three of four difficult experiences they have had in their 
lives. Within the question, there is a presupposition that everyone deals with difficulty from time 
to time. Community members were asked to generate examples from their own lives, whereas 
expert informants were asked to generate scenarios typical of community members with whom 
they work. Responses included: “I recently lost a family member.” “I became ill.” “I was 
imprisoned before escaping into exile.” “Out of fear for their safety, I cannot communicate with 
family members left in Tibet.” “I witnessed violence.”  After participants generated a list, I asked 
them to describe for each, how they (or typical community members for expert informant 
interviews) coped with these circumstances. Whereas Phase 1a focused on “resilience,” the 
primary aim of Phase 1b was to develop a greater understand of local forms of “coping,” a 
related but distinct term.   
  Although I was particularly interested in understanding the role of Buddhism as it relates 
to coping and resilience, the methods in Phase 1 were intentionally crafted to avoid leading 
questions about religion. These open-ended methods allowed for participants, themselves, to 
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discuss (or not) how their religious practice acts a pathway to resilience. If participants did not 
mention Buddhism, but other pathways to resilience (e.g. social support, political identity as a 
Tibetan exile member, economic stability) this not only deepened my understanding of 
resettlement in this community, but it gave me useful data for understanding the range and 
variety of Buddhist practices across the sample. The open-ended nature of these methods also 
allowed for members to describe sources of resilience across a number of domains, including 
psychological, familial/social, and community-wide. From these data, particular patterns among 
certain groups begin to emerge, such as differences in terms of seeking social support. 
 
Phase 2:  Using the data collected in Phase 1, I developed a semi-structured interview guide to be 
utilized in Phase 2: interviews with expert informants (N=12) and community members (N=34) 
to examine more fully the processes of coping and resilience in the context of resettlement. By 
applying what I learned about how Tibetans conceive of “resilience,” and what coping methods 
seem most salient, to whom, and under what circumstances, my interview schedule was tailored 
to the specific discourses and practices of this community. Furthermore, interviews occurred 
alongside ongoing participant observation, giving me the additional perspective of observing 
these phenomena through social interaction in everyday life. Ongoing fieldwork dovetailed with 
the development of more structured work insofar as I was able to systematically identify key 
themes related to resilience and coping. If truly a salient theme, it should have emerged in both 
participant observation and open-ended preliminary interviews and free-listing, suggesting it 
should have been further engaged through semi-structured interviews. The development of the 
interview guide was iterative and dialectic, meaning through ongoing observation and open-
ended interviews, my hypotheses and preliminary findings were refined.  
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  Expert informant interviews were crucial in helping me to gain a broader sense of how 
community members work with suffering in the context of resettlement. Expert informants 
included Tibetan doctors and other health care workers, traditional healers, social service 
providers, lamas, and other religious practitioners. I included in my sample a mix of expert 
informants who had lived in Dharamsala for a number of years, and asked them to describe how 
they typically help political refugees, and how that has changed over time. For example, I asked 
doctors if they find they are prescribing more medicines that “calm the winds” (often indicative 
of mental distress) than in the past. Do they find that in situations where years ago members 
would first consult the lama, they are now going to the doctor? These interviews focused broadly 
on how political refugees seek services across different domains and how healing “professionals” 
understand mental distress and coping behaviors.     
  Drawing upon what I learned in Phase 1, I constructed a separate semi-structured 
interview guide to shape in-depth interviews with community members. Here I asked specific 
questions related to suffering and coping behaviors, but I also asked more subtle questions such 
as, “did you have to visit the doctor or the lama?”  Often if asked directly, some Tibetans will 
deny experiencing any mental distress, but then later report needing to go to the doctor or a lama 
for a variety of symptoms (difficulty sleeping, somatic pain, and various problems with rlung 
“inner winds”).  There was also tension in terms of asking direct questions about Buddhism. On 
the one hand, there are many Western Buddhist practitioners and tourists seeking retreats and 
teachings in Dharamsala, so there was a risk that community members will simply tell me what 
they think I want to hear. On the other hand, they might omit important aspects of Buddhism as it 
relates to coping—such as compassion and accumulation of merit—if they thought I would not 
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understand. Therefore, I asked open-ended questions that were not leading in regard to religion; 
if the topic was mentioned, I engaged the discussion to understand the nuances of the response.  
  The average initial interview lasted between 60 and 90 minutes, but this was modified 
when needed. Although I developed a semi-structured guide, my interview style was relatively 
open ended. An open ended approach allowed me to generate data that were less subject to 
response bias; this approach was also more culturally appropriate than asking very specific or 
hypothetical questions. As Craig et al. (2010) assert, in the Tibetan context, seemingly innocuous 
hypotheticals as: (“imagine a family member or friend became mentally ill. What would you 
do?”) are locally ill-advised. Many Tibetans believe that speaking about such occurrences 
actually “invites” them. I found that a very open ended approach occasioned Tibetans to feel at 
ease in discussing their own experiences, along with actual examples they know of in the 
community.       
 
Data Analysis and Dissemination 
The “dialectical” nature of ethnographic production (Wolcott 2001) means that analysis took 
place concurrent with data collection. I generated descriptive fieldnotes daily over 14 months, 
which were analytically coded on an ongoing basis. I systematically reviewed fieldnotes, 
observation memos, and interview transcripts (in Tibetan and in English) throughout the data 
collection period to identify new leads, unforeseen (or, at the time, undetected) omissions, 
puzzling contradictions, and ambiguities in the interest of optimizing data quality. Ongoing 
interpretive analysis allowed me to identify themes that emerge across observational and 
interview data; those themes, in turn, helped refine and redirect interview protocols. A major 
strength of ethnographic work is its iterative nature, meaning research questions are repeatedly 
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and systematically reformulated throughout the data collection process. The research evolves as 
the investigator develops greater understanding of the research question and of the community 
(Emerson et al. 1995; Ware et al. 2003). The upshot is not only more valid and reliable data, but 
depth and texture that would be difficult to attain through other methods.   
  Using Charmaz’s (2008) notion of “open coding,” to minimize preconceived ideas about 
the research problem and the data, I scanned fieldnotes for data which both confirmed and 
challenged working hypotheses. As the fieldwork and coding process continued, I began to 
develop what Emerson et al. (1995) refer to as integrative memos, or theoretical categories, 
topics, and themes, which emerge from these data. These memos helped me to develop a 
“focused” coding schema, through which I theorized the data to both address the central research 
questions driving this project and, more broadly, generate theory of relevance to cultural and 
medical anthropology.  
  Issues of reliability and validity in ethnographic research must be given special 
consideration. Interviews were coded alongside fieldnotes with the aim of systematically 
checking for the consistency and clarity of (as well as tensions within) data. I also on an ongoing 
basis engaged in member checking, or a systematic process by which the researcher confirms his 
or her understanding of concepts, events and interactions with informants. Rather than 
conducting several interviews at once before transcribing and coding them, I continually 
analyzed interviews on an ongoing basis in order to: 1) refine the interview schedule, 2) check 
their intelligibility against data collected through other methods, and 3) develop preliminary 
findings and theories.  As with fieldnotes, transcripts were coded using a focused coding 
approach, categorizing data into sets of themes. These line-by-line codes coalesced into 
theoretical integrative memos, which ultimately informed the study results. Transcripts were 
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analyzed not only in terms of evidence that supports preliminary hypotheses, but also with a 
careful eye towards data that disconfirmed hypotheses. But rather than treating discrepant 
findings as problematic, I interpreted tensions in the data as reflections of diversity or even 
conflicts within the sample. 
            Collecting data in this community required heightened security to protect participants as 
well as their families back in Tibet. I worked closely with the Columbia University Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) to develop a systematic plan for swiftly removing fieldnotes and interview 
transcriptions from my hard-drive, including sending raw data to a password-protected electronic 
archive on a secure server.   
            All interviews were transcribed in Tibetan by my local research assistant. After 
transcription my assistant and I collaboratively translated each transcript into English. Using 
Atlas.ti software, I used open coding procedures to analyze fieldnotes and interview transcripts, 
generating key themes related to resilience and coping.  
 
Introduction to Chapters 
Below I present an introduction to the chapters of the dissertation and highlight the significance 
of this work. The Tibetan concept of resilience is more an active process than a personality 
attribute. Seeing emotions as impermanent and changing, Tibetans living in exile are reticent to 
dwell on distress, which seems only to stagnate or prolong suffering. Rather than processing the 
details of traumatic events, members of this community attempt to transform distress through 
cultural practices that emphasize compassion and impermanence. Many forms of coping in 
Dharamsala work to create a greater sense of spaciousness, openness and flexibility within the 
mind—qualities associated with resilience and wellbeing. In practicing flexibility, the durability 
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of negative emotions is diminished, such that the usual encoding of trauma is derailed and 
disrupted.  
   In Chapter 2, I explore in greater detail, the setting of the study and context of the 
research problem. I introduce Tibetan political history from the early 1900s until present day, 
with particular emphasis on political activism, including recent self-immolations. In this chapter 
I render the actual setting, describing Dharamsala itself, and how this small hill-station has 
changed over the last 50 years. The identity and meaning of being a refugee living in exile varies 
across this “community,” which some researchers have mistakenly characterized as static and 
uniform. To situate the research problem in ethnographic context, I conclude this chapter by 
introducing key concepts in Tibetan medicine, as well as local healing practices.  
            In the next chapter, “Trauma and the Making of Flexible Minds,” I explore concepts of 
trauma within Dharamsala. I show how while the concept of trauma is elaborated through 
institutional and public manipulation of traumatic images and narratives as a political device, 
Tibetan community members seem to experience forms of distress that are unlike Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder. Chapter 3 traces the genealogy of PTSD and uses theory on “looping” to 
explicate the dynamic interplay between self and society. I understand the Tibetan experience as 
an alternative form of looping to generate what is known as a “spacious and flexible mind.” To 
cultivate this inner environment Tibetans utilize cultural practices such as lojong (mind-training), 
that I theorize as technologies of resilience. Finally, this chapter concludes with a discussion on 
karma and its role in shaping basic ontological and epistemological assumptions in this 
community. 
  In Chapter 4, “Theories of Mind, Memory and Temporality,” I engage central debates 
within the trauma and memory studies literature. Exploring what I call the (im)persistence of 
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memory, I argue that Dharamsala is more accurately characterized as a landscape or geography 
of resilience than despair because of cultural concepts of time, temporality and memory. I argue 
that the flexible and spacious minds Tibetans describe as “resilience” are made possible through 
cultural understandings of “emptiness” and “impermanence”—qualities of space and time. The 
resistance to constructing solid interpretations or narratives of suffering—freedom from 
fixation—raises a number of questions about the architecture of memory and its role in recovery 
and resilience. 
  To situate this project within related work on global health, Chapter 5 explores a series of 
epistemological and well as practical dilemmas in the development of research studies and 
interventions among those exposed to political violence. The results of this study challenge a 
number of assumptions that are often made, even among researchers interested in “cultural 
expression” of trauma. I consider the effects of NGOs, volunteers, and international human rights 
discourse in Dharamsala, which are sometimes at odds with local cultural concepts and practices. 
I challenge what is meant by those who advocate a Think Locally, Act Globally perspective, and 
offer a contribution to an engaged and critical global mental health agenda. 
  Finally, the discussion and conclusion, “Agency and the Open Sky of Mind” explores the 
overall significance of the project including some ideas for future research. I review the recent 
surge in studies investigating the clinical uses of meditation and mindfulness, asking whether the 
“tricks of culture” can be on loan. I problematize the use of Tibetan Buddhist practices outside 
their local contexts, but also consider promising avenues for integrating contemplative 
perspectives into mental health research and practice. I conclude by demonstrating how the 
results of this study broaden current understandings of human agency and freedom; this 
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perspective moves beyond the “social suffering” paradigm and opens new possibilities for 
studies on collective or social resilience. 
  Usual paradigms of social suffering, structural violence, and even the “subjectivities” 
literatures within anthropology are limited theoretical frameworks within which to situate 
Tibetan experiences of coping and resilience. I will argue that social suffering and structural 
violence frameworks are predicated on the notion that individuals are entitled to health and 
happiness, and that those who are self-sufficient, self-reliant, and autonomous represent the 
healthiest members of society. The “violence” of structural factors otherwise constrains the 
agency of oppressed individuals.  
  Although the political situation in Tibet could certainly be understood in these terms, this 
theoretical frame loses some traction when confronted with Tibetan concepts of health where the 
site of intervention is better understood as a lessening of inner rather than outer constraints 
(Adams 1998). I suggest that Tibetans place an unusually high premium on what might be 
thought of as “inner agency” or inner freedom. In this context, the most resilient individuals are 
those who are compassionate, selfless, and have a spacious or flexible way of understanding 
difficulty in life. They see suffering as a natural part of life and might even see traumatic events 
as opportunities for purifying karma and generating compassion and wisdom.  
 
Significance 
Some psychological anthropologists (e.g., Csordas 1983; Seligman and Kirmayer 2008) argue 
that healing can come from a reframing or reorientation towards suffering. However, in many 
cases this reframing is implicit or symbolic, as in various types of religious healing (Lester 2005; 
Seligman 2010). Here, Tibetans are quite explicit in their goal: to mitigate suffering, one needs to 
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reframe one's relationship to adversity and negative emotions. The end result of this reframing is 
a greater sense of space and flexibility within the mind—qualities, my Tibetan interlocutors 
argue are important features of resilience.  
            A number of studies find that despite a high prevalence of potentially traumatizing events 
(imprisonment, torture, religious and cultural persecution, mass displacement), rates of 
psychological distress are extremely low, and that coping activities (primarily religious) 
appeared to mediate the psychological effects of trauma. Despite the robustness of these 
findings, some question whether these Tibetan respondents are truly “resilient,” or if they simply 
avoid identifying symptoms of mental distress. Some scholars are skeptical about just how 
genuine these low levels of psychological distress might be, arguing there is response bias—seen 
as the only logical explanation for calm and cool recounting of severe adversity, such as torture 
and imprisonment. Rather than ascribing to binary reasoning (e.g. either Tibetans are extremely 
resilient and “bounce back” in the face of difficulty or they repress emotions and deny pain), I 
take a more nuanced look at processes of coping and resilience, coming to see resilience as a 
learned process and moral practice. Tibetans actively deploy shared cultural understandings, 
often infused with Buddhist doctrine, to reframe the mental distress associated with loss, 
violence, and other distressing experiences. These cultural practices encourage letting go of 
distress rather than holding on or solidifying it.  
  The findings of this study contribute to emerging perspectives on collective resilience, 
particularly in terms of what Saul (2014) refers to as a “creative and emergent process; its 
content and form are constructed over time through cycles of collective action, reflection, and 
narration” (2014:2). I consider how the “resilience imaginary,” the atmosphere in which moral 
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sensibilities arise, is shaped by cultural understandings of the function of memory and cultivated 
























Chapter 2) Little Lhasa: Identity and Meaning in India 
Tibetans began escaping to Dharamsala, a town located in the foothills of the Himalayas in the 
Northern Indian state of Himachal Pradesh ten years after the Chinese first invaded Tibet in 
1949. When the Dalai Lama fled to India, 85,000 Tibetans followed (Ketzer & Crescenzi 2002). 
Temples, monasteries, and Buddhist artifacts were destroyed and many forms of Tibetan culture 
(particularly religious) remain restricted or banned. Approximately 1.2 million Tibetans have 
died in Tibet since 1949 due to persecution, imprisonment, torture and famine and it is estimated 
that over 6000 of Tibet’s religious and cultural monuments have been destroyed (Ketzer and 
Crescenzi 2002). When the Dalai Lama settled in Dharamsala in the early 1960s he established 
the Tibetan government-in-exile along with the Central Tibetan Administration, a central body 
composed of specialized departments including the Department of Security, Department of 
Education, and Department of Health. Dharamsala is home to approximately 7,000 Tibetans, 
with several hundred more arriving every year (Ketzer and Crescenzi 2002). There are various 
reasons for leaving Tibet, including: education or economic reasons, to escape persecution, to 
join a monastery/nunnery, and to meet the Dalai Lama (Sachs et al. 2008). Many Tibetans come 
to the exile community destitute and uneducated; some have been political prisoners and 
survivors of torture. But while the exile community in Dharamsala is well established, India does 
not formally recognize the Tibetan government-in-exile as a legitimate government; nor are 
Tibetan refugees given legal Indian citizenship. Despite such hardships, many Tibetans on both 






Tibetan Political History 
Before the Chinese military moved into Tibet in 1949, it was politically, culturally and 
economically, an independent country. However, as many scholars note (Dreyfus 2003; 
McGranahan 2010; Samuel 1993), in pre-modern Tibet, there was a “semi-bureaucratic” 
governance (Samuel 1993), marked by regional and religious alliances. Tibet’s exact geographic 
boundaries are contested and varied across historical maps. But most regional provinces fell 
under the rule of the Dalai Lama’s administration in Lhasa, beginning with the 5
th
 Dalai Lama 
and extending to the present—the 14
th
 Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso (McGranahan 2010). Of the 
four schools of Tibetan Buddhism (Gelug, Kagyu, Nyingma and Sakya), the lineage of the Dalai 
Lamas is associated with Gelugpa traditions. Throughout Tibet’s history, the rise and fall of 
these various Buddhist schools was synonymous with political rule. Systems of governance were 
not uniform in Tibet; some regions were governed as kingdoms, others as chiefdoms, and some 
were simply ruled by religious leaders (McGranahan 2010).     
By 1949, recently coming into power, Chairman Mao Zedong announced his intention to 
“liberate” Tibet. Despite an appeal by the Tibetan government to both the United States and 
Great Britain to support their application for membership in the United Nations, little was done 
to stop the People’s Republic of China, which was rapidly becoming a world power. The United 
States, focused on the Korean War, did not speak out against the invasion. However, as 
McGranahan details in her recent book, the United States has a long history of working quietly 
behind the scenes for the Tibetan political cause, including covert CIA training of Tibetan 
civilian militia. In 1950, forty thousand troops moved into Tibet, prompting the state oracle
5
, to  
                                                        
5
 “Oracles,” or monastics or lay tantric practitioners who go into trance and become possessed by particular deities. 
The deity pehar has long possessed the Nechung Oracle, which historically consults closely the lineage of the Dalai 
Lamas. To this day, the Dalai Lama and the government-in-exile parliament members in Dharamsala consult the 
Nechung Oracle before making important political decisions. 
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determine that because of the mounting political crisis, the 16 year-old Dalai Lama should 
assume power immediately rather than waiting as was custom until age eighteen (McGranahan 
2010). Despite a number of appeals to the United Nations, the international community did not 
intervene, and over the next decade Tibet was systematically taken over by China. 
By 1959, the Dalai Lama, in a disguise, fled to India. The journey took three weeks by 
horseback, traversing the Himalayas. Over the next several years, 80,000 Tibetans followed the 
Dalai Lama, the political and spiritual leader of Tibet, into exile. The Dalai Lama and his people 
were welcomed into India by Prime Minister Nehru, who provided the Tibetan leader and his 
people a safe haven in Dharamsala, a hill-station town in the Northern state of Himachal 
Pradesh, which during the time of British rule served as a military cantonment. Twelve hours 
from New Delhi, Dharamsala is remote and mountainous, lying at the foothills of the Himalayas. 
Figure 1: Dharamsala 
 
Photo by the author 
The flow of Tibetans out of the Tibetan plateau has fluctuated widely over the last sixty 
years, but it is estimated that nearly 150,000 are living “in exile,” in India, Nepal, Bhutan, and 
elsewhere across the globe. Although it is difficult to document current trends in the diaspora, it 
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is estimated that approximately 3,000-4,000 Tibetans leave the country illegally each year 
(International Campaign for Tibet 2013). 
Central Tibet today spans an area of China known as the TAR—Tibetan Autonomous 
Region; much of Eastern Tibet, Amdo and Kham (see map below), have been incorporated into 
the Gansu, Yunnan, Sichuan and Qinghai provinces. The official statement from the Chinese 
government is that Tibet has always been a part of China, thus justifying the invasion. 
McGranahan (2010) argues that in these early days of the political conflict, Tibetans resisted the 
characterization of the struggle as a violation of individual or human rights, instead, insisting that 
the focal problem was to regain the sovereignty of the Tibetan state.  




Beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the government-in-exile, led by the Dalai 
Lama, attempted to engage China in a series of peaceful negotiations. Despite being termed the 
“Tibetan Autonomous Region,” the government-in-exile noted that Tibetans continued to be 
victims of religious, cultural and ethnic persecution. The Dalai Lama hoped that through 
compromise and peaceful dialogue an agreement could be reached. He along with the kashag 
(cabinet) developed what is known as the “Middle Way Policy,” which does not ask for 
independence, but rather “meaningful autonomy.” The policy outlines the following: 
The Central Government of the People’s Republic of China has the responsibility for the 
political aspects of Tibet’s international relations and defense, whereas the Tibetan 
people should manage all other affairs pertaining to Tibet, such as religion and culture, 
education, economy, health, ecological and environmental protection; The Chinese 
government should stop its policy of human rights violations in Tibet and the transfer of 
Chinese population into Tibetan areas; To resolve the issue of Tibet, His Holiness the 
Dalai Lama shall take the main responsibility of sincerely pursuing negotiations and 
reconciliation with the Chinese government. [Dalai Lama 2013] 
 
However, the People’s Republic of China has refused to enter into dialogue with the Tibetan 
government-in-exile, maintaining that the Dalai Lama is a terrorist who encourages “separatism” 
among Tibetans (who should pled allegiance to the Chinese government). Despite wide 
admiration for the Dalai Lama across the globe, there are no countries that recognize the Tibetan 
government-in-exile as a legitimate government. Exile communities in India are thriving; 
however, Tibetans living in India are not granted citizenship. Tibetans must obtain a residential 
certificate (RC), which must be renewed every year. Some Tibetans who are born in India are 
able to procure Indian passports.  
48 
 
Figure 3: Tibetan monks waiting to renew their RC 
 
Photo Credit: Tibet.net 
The Tibetan government-in-exile, housed in Dharamsala is composed of the kashag 
(executive cabinet) and 44-member parliament. At his own urging
6
, the Dalai Lama relinquished 
his title as political leader of Tibet, and pushed the government leaders to develop a secular and 
democratic political system. In 2011, the Sikyong (political leader), Lobsang Sangye, a Harvard 
educated lawyer, was elected to the cabinet as the prime minister and new political leader of the 
Tibetan people. The Dalai Lama remains a spiritual leader of Tibet. 
One might ask why China cares so much about Tibet. It is first important to recognize 
that there are dozens of “Tibets,” meaning that various territories throughout Mongolia, Russia 
                                                        
6
 Many Tibetan people did not want the Dalai Lama to relinquish his political authority, but followed suit and 
participated in elections on the Dalai Lama’s urging. 
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and the South China Sea (not to mention controversy over Taiwan) have been annexed to 
Mainland China over the last fifty years in a variety of land disputes. Because of the fascination 
with Tibetan Buddhism and admiration of the Dalai Lama, Tibet remains notable on the world 
stage. Today, Tibet is valuable because it offers space and untapped territory for Han Chinese 
settlers; in the 1970s Tibet’s vast, open space was used for different purposes: the storage of 
nuclear weapons. There is also an abundance of natural resources in Tibet, such as lithium, 
copper and rare minerals. It also houses a great mass of underground water. Recently, China has 
built a series of hydro-electric dams on rivers in Tibet to export electricity back to Chinese cities. 
Many Tibetan activists today have become increasingly concerned with the environmental 
destruction of the land; for instance, many are protesting the development of a hydro-electric 
construction project on Yamdrok Tso, a sacred lake between Lhasa and Shikatse (The 
International Campaign for Tibet 2014).  
There are also cultural reasons that China is concerned with Tibet. The Tibetan people 
are counted as one of 55 ethnic minority groups within the Han-dominated People’s Republic of 
China. Besides so-called “ethnic” issues, Tibet has long been a source of tension because of the 
pervasiveness of religion. As mentioned above, not all Tibetans are religious; however Buddhist 
holidays, rituals, and institutions, such as monasteries are central forces in everyday Tibetan life. 
Local monasteries and nunneries hold a great deal of responsibility within communities, such as 
daily rituals to appease local deities and managing the care of those who died. Lay Tibetans also 
make offerings to monasteries to perform purification practices on their behalf in times of 
sickness, financial hardship, or suspicion of spirit harm. Unlike in other religious traditions 
where monasticism is dying out, the tradition in Tibet remains strong. Many families will send at 
least one child to a monastery or nunnery. It is also not unusual for Tibetans to spend some part 
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of their youth as a monk or nun, where they receive an education and a great mass of merit (good 
karma). It makes little sense to divorce cultural life in Tibet from Buddhism.   
It is estimated that nearly 4,000 monasteries, nunneries, and religious monuments have 
been destroyed across the Tibetan Plateau. This was done to “modernize” Tibet and, particularly 
during the time of the Cultural Revolution, to liberate its people from the “opiate” of religion. 
Initiatives to modernize and develop Tibet continue today. With a railroad now joining Beijing to 
Lhasa (a 48-hour journey), Han Chinese are rapidly moving in to the region as they enjoy 
economic incentives to work and settle in the TAR. Many community members in Dharamsala 
described how difficult it was to get work without good Chinese language skills, and those who 
found work, made much lower wages than their Han Chinese peers. 
Across the Tibetan plateau, the People’s Republic of China continues to threaten human 
rights, including the right to religious and cultural freedom. The degree of persecution is 
variable, however, and many Tibetans live good, self-determined lives without discrimination. In 
many regions of the TAR and within the eastern provinces, there are restrictions on Tibetan 
cultural practices (particularly those that are religious in nature), prompting many Tibetans and 
Tibet supporters to characterize China’s political activities within Tibet as a “cultural genocide.” 
For example, many Tibetan schools have been converted to Chinese-speaking schools, and in 
some areas, teaching classes in the Tibetan language is forbidden by law. It is dangerous for 
Tibetans to publically display photos of the Dalai Lama in their places of business, for example, 
which might be interpreted as political activism against the state.  
Nearly all the major Tibetan monasteries have relocated to India (Sera, Gandan, Drepung, 
Kirti, Namgyal) or Nepal (Shechen). Local monasteries across Tibet are still functioning, but 
many have restrictions on how many monks can be there at a time. There are also reports of re-
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education campaigns, particularly in rural regions of Kham and Amdo. At any given time there 
seems to be friction between the monasteries and Chinese authorities somewhere within Tibet. 
For example, at the very end of December 2013 protests erupted in Driru county after Drongna 
monastery was closed following the arrest of Kalsang Dhondrup, the monastery’s debate master. 
It is unknown what the charges are (Phayul 2014), but some reports indicate that the monasteries 
and local villagers refused to fly the red communist flags that were issued to them. After a 
number of monks failed interviews to assess their political allegiance, two more monasteries in 
the Nagchu region, Tarmoe and Rabten, were also shut down (Tibetan Review 2014).  
Since the early 1950s, it is estimated that hundreds of thousands (some reports suggest 
nearly one million) of Tibetans have been imprisoned for engaging in “separatist” political 
activities, such as distributing pro-independence literature, displaying the Tibetan flag and 
images of the Dalai Lama, and more recently, involvement in a self-immolation. Tibetans who 
try to leave illegally may also be arrested by Chinese or Nepali border police. Not all who are 
imprisoned in Chinese prisoners are tortured. However, the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights found torture, particular among monks and nuns, to be widespread (United Nations 2013). 
Torture activities include beatings, exposure to severe cold, being forced to stare at the sun for 
extended periods, starvation, suspension in the air, attacks by dogs, solitary confinement, and 
sexual assault (Hooberman et al. 2007; Tibet Online 2013); some report being forced to watch 
others being tortured, such as watching others receive electric shocks, as a warning (Benedict et 
al. 2009). Many found being forced to denounce the Dalai Lama, even to stomp on his 
photograph, to be particularly devastating. 
The importance of the Dalai Lama to the Tibetan people cannot be overstated. In 
interviews with foreign journalists, public talks in English, and religious teachings given in 
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Tibetan, the Dalai Lama—His Holiness, as he is often called—tirelessly reminds his audience 
that he is a “simple Buddhist monk.” While arguably one of the most widely recognized world 
leaders alive today, he is a man who was born to a humble nomad family living in a tent in 
Eastern Tibet. As a Nobel Prize laureate and admired world figure, his central message to his 
audience is the interconnectedness of all sentient beings. Despite his fame, he still lives within 
the walls of Namgyal Monastery and wakes each day at 3:30am to engage in several hours of 
meditation and compassion practices. But while the Dalai Lama emphasizes that he is no 
different from other “simple Buddhist monks” at heart, he remarkably relates to a vast array of 
situations—from meetings at the White House to audiences with poor Indian families who travel 
days by bus to seek his council. “The Dalai Lama is vitally aware of his own multiplicity of 
identities” (Thurman 2008:14). Politicians, religious leaders, and scientists across the globe have 
developed collaborative partnerships with the Dalai Lama. For instance, he has teamed with 
Emory University in starting the “Science for Monks Program,” which brings American senior 
scientists to monasteries and nunneries in India to help introduce science into monastic 
education.  
During my time in the field I once had the opportunity to visit the Dalai Lama’s private 
residence and speak with him for five minutes. He held my hand (as he often does with whom he 
speaks) and said, “you are a researcher. This is good. Very good!” He then took the next few 
minutes to give me a short talk explaining how the Buddha was a scientist. “Buddhism,” he said, 
“it is better to think of it as a science—not a religion. You have to closely investigate and ask 
questions. The Buddha said not to accept anything on blind faith. We have to check and 
investigate for ourselves. All scientists and researchers are doing the same. You foreigners are 
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very good, very intelligent, about investigating outer reality. And we Tibetans have excelled in 
studying inner reality—the mind.”  
The Dalai Lama often argues that there is always common ground to be found—even 
with supposed “enemies.” He has worked tirelessly to engage the Chinese government in 
peaceful dialogue while at the same time vehemently opposing and criticizing the human rights 
abuses that take place there. And yet, when asked by journalists about the situation involving 
“the Chinese,” he is quick to point out the distinction between the Chinese people and 
government policies, usually noting that most Chinese people are intelligent, reasonable and 
kind-hearted. He cautions against equating government policies with individual people. His 
unique messages often challenge false dichotomies, encouraging his audience to relate to others 
first and foremost as decent people who, just like us, only want to be happy. In a televised 
interview, the Dalai Lama was asked by Pierce Morgan to describe a person who has most 
impressed him over the years. His response, which shocked an incredulous Morgan, is 
emblematic of his style of teaching: 
I think…Nelson Mandela; he is quite impressive. And then, then of course as an 
individual person, I love President Bush. Which one? The younger one. Really? Yes! 
Really? Really? Yes. Not as president of America, but as a human being. Sometimes his 
policies may not be very successful. But as a person, as a human being, very nice person. 
I love him. But how did you feel when Bush went to war so much, and was responsible 
for so many deaths if you are a man of peace? Oh, after he started the Iraq crisis, in my 
meeting with him, I expressed to him, I love you. But where your policies are concerned, 
I have some reservations, I told him.    
 
In advising the Tibetan people, he has consistently stressed for over fifty years the importance of 
non-violence and understanding. There is a growing multiplicity of perspectives among the 
Tibetan people regarding their political situation; some are unfaltering in their commitment to 
non-violence whereas others are increasingly advocating for stronger forms of political action. 
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But the Tibetan people as a whole have a common goal: to see the Dalai Lama one day return to 
his homeland in Tibet. 
 
Political Protest 
Over the last sixty years there has been significant political protest, both among Tibetans and 
foreign human rights activists. March 10, 1959, marked what has been known since as “Tibetan 
Uprising Day”; on this day, tens of thousands took to the streets after rumors began circulating 
that the Dalai Lama would be arrested or abducted by the police following a theatrical 
performance in Lhasa (to which allegedly, he received an invitation from the Chinese 
government but told he could not bring his usual entourage of security and advisers). Thousands 
of Tibetan protesters surrounded the Dalai Lama’s palace to protect him and within a week the 
Tibetan militia planned and executed the Dalai Lama’s escape out of Lhasa.    
The time of the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s and 1970s was a devastating period, 
not only for Tibetans, but for many ethnic minorities and other groups across China. From 1987-
1989, members of the Tibetan Independence Movement staged large-scale protests across the 
Tibetan plateau; this was a particularly violent period and eventually martial law was declared, 
and foreigners, including journalists, were restricted from entering the country. To mark the 30 
year anniversary of the uprising in 1959, monks from Drepung monastery took to the streets, and 
thousands followed suit. 
In 1995 a six year-old boy named Gendun Chokyi Nyima, disappeared from his home 
shortly after being recognized by the Dalai Lama as the 11
th
 incarnation of the Panchen Lama. 
The relationship between the lineages of Panchen Lamas and Dalai Lamas is important in that 





Lama had been arrested and imprisoned for publically supporting the Dalai Lama in the mid-
1960s, and died in 1989. The Dalai Lama spent six years searching for his incarnation. When the 
newly-named six year old boy disappeared (the Chinese government openly admitted to 
detaining him for security purposes), the Tibetan people revolted, leading to more uprisings. The 
Chinese responded by enthroning a young boy of their own (the son of one of their security 
officers) as the Panchen Lama, who would name the next Dalai Lama. The current Dalai Lama, 
Tenzin Gyatso, has openly stated that he will not take rebirth in Tibet, and the original Panchen 
Lama remains a missing person. In many protests today, Tibetans call for the return of the Dalai 
Lama to Tibet, and the release of the Panchen Lama, who, if alive, would now be in his early 
twenties. 
 
Figure 4: Candlelight vigil in Dharamsala, April 25, 2008, depicting the Panchen Lama. 
 
Photo credit: AP Photo/Ashwini Bhatia 
Every year since 1959, Tibetan Uprising Day is observed on March 10
th
. During the 
observance in 2008, there were a series of protests and riots in Lhasa; around 6,000 were arrested 
(Free Tibet 2013). Many monasteries throughout Tibet led protests in their region, and soon 
Tibetans across the globe joined in protest. Nearly twenty Chinese embassies across North 
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America and Europe became sites of fervent protest. The Chinese claim that the Dalai Lama 
orchestrated the riots, thus proving his status as a terrorist. There are numerous websites, such as 
“China View,” maintained by the Xinhua News Agency, which post weekly updates about the 
“Dalai Clique,” citing evidence that he is behind violent separatist plots (China View 2013). 
The summer following the March 2008 uprising, I arrived in Dharamsala to begin 
preliminary fieldwork. It was here that I first observed notable disagreement with the Dalai 
Lama’s stance on nonviolence and the Middle Way, particularly among young people. While the 
official stance of the Tibetan government-in-exile backs the Dalai Lama and his insistence on 
peaceful negotiation, there is a significant segment of the population that is pushing for stronger 
and more active responses. At this time, the Summer Olympics had just begun in Beijing. The 
atmosphere in Dharamsala was one of betrayal. “How could the world give China this honor?” 
people wondered. Students for a Free Tibet distributed sweatshirts resembling those won by a 
sports team that said “Team Tibet”; they were proudly worn in the weekly protests and 
candlelight vigils held for those who were recently killed or imprisoned during the uprising. It 
was somewhat uncanny to see the mo-lags (grannies) wearing black zip-up sweatshirts over their 
chupas (traditional Tibetan dress).  
During the 2008 uprisings, foreigners were again shut out of Tibet. Since this time, the 
restrictions on foreigners coming into Tibet has waxed and waned. Currently, restrictions have 
relaxed in the TAR, but this can change at any time. For example, in summer 2011, a group of 
graduate students from the University of Virginia were conducting archival research in Lhasa; 
after a series of self-immolations, the American students had their research visas revoked and 
were forced to exit the country. They came to Dharamsala to wait it out, and after a couple 
months they resumed their research in Lhasa. The Sichuan province (known as Amdo among 
57 
 
Tibetans), where most of the immolations occur, is currently closed to foreigners as well as 
Chinese journalists. While visiting Tibetan areas, generally tourists are encouraged to stay with 
an official tour guide, and during times of restrictions, they may be required to do so. Foreigners 
risk trouble with Chinese authorities if they stray too far from prescribed tourist destinations. 
Some Tibetans inside the TAR are reticent to associate with foreigners, which might arouse 
suspicion that they are engaged in political activity. Likewise, some in Dharamsala worried that 
their family inside Tibet might be harmed if their faces were shown on TV or in photographs, 
insinuating political involvement. 
 
Life in Dharamsala 
There are thirteen Tibetan settlements in the Northern Indian state of Himachal Pradesh, which 
are home to 20,000 Tibetans (Proust 2008); around 9,500 of this total live in Dharamsala. Many 
previous researchers mistakenly conceive of the exile community as a homogenous group. In 
fact, there is great diversity across the settlement in terms of language, socioeconomic status, 
region of origin in Tibet, age, and education level. Many Tibetans living in India earn their living 
through making handicrafts and selling sweaters, wool shawls, and Tibetan jewelry. Others work 
in the service industry in hotels, restaurants, and other private businesses. While some Tibetans 
in Dharamsala are able to start their own businesses, nearly all of these ventures have an Indian 
partner behind the scenes. It is ambiguous whether Tibetans can legally own property or 
businesses. But, like many things in India, everything is negotiable.  
Conflict between the Tibetans and their Indian hosts is not uncommon. There is 
resentment that so much international aid goes to the Tibetan community, while their Indian 
neighbors may be even worse off (Vatali 2009). Some Tibetans manage to get foreign sponsors 
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who send money every month. From the Tibetan point of view, many feel they are often cheated 
and discriminated against by local Indian shop-keepers, police and government officials. I 
observed some poor treatment, but there is also a culture particular to India that foreigners 
(including Tibetans) are not always adept at managing. For example, for five months, there was 
water for only one hour per day in my Tibetan managed flat. The building was owned by a 
Tibetan woman who lived in Dheradhun, some 10 hours away; it was managed by her brother, a 
Tibetan doctor, who lived near Dharamsala. I was told that the pipes were “not good,” which was 
why there was such a limited supply. However, a neighbor, the wife of a retired Tibetan 
government official, confided in me that the owner does not want to pay “baksheesh
7
” to the 
Indian water company. It seemed that everyone else in the neighborhood had paid; and they had 
water. I called my landlord to inquire further about the problem. He admitted that they refused to 
pay extra. Instead, they applied for a permit to build a new water tank.  “We have dignity,” he 
said, and then added, “not like the Indians. They are always cheating each other.”  The permit for 
the new tank never arrived. Sometimes I fantasized about finding the Indian water guys and 
paying the baksheesh, myself. Forget dignity, I wanted water. After the five month stand-off, my 
landlord called and said, “Sara-la, water is coming now.” The water was back and I did not dare 
to ask what happened. 
 Although Dharamsala is in some ways just like any other town in Northern India, it is 
known as “Little Lhasa” for a reason. With 13 monasteries and 4 nunneries in the greater-
Dharamsala area, there is near-constant sounding of drums, trumpets, bells, and cymbals echoing 
through town as part of the pujas and daily rituals required for vajrayana Buddhist practices. 
Outside the monasteries, lay tantric yogis (ngakpas) perform exorcisms, divinations, and 
                                                        
7
 Baksheesh is a “tip”that is more analogous to a bribe. The practice is common in many part of India. Particular 
institutions, such as utility companies, the postal service, and a range of government agencies may deny services 
until the “customary” baksheesh is paid.  
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elaborate rituals to cure illness and bring fortune. Such a picture might conjure up what Lopez 
calls the “Myth of Shangri-la,” (1998), or the romantic idea that to be fully Tibetan is to be 
steeped in holy and mystical Buddhist practices. But alongside all of this, one finds endless 
internet cafes, young Tibetan teens cruising around on motorcycles (often with a young Western 
girl on the back), monks chatting on cell phones, and rowdy arguments over the price of cooking 
gas.  
While not particularly easy to get to, it remains a thriving tourist destination for both 
foreign and Indian tourists, alike. Offering a welcome respite from the hot, crowded stress of 
India, many come to Dharamsala to relax. It is not just the cool mountain air that attracts so 
many tourists and spiritual-seekers. Alongside the variety of Buddhist courses and retreat 
centers, Indians and Western ex-pats have set up shop offering reiki, yoga, crystal healing, and 
massage. Tibetan Buddhism has long been naively equated with peace, serenity, and love 
(Khyentse 2008; Lopez 1992), prompting Western seekers to engage in what Trungpa Rinpoche 
called “spiritual materialism” (1973). It is no surprise that the home to the Dalai Lama would 
attract such sentiments. And yet, alongside this hodgepodge, are functioning government offices 
and rigorous Buddhist institutes of study, debate, and practice. Many important lamas and abbots 
reside in Dharamsala, making it an attractive place for young monks and nuns to complete their 
training. 
Dharamsala, with its mix of Tibetans, Indians, and foreign ex-pats, makes for an unusual 
“community.” The words of Paul Connerton ring especially true here: 
All beginnings contain an element of recollection. This is particularly so when a social 
group makes a concerted effort to begin with a wholly new start. There is a measure of 
complete arbitrariness in the very nature of any such attempted beginning. The beginning 
has nothing whatsoever to hold on to; it is as if it came out of nowhere. For a moment, 
the moment of beginning, it is as if the beginners had abolished the sequence of 




There is indeed, a certain arbitrariness here. That this small Indian town has become an epicenter 
of Tibetan culture was merely by chance when Prime Minister Nehru offered the remote land to 
the Dalai Lama in 1959. How over the last fifty years has this community built and fashioned 
their Tibetan culture onto this place, and how has the place and culture of Northern India 
changed its Tibetan inhabitants? 
Figure 7: monks at an internet café in Dharamsala 
 
Photo by the author 
Some Tibetologists avoid conducting research in Dharamsala, seeing it as an “adulterated 
field of anthropological inquiry” (Proust 2008:7). It is not only researchers from outside who 
question the authenticity of these new forms of Tibetan culture. Many “old-timers,” that is those 
who left Tibet decades ago—particularly those who left Lhasa with the Dalai Lama—complain 
about exile culture. The shey-sa (honorific language) style of Tibetan I learned to speak at 
university, was rarely used among young people—especially those born in exile who spoke slang 
Tibetan mixed with Hindi and English words. Many of my friends around town were new 
arrivals from Tibet. As well, some of my richest fieldwork was conducted at dawn when I joined 
61 
 
the mo-lags and bo-lags (grannies and grandpas) in doing daily prostrations on long wooden 
boards positioned inside the Dalai Lama’s temple. “You are a good girl! A very nice girl,” two 
ladies said. “You speak Tibetan very politely.”   
“But your prostrations!” said another one, giving me a good-natured whack on the 
behind. “You shouldn’t stay on the ground so long. You are young! Not old like me. Don’t be 
lazy.” She picked up a fleece jacket I had set down next to me, yanked me close to her and tied it 
tightly around my waist. “Your kidneys!” she cried. “You will get sick. It is cold.” The other 
ladies nodded in agreement. “But good speaking. You are not rude like those exile girls.” The 
old-timers even questioned the extent to which new-comers from Tibet were even really Tibetan, 
having grown up in China. And derision such as this existed on the side of those born in exile, as 
well, who saw the old-timers as backwards and unsophisticated.  
There has also long been an elitism associated with regions within Tibet. A language 
teacher who was from Lhasa once explained to me rather innocently, “you see, those from Amdo 
and Kham…they are a little bit rough. They are a little like, how do you say? Like hillbillies!” 
Many regional dialects throughout Tibet are so variable that some Tibetans cannot communicate 
with one another. Some new arrivals to Dharamsala not only wanted to learn English, but also 
needed to learn “standard” Tibetan to communicate.  
A similar elitism can be found in the long and complex history of sectarian conflict 
across the schools of Tibetan Buddhism. Often the heart of these debates are at once 
philosophical and political. Reflecting again on Lopez’s (2008) assertion that there is a particular 
fascination and romanticism associated with Tibet among Westerners, some might be surprised 
to learn that monasteries are not the peaceful and serene settings they imagine. Monks are not 
often sitting quietly in meditation; rather they are on strict schedules that dictate a rigorous daily 
62 
 
routine involving recitation, debate, exams and elaborate ritual responsibilities for pujas. 
Lempert (2012) conducted ethnographic research at Sera Mey, one of the largest and most 
important monastic colleges in South India. He found that these settings are highly restrictive 
and morally conservative; dge bskos (discipline masters) routinely used public shaming and 
reprimand to enforce order and motivate young monks by encouraging competition.  
There have also been instances throughout history among monastic sects that are not 
merely symbolic violence. Because the religious clergy often assume political positions of 
power, during struggles over land, money, and power, monks as well as their lay patrons 
engaged in violent warfare (Lempert 2012; Lopez 2008). A contemporary example of the dark 
side of monastic institutions is the “Dorje Shugten” affair. Dorje Shugten is a protector deity  
that has been historically connected to the Gelukpa tradition (the lineage of the Dalai Lama); 
however in the 1970s the Dalai Lama was advised by his council that the practice had dangerous 
implications for him (reportedly he received similar messages in dreams from the Nechung 
oracle as well as his previous incarnation, the 5
th
 Dalai Lama). Because the deity promotes 
extreme sectarianism, the current Dalai Lama, a notable proponent of ri me (non-sectarian 
movement across all Tibetan schools) banished practices associated with Shugten—also making 
a political statement that angered conservative Gelukpa leaders who believed they should 
prevail. In the 1990s the Dalai Lama made a formal statement (which I heard him repeat during 
teachings in Dharamsala) that Shugten practitioners cannot receive tantric empowerments from 
him. In 1997 the principal of the Institute of Buddhist Dialectics and two students were stabbed 
to death by known Shugten practitioners in front of the Dalai Lama’s temple in Dharamsala.  
The gravity of this situation is palpable. Tibetans avoid speaking Shugten’s name; if they 
must, it is usually whispered in fear. During religious teachings and empowerments in 
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Dharamsala, the Dalai Lama often mentioned this harmful deity imploring people not to engage 
in these practices. The Dorje Shugten sect continues to grow as part of the New Kadampa 
Movement (NKD), an organization that is known for beautiful and welcoming Dharma centers in 
America and Europe. They often protest outside the Dalai Lama’s public talks around the world, 
claiming religious discrimination. Recently, it has been verified by a number of sources that the 
Chinese government gives large sums of money to NKD as part of their anti-Dalai Lama 
campaign. 
I include descriptions of the “darker side” of Tibetan culture to avoid romanticizing—a 
trap that one could easily fall prey to in a study of resilience and wellbeing. These accounts also 
portray the long-standing conflict across various Tibetan factions. Like any other society, Tibet 
has its share of violence and corruption. And yet, despite the very human failings of Tibetans 
across the ages, there is also remarkable resilience. Indeed, many community members told me 
that they believed they were more resilient than other cultural groups. My research did not aim to 
demonstrate that this group is any more or less resilient than other communities, but I found that 
this belief was very prevalent across Dharamsala. “We have a very special way of thinking,” 
explained one woman. “And thinking that the rest of the world could benefit from how we 
approach life’s difficulties, this inspires us to continue fighting for our country and way of life. If 
your motivation is to help others, you will never give up.” Perhaps there is nothing that 
demonstrates this resolve more than the recent series of protests through self-immolation. 
 
Self-Immolations 
During my time in the field between 2011-2012, nearly forty Tibetans set themselves on fire to 
protest the Chinese occupation of Tibet. It is estimated that since 2009 there have been 125 self-
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immolations (Huffington Post 2014; Tibet Online 2014). Self-immolation as a form of protest or 
religious practice is new to Tibet (Shakya 2012; McGranahan & Litzenger 2012). Most of the 
immolators have been monks and nuns (including a tulku, incarnate lama); lay men and women, 
most of whom had families, have immolated, as well. They believe that these acts will finally 
alert the international community to the severity of suffering within Tibet; and once people 
know, they say, of course they will help. And yet, Time Magazine called the immolations in 
Tibet the #1 under-reported story of 2011 (cited in McGranahan and Litzinger 2012). 
 On March 26, 2012, a young Tibetan student named Jamphel Yeshi set himself on fire 
during a protest in New Delhi just hours before the Indian government welcomed Chinese 
president, Hu Jintao for a visit. And unlike in the closed area of Amdo, where most of the 
previous immolations occurred, hundreds of bystanders, including reporters for Reuters Press, 
captured the horrific images that went viral world-wide. Images such as the one below were 
almost immediately printed on large banners and hung throughout town in Dharamsala. Tibetan 
shop-keepers closed their stands and joined the hundreds of monks, nuns, and students who 
began to gather outside the Dalai Lama’s temple. Although there had already been thirty or forty 
immolations, this one, which occurred on the streets of New Delhi, struck a wounded chord in 










Figure 5: Self-Immolation in New Delhi, India 
   
Photo Credit: Telegraph.co.uk 
Word began to travel around town that the body was being transported to Dharamsala. 
When the corpse arrived on March 30, early in the morning a group of middle-aged Tibetan men 
drove motorcycles through town. One, perched on the back of a bike, held a megaphone and 
announced loudly that the mi rigs kyi dba-wo (hero) was inside the Dalai Lama’s temple. I lived 
along a steep path that wove past Jamyang Choling Nunnery and Kirti Monastery; the path a 
shortcut to the main temple tucked away from tourist hotels was a quiet respite from the honking 
cars of Indian taxis below. Not walking with anyone in particular, I joined my Tibetan neighbors 
in walking up and over the path down to the Dalai Lama’s temple where townspeople and 
monastics were already filing in. A group of Ama-la’s (honorific term for mother or woman) 
handed out bag leb (homemade bread), and some monks poured Tibetan tea from huge metal 
teapots, as is customary during religious teachings.   
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The slow moving line into the temple was somber. Many grasped a mala (prayer beads) 
in their hands, quietly mouthing om mani padme hum, the mantra of compassion. As we moved 
from the courtyard and upstairs to the main tsuglakhang (temple), I was surprised to see rows of 
school children, who stood in their blue and green uniforms as if it were an assembly. I learned 
later that this was the first time a dead body had been brought to the Dalai Lama’s temple. And 
while political activity is generally discouraged inside the complex, today seemed an exception. 
Hundreds of Tibetans came, one-by-one, to offer a khatag (ceremonial white scarf). There were 
two monks standing by who periodically had to clear the towering stack of khatags off the coffin 
that was draped in military style, with the Tibetan flag.  
Figure 6: Jamphel Yeshi’s funeral in Dharamsala 
 




Eight or nine parliament members arrived and there were a number of speeches 
commending the boy for his heroism and martyrdom. The sentiments were similar to what is 
found in the plethora of news articles such as, “Tibet Self-Immolation is the Highest Form of 
Non-Violent Struggle” (Tibet Post 2013), which proliferate Tibetan popular views. The article 
and others like it emphasize that “the self-immolators have not harmed a single Chinese person, 
but have simply voiced their protest” (Tibet Post 2013); those who self-immolate are seen as 
selfless heroes.  
 The immolations were the focus of most discussions around town. I noticed that there did 
not seem to be (on the surface, anyway) much variation in how Tibetans living in Dharamsala 
thought about this form of protest. They believed, unequivocally, that the horrific acts were 
capturing the attention of the rest of the world. It was also assumed that the motivation for taking 
one’s own life for the “benefit” of the Tibetan cause was always noble. Walking together on the 
khora, I asked my friend Yangzom if anyone is trying to discourage others from self-immolating. 
“Does anyone think it is bad?” I asked. She explained patiently that it is very sad, but the 
immolators will gain tremendous merit that will help them take a good rebirth. I thought about 
this, silently for a few moments. “But isn’t it a suicide?” I asked. “Doesn’t committing suicide 
bring you to a hell realm within the Buddhist worldview?”  
“Oh,” she said simply. “This is different. It is not a suicide.” She went on to explain that 
when ordinary people are in so much anguish that they want to die, their negative state of mind 
at death brings them to a hell realm. “Your state of mind at death will tell you what your next life 
will be like.” Someone who is so generous, brave and selfless to give their own life—this is 
evidence, she explained, that they are not ordinary beings. Ordinary beings do not choose where 
to be reborn; they are simply thrown into their next samsaric life, fueled by their karma. 
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However, great beings, like bodhisattvas, accumulate tremendous merit and will not be reborn in 
a lower realm. Those who self-immolate are greatly admired and seen as possessing great virtue 
and generosity. During this time, many Tibetans with whom I spoke about the immolations told 
me a story from the Jataka Tales
8
, where the Buddha gave his body to a tigress to feed her cubs.  
Just three months before Jamphel Yeshe self-immolated in New Delhi, I was in 
Bodhgaya (the place in Northern India where the Buddha is said to have attained enlightenment 
sitting under a bodhi tree). The Dalai Lama was giving the Kalachakra Initiation, and nearly half 
a million people attended. Some had risked imprisonment to get there, including many elderly 
Tibetans who arrived in rags, covered in dirt. “This is probably the last chance in my lifetime,” 
an older woman explained to me. “I wanted to see Gyalwa Rinpoche (highest precious teacher), 
His Holiness the Dalai Lama, before I die. And all Tibetans want to receive the Kalachakra
9
; it is 
very important…for the future.” I realized that when she said “the future” she was referring to 
future lives. She arrived with a group who travelled together from her county in Kham. They did 
not yet have a plan of what they would do after the Kalachakra; but was unlikely they could get 
back to Tibet. 
My perception of what it means to be in a crowd has been forever changed. With half a 
million people in tiny Bodhgaya, most staying in make-shift tent villages, there was no way to 
walk down the street without slowly trudging forward pressed up against a wall of people. 
People in India do not wait in line with a few feet of distance between you and the next person; 
rather with separate lines for men and ladies, you press your body (and sometimes even hold on 
                                                        
8
 Stories that depict the life of the historical Buddha in his previous lives 
 
9
 A practice of highest yoga tantra. Kalachakra, meaning “Wheel of Time,” is a highly complex vajrayana practice. 
The vast majority of initiates will not practice Kalachakra. But it is said that receiving the wang (empowerment) 
purifies an extraordinary amount of negative karma, such that anyone who receives it will attain enlightenment 
within 16 lifetimes.  
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to) the person in front of you. Moving slowly down the street I felt my mobile phone vibrating. It 
was a text message from my Tibetan research assistant: “Sara-la
10
, I met one monk, same county, 
he try to self immolate before in Nepal. You want to interview?”   
I rushed, as best as one could rush on the crowded streets of Bodhgaya, to the stupa 
where we agreed to meet. Thousands of people were doing khora, circumambulating around the 
huge chörten
11
 (stupa). Despite the mass of people, it felt calm and serene, unlike the street. I 
found my assistant and we continued walking the khora as waited for the monk to arrive. My 
assistant said, “he is, um, a little bit, maybe nyonpa (crazy). He is a little bit funny.” I asked him 
to say more. My assistant was silent and seemed uncomfortable. “Well, he is a monk. But we 
don’t know. Maybe he wants to change.” This is a euphemism for saying that perhaps there is an 
indication he is trying to sleep with women (meaning he would no longer be a monk); it can also 
mean that he is already sleeping with women but continues to wear robes. Although giving up 
monastic vows is seen as a bit shameful after coming of age
12
, it certainly does not make one 
nyonpa. I pressed my assistant. “Well, he…we don’t know his intention. Those who self-
immolate for Tibet, they have very pure hearts.” It seemed incommensurate that someone who 
attempts self-immolation might not have the purest of values.    
                                                        
10
 Tibetans often place a lags (pronounced “la”) at the end of a person’s name to communicate respect. 
 
11
 A structure that commemorates a holy person, or event that occurred, usually in connection to the historical 
Buddha. Stupas sometimes contain ashes or relics. The stupa in Bodhgaya sits adjacent to the bodhi tree where the 
Buddha is said to have attained enlightenment. 
 
12
 It is not uncommon for young monks after receiving their education to give up their monastic vows, and this is 
usually acceptable. Likewise, there are times when laypeople will take monastic vows later in life after having been 
householders. However, engaging in sexual activity and continuing to wear robes is extremely shameful. Most 
people will not directly criticize monastics, which is seen as disrespectful to the institution of monasticism. But there 
are many euphamisms and subtle gestures to indicate that a monk or nun is breaking vows. 
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We managed to find the monk in the crowd and walked out to a grassy area, moving 
slowly because he walked with a cane. We found a log on which to sit. After chatting for a bit, 
he lifted his robes to show me the burns scarred on his extremities.  
“I did it. I was on fire,” he said. “The Tibetan people nearby tried to shield me when the 
Nepali police in riot gear stormed in and extinguished the flames.” There are a number of 
established Tibetan communities near Kathmandu. The monk, who lived in a nearby monastery 
went to the heart of a Tibetan neighborhood near a sacred stupa to perform his immolation. The 
townspeople shielded him to support his heroic act; but he was quickly extinguished by police 
who often linger near the stupa and transported to the state hospital in Kathmandu.  
I asked, “what happened next?” He described how after a few weeks recovery in the state 
hospital he was “sponsored” by the Tibetan government-in-exile in Dharamsala to be moved 
from Nepal to India. He spent two months in the Delek Hospital in Dharamsala recovering from 
the burns, where he was given a special room. Many visitors, including important lamas came to 
see him. 
Although there is no specific historical tradition of self-immolation in Tibet, Gyatso 
(2008) points out that a parallel may be drawn to other instances of spiritual virtuosos 
withstanding pain—evidence of their superior qualities and the power of Buddhism. Specifically, 
Gyatso calls to mind the Tibetan tradition of gtum’mo where highly practiced yogis withstand 
freezing conditions wearing only thin, cotton robes by generating intense inner heat through 
meditation. These practitioners survive sometimes for years—even decades—in icy, Himalayan 
cave retreats. Such practices, accomplished through sustained purity and discipline (Gyatso 
2008), serve as inspiration for lay Tibetans. Generating this remarkable inner fire was not an end, 
in itself, but rather an indication of a highly realized person. My impression of the monk I met 
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who attempted self-immolation was somewhat neutral. He did not strike me as remarkable 
(unlike some other practitioners with whom I conducted interviews); he also did not strike me as 
nyonpa, crazy, as my Tibetan assistant asserted. It seems to be his ordinariness, juxtaposed with 
the extraordinary acts that only a highly selfless person could accomplish, that creates the 
uncanny feeling of doubt and discomfort among his Tibetan peers. The speculation that he might 
have broken his vow of chastity only further exposes his ordinary human character. 
Although it seems at first glance that all Tibetans are uncritical of the immolations and 
believe that it will help their political cause, there are, of course those who do not encourage the 
acts. A notable voice is that of the 17
th
 Karmapa (head of the Karma Kagyu school), who 
published an open letter denouncing the immolations (see Appendix C); other high lamas have 
also come forward emphasizing that such acts do not uphold the sanctity of life (Makley 2012). 
Some have criticized the Dalai Lama for not doing the same. When asked directly in a series of 
interviews, he stated he was in a difficult position. Although he does not encourage the 
immolations, he remarked that the friends and families of those who immolated might be upset if 
he spoke out against them.  
Numerous scholars of Tibet have tried to makes sense of this new form of protest. Many 
note that the self-immolations are different from other political suicides, such as suicide 
bombing, in important ways. Rather than an act of terror meant to scare, they are seen instead as 
a “horror intended to induce empathy” (Shakya 2012). The body is not a weapon, but a medium 
for communication (Makley 2012). As my Tibetan friend, Yangzom articulated, “suicide means 
that you want to die; or at least you don’t want to live.” As a researcher interested in social 
resilience, I am less concerned with individual motivation or the efficacy of the acts. Rather, my 
concern is to understand the range of interpretations within the exile community, asking how this 
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new social phenomena changes the lived experience of being a Tibetan refugee. For those who 
see immolations as an act that only a bodhisattva would perform, the desire to live or die is only 
a second order concern. It is precisely because the activist is able to put the Tibetan cause before 
his or her desire to live that they are heroic. From this vantage point, those who let go of what is 
often called “self-cherishing,” are spiritually superior and worthy of admiration.  
 
Identity and Meaning in Dharamsala 
Scholars working on trauma and suffering have long been concerned with how oppressive social 
structures discipline the bodies and minds of their inhabitants (Farmer 2003; Foucault 1977; 
Goffman 1990). Many anthropologists have considered the ways that institutions of public 
health, medicine and law give shape and definition to suffering. The bind in such situations is 
that fighting against oppressive labels, only seeks to reinforce them—demonstrating non-
compliance and lack of self-control.  
There are numerous works within medical anthropology that demonstrate how chronic 
and prolonged oppression systematically breaks down personal agency (Biehl 2005; Bourgois 
2009). But I am concerned with a different set of questions. How, in the face of adversity, does 
this community thrive? More broadly, this research considers how cultural ethos and other social 
factors might produce resilience. Researchers including Wexler and colleagues (2009) have 
investigated the ways that exposure to the kind of discrimination, institutional structures, and 
unfair economic practices that produce and maintain health disparities might serve to orient 
people in overcoming those very disparities and achieving wellbeing. They find that many 
previous studies understand “culture” as a proxy for discrimination and thus usually seen as a 
risk factor. Their research demonstrates that the effects of marginalization status and group 
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affiliation are not always negative. When activated, there seems to be something about collective 
struggle that provides strength.  
Research elsewhere has considered the ways that meaning in the context of war and 
violence enhances resilience. Barber (2008) conducted a study among Palestinian and Bosnian 
youth, comparing their experiences. He finds that experiences of war are far from uniform across 
contexts. Specifically, Palestinian youth relied on strength passed down across generations and 
felt they were contributed to something larger than themselves; the narratives of Bosnian youth 
in Sarajevo centered around individual trauma and stress with little connection to broader 
historical and cultural context (2008:289). A sense of “purposelessness” may, indeed be a causal 
factor in poor mental health outcomes among oppressed populations—as the work of Wexler et 
al. (2009) demonstrates, oppressed populations who share a collective purpose may actually use 
their oppression to inspire and motivate their fight. In this light, resilience is not the “final 
accomplishment,” but a dynamic process heavily dependent on interpretation of difficult life 
events (Wexler et al. 2009).  
 
Tibetan Medicine and Local Healing Practices 
Being resilient is not the same as a mere absence of suffering. Rather, it implies that suffering is 
managed effectively, often with grace and pragmatism. The cultural methods for working with 
distress are varied in Dharamsala, and span religious, medical, and social spheres. Below I 
explore the ways that Tibetans in this community seek out treatment when they are not doing 
well. This section also serves as an introduction to various Tibetan concepts and practices, on 
which I base my arguments in the following chapters. Specifically, this section seeks to articulate 
why religion, science and medicine share an epistemological frame.  
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Lamas, Doctors, and Yogis 
When investigating the use of so-called “local” medicine, anthropologists do not necessarily 
make sharp distinctions between something that is true and something that works. Once, Farquar 
asked an herbalist in China’s Guangxi Province about his use of divination. He said, “I don’t 
know if this stuff is true or not, maybe it’s just superstition; but I know that it works” (2013:108). 
There is a similar pragmatic attitude found in Dharamsala, among patients and clinicians, alike. 
Physicians who practice Tibetan medicine are known commonly as amchi (a Mongolian 
word); the Tibetan word for doctor is sman pa (pronounced, men-pa). They are degreed 
specialists who study tradition Tibetan medicine for seven years at a mentsikhang (traditional 
Tibetan hospital) training institute. The classical Tibetan medical text, “The Four Tantras” 
(Rgyud bshi) describes many syndromes that as part of its presentation include psychological 
symptoms (Schröder 2011). When patients visit amchis, they do not begin their consultation by 
telling the doctor what is wrong. The doctor tells the patient what is wrong, or merely prescribes 
treatment without the patient being too concerned about a discrete diagnosis. Instead, they might 
be made aware of an imbalance within particular organs (e.g. “kidney problems”). Patients are 
often prescribed herbal medicines and given lists of foods to avoid or other behavioral changes. I 
once visited an amchi who after feeling my pulse for a few seconds told me that my blood 
pressure is very low (which is true), and suggested that I do a series of breathing exercises 
immediately upon waking to better circulate oxygen to my organs. 
The sowa rigpa (science of healing) is highly systematic and in a sense, very rigorous. 
But while medical systems like biomedicine are often considered to be in opposition to religion, 
the science of healing in Tibetan medicine actually stems from Buddhist philosophy. Tibetans 
sometimes visit lamas for a mo (divination) before seeking medical treatment to find out which 
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hospital to visit, which doctor to see, on which date to go, and whether the medicine will even be 
effective (Schröder 2011). It is not assumed that medicines will work on all people, all the time. 
This does not mean that the medicine lacks efficacy; rather one may not have the karma for the 
medicine to be effective. Tibetan medical practitioners function alongside lamas, ngakpas 
(yogis), and other religious specialists, such as lha pa and lha ma (oracles). Oracles become 
possessed by deities who diagnose and treat illnesses. Religious practitioners treat mental 
distress through prayers, blessings, advice, and protection cords/amulets; some are known to 
have particularly strong connections to their personal meditation deities (yidams) (Schröder 
2011), such as White Tara or Vajrayogini.  
 
A Mind Unsettled 
While this project is focused on resilience, it is important to acknowledge that not all community 
members display extraordinary resilience and indeed, many struggle with chronic psychological 
problems. In this section I describe local presentations of mental distress. Although the scope of 
my study does not specifically address this, such cases provide informative contrast, showing 
discrepant cases, or those who for whatever reason do not find adequate sources of resilience. 
Future work might involve a systematic investigation of risk factors and protective factors 
associated with mental health outcomes, which could benefit those who suffer chronic or 
debilitating distress. 
  Within many Tibetan communities, overt mental illness (sems kyi na tsha) is often 
attributed to various types of spirit harm (gdon, btsan, rgyal po, mamo
13
), for which one needs 
the help of a lama (Clifford 1994; Samuel 2007). Illness caused by spirits can be highly treatable 
                                                        
13







 offerings and the like; families sometimes pay monks or nuns at 
local puja houses to perform these rituals on behalf of the patient. The merit of the practice is 
“dedicated” to the patient, helping to purify “outer obstacles,” (such as spirits), or “inner 
obstacles” (such as negative karma). As Schröder found in her work among Tibetan healers in 
Ladakh, “neither the term ‘illness’ nor the term ‘mental’ serves to cover” the interpretations of 
mental distress (2011:26). There are not clear distinctions between illness that is “mental,” 
illness that is “physical,” and illness that is “spiritual.” If rlung (wind), as well as the other two 
humors, mkhrispa (bile) and badken (phlegm), become unstable, a variety of physical and mental 
disturbances can arise. 
Some religious practitioners encourage individuals with mental distress to visit a 
doctor—often when they suspect a rlung, “life-wind” imbalance or snying rlung (heart-wind 
illness). And yet even medical disorders, such as rlung (pronounced “loong”) are based on moral 
concepts of personhood based on Buddhist ontology (Adams 1998; Clifford 1994; Janes 1995; 
Millard 2007). A number of anthropologists have written on rlung disorders as an emerging 
"epidemic" in Tibetan communities
16
 (Adams 1998; Janes 1995; Prost 2006), suggesting that 
traumatic distress (particularly political violence) may be expressed by this culturally-constituted 
category of illness. It can cause dizziness, insomnia, chest pain, syncope, vertigo, sadness, 
                                                        
14
 Pujas are religious rituals that often span several hours and involve elaborate prayers, mantra recitation and 
visualization of particular deities. Monasteries and nunneries undertake a variety of pujas throughout the day on 
behalf of the community. Generally “protector” pujas are performed daily and seek to appease wrathful deities who 
fiercely protect practitioners from harm. Other deities, such as the Medicine Buddha and Green Tara, have particular 
days within the lunar calendar on which it is traditional to recite mantras and make offerings that are particular to 
these deities.  
 
15
 Torma are cakes usually made with tsampa (barley flour) and butter that are formed into particular shapes and 
offered in pujas.  
 
16
 There are no epidemiological studies at this time, which could confirm whether rlung disorders are on the rise in 
Dharamsala. Tidwell (2014) an anthropologist who has worked extensively at the Mentsikhang in Dharamsala says 
that she has not heard this to be the case among Tibetan clinicians. Interestingly, she notes that Tibetan physicians 
say that Westerners all seem to have a dominant rlung imbalance, and often cite the exile population as their 
comparative population in contrast to the large numbers in the Western populations they treat. 
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disorganized thinking and psychosis. One is said to be at risk for developing rlung disorders if 
negative emotions are strong; some inherit a propensity for the disorder in past lives, putting 
them at higher risk (Adams 1998). It is important to note that there are a variety of rlung-related 
illnesses, and not all of them are associated with mental illness.  
Because political prisoners are thought to be at higher risk, some researchers argue that 
rlung disorders are merely the local name for PTSD
17
. Some symptoms of rlung, such as 
insomnia and anxiety, are also part of the cluster of symptoms that characterize PTSD. 
Researchers such as Benedict et al. therefore deduce that “the srog-rLung diagnosis is 
nosologically similar to PTSD comorbid with MDD or GAD” (489). But while there is some 
overlap, there are a number of key criteria for PTSD that are missing; likewise, many features of 
rlung are not part of the PTSD cluster. But because political prisoners and those exposed to 
severe violence are at higher risk for rlung disorders and therefore might have a higher incidence, 
some researchers attempt to make direct comparisons. 
Moreover, rlung is not a “trauma” disease. While it is true that political prisoners are at 
increased risk, so are students studying for exams and practitioners engaged in intensive religious 
practices. Those with excessive activity within the mind, including mental exertion from 
studying, or strong emotions from witnessing torture, are equally plausible candidates for a rlung 
disorder. There are also key symptoms of PTSD that would likely not be attributed to rlung. A 
patient experiencing bad dreams, intrusive thoughts, and feelings of insecurity might be more 
likely diagnosed as a victim of gdon (spirits) affecting the bla (life essence). This could be true 
even among those who had been exposed to a traumatic event (Schröder 2011). A traumatic 
experience can make the mind unstable which puts one at increased risk for spirit harm. But 
                                                        
17
 There is a long history of equating psychiatric categories with local categories of distress across cultures. For 
example, it was in vogue for a period of time to deduce that possession and trance states are cultural manifestations 
of multiple personality disorder or schizophrenia. 
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nightmares and intrusive thoughts are not thought to be characteristic of rlung disorders, whereas 
they are core symptoms of PTSD.  
Rather than debating whether rlung disorders are the same or different from PTSD, a 
more fruitful investigation might be to consider the ways that conditions for developing rlung 
disorders (such as srog-rlung and snying-rlung), may be present in exile culture. Are excessive 
crying, worry, thinking or talking too much, and over-exertion (Jacobson 2007; Janes 1999a, 
1999b) more prevalent in exile? Because rlung is just as associated with “intellectual 
overexertion” as it is with disturbing emotions, it makes little sense to characterize the disorder 
as one linked only with trauma (as is the case for PTSD). Proust (2006) points out that it is often 
very “high profile” scholarly monks who leave Tibet and come to Dharamsala in the first place. 
So the increased “risk factors” for rlung in exile might have just as much to do with the intensive 
debate and study staged within schools and monasteries, as it does with an influx of political 
refugees. As Farquhar articulates, “[t]he ‘culture’ that ‘binds’ this syndrome to the lives of 
moderns is everywhere; it is difficult indeed to evade the effects of these constraints” (Farquhar 
2013:108).  
A future study might involve a systematic epidemiological investigation of the 
prevalence of rlung in Dharamsala, which measures the various sub-types across the population. 
Such studies might also consider investigating how individuals with previous histories of rlung 
disorders respond to traumatic events compared to those who had never suffered previous rlung 
disorders. Researchers have explored the relationship between cultural idioms and Western 
psychiatric categories in other contexts. For example, some researchers are quick to see nervios a 
chronic and generalized form of distress as a generalized anxiety disorder, and ataque de nervios, 
the experience of sudden panic and loss of control, a “cultural” term for panic disorder. 
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Hypothesizing that this correlation is not one-to-one, Alcantara and colleagues (2012) found that 
Latina/o individuals with histories of nervios (but not ataque de nervious) was a predictor for 
anxiety disorders. This study does not claim that nervios is the same as anxiety, just as rlung is 
not the same as PTSD. But it acknowledges the relationship between these local idioms and 
psychiatric categories of illness. 
When rlung is described as snying tsha, a heart illness, it is important to remember that 
for Tibetans the location of the sems (mind) is in the heart, not inside the head. I once heard 
Richard Davidson (2013) tell a story about a neuroscience experiment his research team 
conducted among highly trained Tibetan monks in Northern India. The experiments were 
conducted with an audience of fellow monks standing by. When one of the subjects emerged 
with electrodes covering his head, the monks roared with laughter. Davidson said to them, “yes, 
he does look pretty funny!” But the monks were laughing not because of how funny he looked, 
but at the foreign researchers who put electrodes on the head when claiming to conduct an 
experiment on the mind. The notion that the heart (not the brain) is the major center for emotion 
is found across the world, and has been explored somewhat extensively by cultural psychiatry 
researchers (e.g. Good 1977, Hinton et al. 2001, Kohrt 2005).  
As with rlung disorders, a common perception is that such imbalance within the heart 
might present increased risk for other kinds of problems. Mental distress can be both a cause and 
a result of these disorders of the heart. For example:  
Cambodians worry that heart weakness may cause strong reactivity to various stimuli, for 
example, to sounds and to smells, and predispose to experiencing certain negative 
emotional states such as being easily frightened, frequently becoming angry, and both 
engaging in worry and not being able to stop worrying. [Hinton et al. 2012:395]  
 
Similarly, Good (1977) found that “heart distress” or heart illness in Iran, known as ‘malaise of 
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the heart,’ (narahatiye) causes a variety of negative symptoms. Because the trouble arises from 
the heart, this will be the main site of treatment rather than the symptoms, themselves.  
During his time in Iran, Good was perplexed as to why there was so much complaining 
about the heart: for women on the pill or after giving birth, and also among men for a variety of 
reasons like conflict with family members or grief. As one informant said: “the heart is like a 
motor, the motor of the body. If the heart goes bad, then everything else may” (Good 1977:31). It 
is the locust of emotion and affect.  
Many medical anthropologists have written on the difficulty of classifying mental 
distress within cultures that do not make clear separations between body and mind. For example, 
many rural Nepalis experience a kind of distress, known as jhum-jhum, which tends to be 
conflated with depression by researchers. As with the case of rlung disorders among Tibetans, 
there are no specific etiological agents or events associated with the development of jhum-
jhum—it is often attributed to spirit harm, but equally plausible is chronic tension and being 
overworked (Kohrt et al. 2005). In both the Nepali and Tibetan cases, the forces that cause 
imbalance have the agentive power to yield problems in both the body and mind; and they are 
often intimately connected. 
            Many community members whom I consulted explained how negative emotions can 
cause illness—particularly if they are pervasive. For example, Sonam, a sixty year-old mother of 
four explained: “this back pain, my kidney problems. It comes from too much worry and crying. 
When my husband died back in Tibet I had to care for my children by myself. We did not have 
enough food. I worried and worried for many years, so now I am sick a lot.” The notion that 
worry and prolonged distress can itself lead to mental illness is a common belief across cultural 
contexts. Among Khmer trauma survivors, Hinton et al. (2002) found a high prevalence of 
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complaints related to a "weak heart," which seemed to be worsened by anger, worry or other 
psychological disturbances. 
 
Thinking too Much 
Research elsewhere describes how “excessive thinking,” is a local idiom of distress across a 
number of non-Western contexts (e.g. Yang and Singla 2011). Among Malagasy, miasa loha 
(overworked mind, worry) is a primary cause of madness as well as a symptom of spirit 
possession (Sharp 1993). Across these various cultural contexts, the idioms associated with 
excessive thinking are both a symptom of and cause of mental illness. As Hinton and describe 
among Cambodians: 
This complaint describes a mental state that has the following characteristics: one thinks 
of upsetting topics such as current [problems (e.g., difficulties with money or children), 
past trauma events (e.g., during the Pol Pot period), and separation from loved ones 
owing to their having died or living at a distance; one has a hard time not thinking about 
these things; and one thinks about these things to the point that it induces symptoms like 
headache and dizziness and potentially brings about various physiological disasters. 
[2012:395] 
             
In Dharamsala, young monks and nuns studying for philosophy exams are thought to be at risk 
for rlung disorders because of "thinking too much." My research assistant became very 
concerned when I decided to study philosophy at one of the monasteries. "But, Sara-la, you 
already do too much thinking!" he cried. "You cannot study debate philosophy. You will become 
ill." There is a strong sense that one needs to maintain a calm inner and outer environment to stay 
healthy. Over-thinking, excessive emotionality, as well as volatile environmental conditions can 
all lead to problems with rlung.  
            In my interviews, many people talked extensively about how food and weather were 
difficult upon arrival to India. As Adams (1998) explains: 
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winds outside the body are the winds inside the body; they are of the same substance and 
potentiality—effects outside are effects inside...For example, when Tibetans talk about 
foods and job frustrations as similar disruptions to their winds, they are telling us that, in 
terms of bodily experience, these two things are in the same category. [88-89] 
 
While imprisonment, torture and displacement are more severe in degree, they are understood to 
be just like any other potential disturbance (e.g. bad food, bad weather), which can make it 
difficult to control the mind. The extent to which one experiences mental distress depends on the 
reaction to the event; in other words, suffering can only come from within. As my elderly 
neighbor told me, a Tibetan proverb says: "self is the protector of it self." Because losing control 
of one's emotions is known to lead to illness and the generation of negative karma, Tibetans have 
great motivation to recover quickly in the face of adversity. This recovery can be spurred by 
spiritual practices as well as medical treatment. 
One bitter cold day in February I sat inside the small Mentsikhang (traditional Tibetan 
clinic) with Dr. Norbu, a senior physician. Though his demeanor was not particularly warm and 
inviting, he was very patient and took a keen interest in my project. He drew me small diagrams 
on the back of a prescription pad, depicting the movement of internal “winds,” which if not in 
balance can cause both physical and mental illness, often in tandem. He systematically pointed to 
jars, one by one, of herbal pills lining the shelves behind him. The pills (men tsa), are usually 
crushed and taken with hot water several times a day. Tibetans consider their traditional 
medicine to be highly effective, although it is known to work slowly (unlike Western medicine 
that is quick-acting but may not address fundamental underlying causes of illness). Dr. Norbu 
gave me some examples of common diseases (e.g. liver problems, diabetes, and gastrointestinal 
issues) and showed me the pills that he might prescribe for each one. “But how much these 
work,” he said, “depends on the mind of the patient.” He elaborated, stating:   
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Actually there are three different ways of coping with disease (best, middle and least 
desirable). The best is when someone is sick they make a wish for this disease to affect 
them and not others; they wish to experience the disease so others don’t have to. This is a 
Buddhist practice. The next best is when they have these problems they wish, after I 
recover I will help others and wish to do something beneficial for others. With this 
motivation, they recover. The third method is not as broad and spacious. They just feel 
very encouraged to get better but they don’t think about others. Some people who cannot 
practice any of these three methods become “damaged,” or discouraged--even crazy. 
They can take many pills, but it will be difficult for them to recover without broad 
thinking.    
 
His colleague, a young Tibetan woman who recently finished her physician training, said, “each 
person has a unique presentation of the illness. If the people come to Mentsikhang they cannot 
solve their problems through medicine alone. We also have to give them advice. It is important 
for us to analyze the person’s state of mind and we need to try and experience what they are 
feeling.” She went on to explain that if doctors speak with great compassion, it will greatly 
benefit the patient by making the medicine powerful. Within Tibetan medical science, love and 
compassion have physical and tangible effects.  
The importance of compassion is reflected in medical and religious practices, alike. After 
doing any Buddhist practice Tibetans “dedicate the merit” of the practice to all sentient beings. 
This dedication of merit (good karma) is thought to have a ripple effect; it benefit others, and the 
generosity of giving good karma away, creates an abundance of merit for oneself. Lamas and 
teachers emphasize that practitioners should not have selfish motivation, but they should feel 
good in knowing that their generosity and compassionate acts will come back to them. By 
wishing happiness for others, and not for oneself, paradoxically, this brings happiness. These 
ideals, which stem from Buddhism are reflected in Tibetan medical practices. 
While in India I often struggle with an allergy to mold, particularly during the monsoon. I 
took the advice of some Tibetan friends and visited the mentsikhang to see if Tibetan medicine 
might help. Not wanting to wait, I arrived around 7:30am right as the doors were opening. A 
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young Tibetan woman who worked behind the reception desk asked me to have a seat. “The 
doctor will see you after the morning prayers,” she said, gesturing to a wooden bench where I 
was to wait. Shortly thereafter all the staff, including pharmacists, receptionists, doctors and even 
a young girl who seemed to be employed as a cleaner, gathered together in one of the exam 
rooms and shut the door. Sitting outside, I was able to hear a string of prayers in Tibetan—the 
refuge prayer to the Buddha, a long-life prayer for the Dalai Lama, several recitations of the 
Medicine Buddha mantra, and a dedication of merit. After about 15 minutes the staff filed out 
and returned to their stations.  
The doctor gestured for me to come in. He began taking my pulse on both hands, jotting 
down notes on a prescription pad. Without asking me why I had come to the clinic he began 
listing off the health problems he was able to discern through my pulse—low blood pressure, 
frequent colds and congestion—he said, “this weather in India is not good for you.” He started to 
compose of list of foods I should avoid, such as cold drinks and milk products.  
“Can you tell me about the prayers you were doing before?” I asked. He raised his 
eyebrows, surprised by my question. “Oh,” he said casually, “it is important that we have good 
motivation.” I nodded, hoping he would elaborate. “And the prayers, to the Medicine Buddha, 
makes the medicine more effective. The blessings from the Medicine Buddha,” he added. I asked 
what happens when Tibetan clinicians do not have a good motivation. He explained that their 
treatments will have limited efficacy. “Actually, the most skilled physicians,” he said, “are those 
who can with great confidence visualize themselves as the Medicine Buddha.” It is evident here 
that compassion is not merely a moral value, but an important causal factor in Tibetan science 
and medicine. Over the course of my fieldwork I began to gradually understand the variety of 
ways that compassion is used by individuals and by practitioners to work with distress. Great 
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Chapter 3) Trauma and the Making of Flexible Minds 
Many important thinkers over the last few decades have contributed to a growing literature on 
the historical and social construction of trauma. Anthropologists in particular have critiqued the 
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universalizing of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), showing how while trauma is taken to 
be a natural human experience, it is a relatively new concept brought into existence at a 
particular moment in history (Fassin 2009; Hacking 1995, 2002; Young 1995). In this chapter I 
explore the genealogy and social construction of trauma. But beyond merely articulating the 
ways that Tibetan categories of distress are different from biomedical ones, I seek to push 
theoretical boundaries by showing how alternative systems of trauma appraisal contribute new 
possibilities for understanding resilience.  
            Whereas the looping of trauma among American war veterans is articulated and 
reinforced by biomedicine and psychological therapeutics, the alternative looping in the Tibetan 
context encourages those exposed to violence and extreme events to see past events as 
impermanent and not fixate on distress. Put more simply, in the Tibetan context, “going back” 
and debriefing, working-through, or processing past events is not seen as a particularly 
efficacious way to manage distress. 
As part of this study I conducted what is known as a “cultural domain analysis,” a 
method for identifying particular cultural idioms used to describe a given concept. The results of 
this analysis revealed that the qualities associated with resilience in Dharamsala are: 
spaciousness, openness or willingness to let go, and a sense of flexibility. Rather than talking or 
processing details of past events, the support that Tibetan refugees give to one another often 
follows the kind of sensibility found in lojong “mind-training” and other approaches that 
emphasize putting others before self, and changing the way you think (rather than changing the 
external environment). This way of relating to difficulty helps to create space and flexibility in 
the mind by recognizing that negative emotions are impermanent and changing. The notion that 
greater flexibility promotes wellbeing and health contributes new theory within medical and 
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psychological anthropology. In this community, resilience is more a verb than an adjective; an 
approach for meeting life’s inevitable problems with openness, humor, and compassion. In this 
community it is stressed that if people are dependent on external circumstances for happiness 
their lives will be a constant roller-coaster of ups and downs. Instead, it is more effective to 
generate inner stability and strength that can weather life’s challenges (and successes) without 
being swept away. The concept of “flexibility” is a method or a technology for cultivating this 
inner environment of stability. 
            This chapter also demonstrates how compassion is not merely a cultural value, but 
actually a practice or another kind of technology used to work on the self, particularly in times of 
crisis. Techniques such as thinking of all the others in the world who are experiencing similar (or 
worse) problems, and wishing happiness for all sentient beings are considered extremely skillful 
ways of working with distress. Most lay Tibetans if asked directly will insist they do not 
understand core concepts of lojong, such as emptiness and do not have great compassion. And 
yet, such teachings seem to permeate cultural sensibilities to such an extent that they readily 
draw upon them in times of crisis.            
 
The Birth of PTSD 
According to Allen Young, the key to tracing the origins of PTSD comes down to the following 
question: “how does an emotion, acting alone, produce effects that duplicate the consequences of 
a serious physical trauma? The puzzle is solved once one accepts that fear is simply an assault, 
comparable in its action to a physical blow or injury” (1995:15). While all mental disorders are 
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likely influenced by social forces, perhaps none to the extent of PTSD are directly caused by the 
force or impact of an external event
18
.  
 Early foundational thinkers in the late 19
th
 century, including Charcot, Janet and Freud, 
linked trauma and traumatic memory with hysteria and what today might be known as 
somatoform and fictitious disorders. In the early 20
th
 century with the rise of behaviorism, 
psychologists such as Pavlov understood traumatic memory as a conditioned response. The 
scope of what triggers the fear response is “gradually extended, through association (via analogy 
or contiguity), to objects and events located outside the original place of pain. Escape is not 
impossible, since each reexposure revives the victim’s pathogenic memory and the potency of 
the conditioned stimuli” (cited in Young 1995:25).   
 The First World War is an important time period in the genealogy of PTSD. A notable 
figure in early writing on war neurosis was W.H.R. Rivers, an anthropologist and captain in the 
Royal Army Medical Corps, who served as a psychiatrist specializing in “nerve regeneration.” 
War neuroses came in four related but distinct forms: shell shock, hysteria, neurasthenia, and 
disordered action of the heart (Young 1995). Shell shock, as the name suggests, was a condition 
associated with the shock waves from explosions. The forms of hysteria
19
 that were common 
among soldiers (e.g. mutism, paralysis, fugue states) are similar to conditions articulated by 
Freud and Janet. Symptoms of “nerve exhaustion,” or neurasthenia included chronic fatigue, 
headache, loss of appetite, and difficulty sleeping. Finally, some people were diagnosed with a 
condition known as “Disordered action of the heart,” a more diffuse anxiety characterized by 
                                                        
18
 The DSM-V category of “Complicated Grief Disorder,” might be an exception. 
 
19
 Symptoms of hysteria in the present day mostly fall into the category of somaform disorders (modified in DSM-V 
to be called more simply, Somatic symptom and related disorders [APA 2013]). Conversion Disorder, one disorder 
in this section of the manual, is the most similar to the kinds of behaviors observed in Freud’s day when hysteria as a 
prevalent psychological problem mostly in women. Today, conversion disorder—meaning anxiety or depression is 
“converted” to physical symptoms—is exceedingly rare.  
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weakness, palpitations, and problems concentrating; this disorder was often given to those not on 
the front lines or exposed to direct combat (Young 1995).   
 In 1941, just before the United States entered World War Two, a monograph written by 
Abram Kardiner
20
 was published; today it is considered a “landmark” (Young 1995) in the 
genealogy of PTSD. Published by the National Research Council, The Traumatic Neuroses of 
War departs from classic psychoanalytic perspective by emphasizing the highly adaptive and 
protective nature of war neuroses. Kardiner argued that Freud’s concept of repetition 
compulsion, “a defense maneuver by the ego to restore mastery—hides the fact that the ego has 
been significantly altered by the traumatic experience” (cited in Young 1995:90). Treatment by 
the War Department included extra rest and rehabilitation, and if severe, standard psychiatric 
therapies of the time, including talk-therapy, drug therapy and convulsion shock treatment. 
 As Young (1995) articulates, before the publication of DSM-III in 1980 (development 
and early drafts of the manual began in 1974), there were no standardized psychiatric 
nosologies—something that today is taken for granted. Some two hundred disorders were 
included, each with a discrete set of criterial features. Inherent to the manual, and this remains 
true today, is a system of differential diagnoses or a method of elimination whereby similar 
diagnoses are ruled out, one-by-one. For example, the absence of agoraphobia rules out a subset 
of anxiety disorders, refining the diagnostic process.  
Before DSM-III when post-traumatic stress disorder first appeared, ongoing distress 
following a traumatic event was known as a “gross stress reaction” in DSM-I and “transient 
situational disturbance” in DSM-II (cited in Young 1995). The symptoms of PTSD have 
remained relatively stable since 1980: persistent and distressful reexperiences of the traumatic 
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 Kardiner had been psychoanalyzed by Freud for a brief period of time (Young 1995). 
90 
 
event, such as dreams, flashbacks, and intrusive images; symptomatic numbing, such as 
emotional amnesia or loss of interest in activities previously found pleasurable; a tendency to 
avoid situations that might trigger recollections of the traumatic experience; and increased 
physiological arousal, evidenced in sleep disorders, difficulty concentrating, and irritability. 
 Historicizing these categories is instructive to understand how culture shapes our 
understanding of mental illness—it may also be a fruitful way to “read” culture. As Andraeson 
points out, “DSM-II was compiled during the relatively tranquil interlude between World War II 
and the Vietnam conflict” (1980:1518). When DSM-III committees in the late-1970s were 
revising the section on anxiety disorders, Transient Situational Disturbances became Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder. At this time in America, the stereotype of the angry, violent and 
drunk Vietnam Vet emerged (Young 1995), further reinforcing this disorder as one marked by 
unpredictability. In the mid-1970s clinicians observed that symptoms exhibited by war veterans 
were remarkably similar to women experiencing what was known as “Rape Trauma Syndrome” 
(Ozer et al. 2003). While PTSD, even today, is diagnosed among survivors of sexual assault, 
accident victims, and others, it has long been associated with war. 
 
Looping Effects  
To explore how it is that particular idioms come about in particular places at particular moments, 
I draw on Ian Hacking’s concept of “looping.” Hacking devotes a number of related works (see 
1988, 1995, 1999) to investigating how categories come into being. In his essay Making up 
People, he opens the text by asking: “were there any perverts before the latter part of the 
nineteenth century?” The answer (decidedly, no) points to a problem that is at once ontological 
and epistemological (1999b[1986]:161). As Davidson argues, “[p]erversion was not a disease 
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that lurked about in nature, waiting for a psychiatrist with especially acute powers of observation 
to discover it hiding everywhere (cited in Hacking 1999b:160). Rather, perversion as a disease, 
and the pervert—a diseased person—was “created,” or came into being in the late nineteenth 
century. And yet, surely behavior that we now ascribe to perverts (such as looking into windows 
and spying; “peeping toms”), was present in the past although not labeled as such. To give 
another example, Hacking points out that “there have been plenty of same-sex activities 
throughout the ages, but not…same-sex people and different-sex people” (1999:163). The 
development of categories often implicitly create binaries; until a “homosexual” was a kind of 
person, there were no “heterosexual” people. 
            The arguments in Making up People, which could be considered a form of labeling 
theory, sets the foundation for a set of perhaps, deeper questions. Hacking is not merely 
interested in labels, but in understanding why and how people come to identify with those labels, 
further perpetuating the ontological status of the category. He refers to this interplay between self 
and society as “looping,” a reciprocal process whereby individuals change their behavior to 
match a culturally constituted category (1995; 1998). Psychiatric categories are not sufficiently 
perpetuated merely by labeling individuals, as such (Bourdieu 2000; Foucault 1965; Goffman 
1961). For a mental disorder to become normalized within a society, individuals must come to 
identify with, and phenomenologically experience oneself as a “depressed,” “psychotic,” 
“traumatized,” or otherwise-categorized person. The self is shaped largely by the responses of 
others; the more the category is recognized in oneself (by others), the more one identifies with 
the category, reifying the salience of category, itself.  
            Building on Hacking, some researchers consider the dynamic interplay of social looping 
and the body. The effects of looping are not merely philosophical, but rather, Kirmayer and 
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Sartorius (2007) argue, cultural systems directly influence the phenomenology of illness at the 
somatic or bodily level of experience. They argue that “biomedicine assumes that complaints 
about bodily function are more or less direct indices of impairments of organ tissue or function, 
neglecting the fact that these complaints emerge from processes of attention, interpretation, 
labeling, and social presentation” (2007:833). Seligman and Kirmayer (2008) have described 
trauma as products of "bio-looping"; an exchange between patterns of attention and information 
processing with cultural scripts (50). Their study draws attention to the work of culture in that 
without feedback and reinforcement from the social world, the loop does not continue. These 
studies raise further questions about the linguistic and cognitive processes involved the 
“translation” of experience. In other words, how do people generate a “verbal report” of what is 
the matter?  
            In her ethnographic account of bipolar disorder in the United States, Emily Martin 
observes a clinical interview of a woman, “Ms. Vincent,” who it seems had a life-long struggle 
with depression. But it was not until this particular admission that she “learned” she also suffered 
from mania. The doctor asks: What is it like when you’re well, when you’re yourself?, to which 
the patient replies, “I don’t know. I just found out I’m sick. I thought I was normal when I was 
speedy” (2007:104). Ms. Vincent experienced herself as “speedy,” and likely got that feedback 
from her social environment, as well. But “finding out” that she is a person who is not just 
depressed, but a person with bipolar disorder, reshapes her understanding of self and of her place 
in the world. 
            When Americans soldiers today begin to experience troubling symptoms, many will not 
be surprised to “find out” that they have PTSD. Although most perhaps cannot name the precise 
symptoms, the culturally-embedded notion of “what happens” when exposed to the violence and 
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horrors of war is already prescribed. When a violent event occurs, the soldiers see how others 
around them respond; in fact, it is likely they already know someone with PTSD. There is a 
culturally-prescribed way of presenting with or expressing internal distress associated with 
troubling events. The looping that occurs involves institutions, experts, popular media, public 
policy, insurance companies, clinical training programs, as well as therapeutic practices. I am not 
arguing that mental health programs and disability benefits cause PTSD, but rather recognizing 
the reciprocal reinforcement of behavior that has come to be associated with trauma. The 
language emphasizing the chronicity of the disorder is reflected in these practices and institutions 
as well as experienced by individuals. 
            In instances of PTSD, memory serves as evidence of the disorder’s existence (looping). 
In other words, “[e]vidence of a traumatic experience is adduced from the patient’s active 
memory of the event; from his embodied memory of it (consisting of traces of the event, mirrored 
in symptoms); and from collateral information that places the patient in circumstances severe 
enough to qualify as traumatogenic” (Young 1995:120). Hacking (1999) refers to this mutual 
reinforcing between individuals and the social world as dynamic nominalism. He understands 
psychiatric categories like PTSD as “interactive kinds,” distinct from the “indifferent kinds” or 
natural kinds of the natural sciences. He gives the example of a quark, which is a quark in spite 
of us naming it as such. In other words, its existence is indifferent to social influence. Interactive 
kinds are shaped by a dynamic relationship between selves and society.  In this way, categories 
of persons can be read as objects of knowledge (Foucault 1970), which Hacking also understands 
as “new possibilities for human choice and action” (2002:4). With regard to trauma, it is only 
through dynamic nominalism that kinds of persons (trauma victims), the study of trauma 
(traumatology) and psychosocial treatment programs like Wounded Warriors arise.  
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            For instance, rates of Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) soared in the 1980s in tandem 
with false memory syndrome and other categories of trauma and dissociation. As clinicians begin 
diagnosing individuals with the disorder, patients systematically identify with it. The more both 
patient and therapist observe indicators of the disorder, the stronger the identification. This 
personal identification loops back to reinscribe the category, such that the category itself acts as 
evidence of an ontological process over time. Psychiatric categories continue to shift and change. 
MPD is now known as Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID); which as Martin articulates, does 
not merely contain a new description, but actually makes new kinds of intentional action 
possible. Those diagnosed with MPD in the 1980s were understood to have more than one 
person inside; in other words, each personality had its own intentional action. With DID this 
shifted towards understanding the shift in personalities to be involuntary and unconscious; 
therefore, “the criteria for speaking of intentionality are not present in the same way” (Martin 
2007:230). With new language and description, comes new possibilities and opportunities (or 
new constraints) for intentional action that were not there previously.  
            The learning of illness comes not only from clinical settings, but from popular culture, as 
well. Martin describes how when a physician asked a young man, Mr. Lawrence whether 
someone told him he was bipolar he replied: “No one said I was bipolar. I started reading books 
myself, like Kay Jamison’s. I also read Moodswing. It hit so on the point, I diagnosed myself. I 
am Bipolar 2b. It is hard to deal with jobs, when the whole world is nothing but consistency and 
you are not” (2007:113). Likewise, when Multiple Personality Disorder was at its cultural height, 
numerous films, books and television shows featured (often young women) dramatic examples 
of what it means to have “multiple personalities.” In the late 1950s, The Three Faces of Eve 
portrayed a woman who after coming to terms with her childhood trauma was at once, whole 
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again. A television series, Sybil, that aired in 1976, depicts a similar tale—although one much 
darker and sinister than previous cinematic representations; here, each personality has a highly 
autonomous agentive status in relation to “the host.”   
            There was also a rapid flux of conferences and clinical symposia on dissociation and 
MPD, which are significantly less popular today. Within anthropology there were a cluster of 
studies investigating whether spirit possession in other cultures were really instances of Multiple 
Personality Disorder (Castillo 1994; Krippner 1987). As Martin (2007) articulates, when mental 
disorders are at their height of popularity there is a lot of attention spent not only confirming 
instances of the disorder across place, but also across time, speculating whether various historical 
figures had the disorder (e.g. did Van Gogh have bipolar disorder?). Hacking (1999a) as well, 
points out the propensity people have to retroactively identify cases of disorders during historical 
time periods before the category existed; this exercise seeks to stake claim to the veracity or 
ontological existence of the category.  
               In tracing the looping effects of mental disorders it can sometimes appear to the casual 
reader that Hacking (1998) and Young (1995) suggest that clinicians and social service 
organizations (almost maliciously) produce disorders in otherwise innocent members of society. 
It should be stated not only that psychotherapists and other providers intend to help and support 
those who are suffering, but they often do help and support those who need it. And nonetheless, 
historians and social scientists interested in psychiatry must necessarily explore how institutions 
across time have diagnosed and categorized those whom they treat. Young (1995) describes how 
Judith Herman, author of Trauma and Recovery, articulates how it is the therapist’s job to help 
the patient to reconstruct the traumatic memory from “the fragmented components of frozen 
imagery and sensation…and to slowly assemble an organized, detailed, verbal account, oriented 
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in time and historical context” (1992:177). With this abreactive style of therapy, patients are 
encouraged to locate and uncover the site of psychic trauma; “every patient conceals a narrative, 
his pathogenic secret” (Young 1995:227). When the narrative emerges it is expected to be 
cathartic; it is also the moment that Hacking’s loop comes full circle. The once painfully hidden 
narrative that is now becoming exposed and uncovered serves as evidence of the disorder’s 
veracity and existence in the first place.  
But is this true that traumatized people must necessarily find ways to reconfigure their 
stories as a method for healing? Young (1995:240) observed group therapy sessions within a VA 
hospital in the late 1980s and offers the following vignette of a clinical debriefing among the 
staff: 
LEWIS: Everything’s ‘reenactment’ now! Five months ago, we had never heard of 
‘reenactment’ and now— 
 
CAROL: Did you hear what Eddie said in communications [group] today? ‘My family 
never listens to me.’ This is a reenactment. It’s his experience in Vietnam. At one point, 
he was abandoned by his outfit. Then later he was its radioman, it’s ‘ears.’ 
 
LEWIS: Listen, Carol, some of the things that they say have nothing to do with Vietnam. 
 
CAROL: The experiences they describe don’t have to be from Vietnam. They can be 
experiences that occurred before Vietnam. But these experiences can be screen memories 
for their Vietnam events. And this stuff [disagreement] between you and me, this is 
reenactment too.  
 
From Carol’s perspective, until the trauma that remains “stuck” inside becomes exposed and 
emerges, it will again and again disturb the Vets who resist confronting and reliving the painful 
events. The traumatic memory is so powerful it can even co-opt previous memories and use them 
as “screen memories.”  
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 The therapeutic process is meant to work by encouraging—sometimes quite 
provocatively—their patients to “go back” and to “face” what happened. In a group therapy 
session, Young (1995:248-249) recounts the following: 
JACK: I’m jumpy today. I had a bad night. Trouble breathing, like Vietnam when my 
anxiety attacks began. 
  
LEWIS: What caused your anxiety in Vietnam? And what caused it last night? What did 
they share? 
 
JACK: I don’t know. I tried to trace it last night. I felt that I was afraid of something. 
What? Dying? A heart attack? Everything mimics a heart problem. I couldn’t get my 
breath… 
 
 LEWIS: What was happening in Vietnam when you had this feeling for the first time? 
 
 JACK: …I can’t remember anything special; just everyday bullshit. 
 
LEWIS: Well, we know that last night there was a major stress response and reenactment. 
Go back further. 
 
JACK: You know, I have just one big fear: that it’s going to happen all over again: that 
they’ll pump me full of Thorazine… 
 
LEWIS: You keep going outside of yourself for your explanation. Go with the model. It’s 
a tool. It gives you something to look for. It’s a map, a hypothesis to check out. It helps to 
focus you. 
 
JACK: I started sweating—my head was pounding. Then everything seemed back to 
normal. But then it started all over again. I’d like to know what’s under this 
motherfucker. 
 
LEWIS: You do know, Jack. It’s conscious. When you recognize it, it will be painful, and 
that’s why you don’t uncover it.  
 
 JACK: You know the motherfuckers gave me shock treatments in the naval hospital… 
 
LEWIS: You’re choosing to avoid—you’re continuing the aggression by talking about 
shock treatments. 
 
From this perspective, so long as Jack avoids following the “map” that will lead him back to that 
painful place, he will not recover. There are also specific reasons for trauma therapy to occur in 
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group settings. As Young articulates, the catharsis of traumatic narrative is meant to occur not 
just in speakers, but in listeners, too.  
Clinicians today do not all agree that a “going back” or “reliving” is beneficial—for 
tellers or for listeners. For example, Seeley (2008) in her ethnographic study of therapists and 
their attempts to provide help during and after 9/11, describes how therapists who descended on 
lower Manhattan began to wonder whether debriefings and the retelling of the horrors people 
witnessed was actually cathartic. As time went on, they too, began to struggle with the atrocities 
around them, sparking a wave of recovered traumatic memories among providers—what Seeley 
(2008) understands as trauma contagion. This rings true of Lester’s assertion that “[w]hen we 
conflate trauma-as-moment-of-injury and trauma-as-ongoing-lived-experience, we forever loop 
present-day experience back into the past, affixing it to the original insult or injury and severely 
constraining our interpretive and therapeutic horizons” (2013:755). In connecting all present 
forms of suffering again, and again, back to same narrative, opportunities for having a different 
kind of experience are foreclosed. In dropping the need to return to what has already passed, 
there is a moment of what Tibetans might call “freedom from fixation.” Recognizing that 
moment to moment everything changes, creates the potential for a kind of radical freedom where 
no possibilities are foreclosed. My Tibetan interlocutors argue that by clinging tightly to 
something that has already passed, we limit our capacity for authentic experiences of the present 
moment.       
 
 
Socialization and Childhood 
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Why do Tibetans find it rather natural to “hold lightly” to memory, whereas Euro-Americans 
might have great reservations in doing so? To understand cultural mechanisms, such as the 
function of memory, I suggest it is productive to reflect on socialization and child-rearing. Many 
Tibetans, particularly from nomad areas, do not know their exact date of birth; I discovered this 
fact in collecting the demographic data for my interviews. When I asked their age, some said, 
“Oh, 33 or 34.” By the time they got to India, when they needed to record a birthday on their 
Residential Certificate (RC), or other legal document, they simply made up a date and estimated 
the year. It is not that Tibetan parents find it insignificant for a child to be born; but recording a 
precise date seems insignificant. A notable exception is the birth of tulkus, incarnate lamas, 
whose birth marks a highly auspicious occasion—a realized being taking rebirth. In chapter 4, I 
explore why cultural notions of memory and temporality create a resistance to formulating 
narratives and testimony of the past.  
            As Makley (2005) articulates, a notable exception to a tendency not to look back too 
much is the extensive Tibetan genre of rnam thar (biography) and rang rnam (autobiography). 
However these texts are generally limited to “accounts of exemplary individuals presenting a 
retrospective process of the development of an enlightened self” (Makley 2005:51; see also 
Gyatso 1998). So while it is typical to remember the birthdays and write about the lives of so-
called realized individuals, such practices are not the norm among ordinary Tibetans. 
            Just as I found it difficult to wrap my mind around how someone could not know their 
birthday, it seemed equally unusual to Tibetans why foreigners make such a big deal of it. I do 
not recall any of my Tibetan friends or neighbors celebrating a birthday even if they knew of 
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their exact date of birth
21
. The ways in which some Tibetans know their exact birthdays, some do 
not, some roughly know, (and all these permutations are culturally acceptable) is easy to 
comprehend example of how Tibetans notions of memory and temporality are not rigid; there is 
an epistemological assumption that all things in the world (including time, space and 
personhood) are somewhat fluid. 
            To explicate the looping effects of traumatic memory among Tibetans—a process, I 
argue that is marked by flexibility among those who are most resilient—I consider the ways that 
socialization creates the ground, or worldview that fuels this particular understanding of trauma 
and memory. The Tibetan responses to violence and potentially stressful events can also be 
understood through Hacking’s (1995) lens of looping; but this interplay between selves and 
societies is of course, quite different from what is observed among American war veterans and 
other trauma survivors. It should be noted that I use American notions of traumatic memory out 
of comparative utility, to highlight the specificity of Tibetan concepts. I do not suggest that  
American notions are natural and Tibetan exotic; rather I see both frameworks as looping 
processes between society and selves. Biomedicine and Tibetan medicine are both in some sense, 
“ethno-medicines.”  
            A significant difference, I argue, is that unlike in American contexts where most children 
are not necessarily provided a framework for managing loss and suffering, many Tibetans are 
socialized with cultural understandings of impermanence, karma, and the naturalness of suffering. 
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 I noticed, however, that Tibetans took great delight in celebrating the birthdays of their foreign friends. A group of 
4 or 5 young guys in their early twenties worked at the café near my house that I frequented every morning to make 
use of their espresso machine. They all had girlfriends, from North America, Australia or Europe. Being ten years or 
so older, they related to me as Achag Sara-la, older sister and often asked my advice on all things “Western.” 
Somehow one of the boys procured a heart-shaped cake pan and one-by-one, each foreign girlfriend received a 







Growing up in a world that is understood to be imperfect (from a strictly religious perspective, 
samsara is characterized by suffering) might help later in life when confronted with difficulty. A 
stressful or adverse life event—although potentially devastating—might at the same time be 
understood as a natural part of life. Karma as an ordering principle of reality mitigates the feeling 
of senselessness that might be felt in other cultural contexts when disaster occurs. Even when 
overwhelmed with pain, there remains a silver lining: the negative karma that has ripened is 
something that will not be experienced again. In talking with community members about how 
they coped with political violence and resettlement, many remarked that they took comfort in 
knowing that they will take rebirth without this heavy karmic burden now that its imprint has 
ripened. 
            I argue that being conditioned as children to expect suffering might bolster resilience. But 
what is difference between this perspective and internalized oppression? Unlike in contexts 
where marginalized groups and individuals come to feel that they somehow deserve 
maltreatment, in this context, accepting that suffering is a natural part of life seems to cultivates a 
sense of interdependence and compassion—we are all human, and thus we all experience both 
happiness and loss. People are “told” by the environment their behavior is wrong (Bateson 1972; 
Hollan 2004). My Tibetan interlocutors seemed to draw sharp distinctions between self-
compassion
22
 and self-pity. If a person focuses too much on their own misfortune, they may 
receive feedback from the social world that they are only making things worse by seeing their 
own plight as special. Excessive self-pity, depression or self-deprecation is actually considered a 
form of arrogance.  
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 Compassion for oneself is an essential aspect of metta (maitri in Sanskrit) “loving-kindness” practice, a 
progressive meditation session where one generates compassion for oneself before moving to someone who is easy 




            The most resilient people in this context take a very realistic approach to their struggles 
in life, recognizing that suffering is caused by one’s own negative karma. Rather than becoming 
depressed, there are very active “solutions” for the future, such as trying to emulate ethical 
behavior to avoid generating more negative karma. One can also do purification practices to 
manage the karma that has already been generating in past lives. In his Southern California 
psychotherapy practice, Hollan (2004) observed that some of his patients who lack cultural 
idioms or explanatory frameworks experience intense psychological distress when confronted 
with loss or other difficulties in life. While some explanatory frameworks can be idiosyncratic, it 
may be that the idioms, which are shared by loved ones and society at large, such as karma 
among Tibetans, are the most protective. 
            Researchers such as Kirmayer and Sartorius have considered how cultural models help 
people to interpret or make sense of somatic illness: 
1) Explanatory models, which make causal attributions and impute specific mechanisms 
or processes of pathophysiology; 2) prototypes, which are salient images or exemplars 
drawn from personal experience, family, friends, mass media, and popular culture that are 
used to reason analogically about one’s own condition; and 3) implicit models and 
procedural knowledge that may be difficult to articulate because they are embedded in 
body practices and ways of experiencing distress. [2007:832] 
 
But because culture is not static, but rather “fluid, heterogeneous, hybrid systems of knowledge, 
institutions, discourse, and practices that vary over time and location” (Kirmayer and Sartorius 
2007:833), it is important to emphasize that the representation of traumatic memory I present 
below is not fixed. There is also significant variation within Tibetan communities in how distress 
is managed. What I present below is one of the more typical ways that Tibetan refugees seem to 




Looping in the Tibetan Case: The Making of Flexible Minds 
The institutions and cultural experts who treat mental distress in Dharamsala do not 
automatically assume that those exposed to violence are at risk for developing a long-standing 
and intractable psychiatric condition. Traumatic distress is sometimes expressed as a rlung 
disorder; but as noted in the introduction, students studying for exams or monks engaged in 
intensive meditation are just as at risk for problems with rlung as ex-political prisoners. Any 
form of excessive or intense mental activity (e.g. thoughts and emotions) that disrupts 
equanimity in the mind is potentially problematic. There is not an enterprise of trauma treatment 
(or a mental health system at all), as distinct from medical and religious healing practices.  
            The institutions in Dharamsala that support ex-political prisoners and torture survivors 
are not clinical in nature, but rather community-based organizations that provide material and 
social support. Therefore, the “contact zones,” or spaces where “people with different kinds of 
power and perspectives negotiate cultural meanings” (Martin 2007:100), tend to frame violence, 
distress and resettlement in terms that are not automatically medicalized
23
.  
            Below are two material examples of discourse used to frame typical coping and resilience 
practices. In a newsletter describing the “resilience campaign” for American soldiers and their 
families, there is a bio-psycho-social approach to care that promotes social support (even 
cultivating “spirituality” through spending time with pets) as well as promise in protecting and 
repairing the brain and nervous systems. To contrast this American healing discourse with an 
example from Dharamsala, I offer a description of services provided by GuChuSum, a prominent 
center for Tibetan ex-political prisoners started by ex-political prisoners. This is where most 
torture survivors go to seek help, and yet, there are no mental health services at GuChuSum. As I 
                                                        
23
 With the influx of NGOs and trauma researchers who engage in mental health “awareness” and “consciousness-
raising” among Tibetan refugees, I suspect that the traditional “contact zones,” such as the refugee reception center 
in Dharamsala might gradually come to frame mental distress in biomedical terms. 
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explore in more detail below, rather than seeing Dharamsala as a “resource poor” community 
that lacks mental health services (thus requiring intervention from global mental health experts), 
I suspend my own cultural assumptions about what torture survivors need to consider the 



























Internal repression of Tibetans still continues today. GuChuSum is working to increase 
awareness of these issues, to the point where the international community will pressure 
the Chinese government to respect basic human rights in Tibet. 
What We Do At GuChuSum 
ACCOMMODATE— We accommodate our members who have nowhere to go. We also 
accommodate employees of the organization. 
PROVIDE subsidized medical care to members. We also give monthly stipend to 
members who have financial problem. 
MAINTAIN an extensive database on political prisoners and their treatment, as well as 
monitoring and reporting on human rights abuses in Tibet. 
PUBLISH the annual magazine ‘Tibetan Envoy’ in both Tibetan and English. We also 
publish the biographies of ex-political prisoners from time to time. Literature on political 
awareness and the plight of prisoners in Tibet is also published. 
CO-ORDINATE events such as peace marches and campaigns with other NGOs. We 
also commemorate the founding day of the organization on 27th September every year 
and the ‘International Torture Day’ on 26th June. We also organize exhibition, lectures, 
talks and interviews with former political prisoner. 
Lung-ta House 
This is our main building. The building is used for our office, staff quarters, tailoring 
center, language school and a restaurant. 
Learning Center— We run a computer course teaching basic and intermediate 
computer skills. We also have a language school teaching English and Tibetan to the 
students who escaped Chinese persecution and didn’t get opportunity to study while in 
Tibet. 
Restaurant--- A very popular Japanese restaurant is based in Lung-ta house. Several 
members of our organization work as cooks and waiters in the restaurant. 
Tailoring Workshop--- Currently, we have twenty-two staffs in our tailoring workshop. 





            The methods of care in both contexts can be understood as methods of working on and 
re-crafting the self (theorized below as “technologies”). Specifically, I argue that Tibetans 
support one another by encouraging those with mental distress to distance themselves or put 
“space” between oneself and the negative emotions that come and go like passing clouds. This is 
accomplished by cultivating an attitude of flexibility, which is markedly different from 
repressing or denying emotions. Rather, a flexible attitude involves seeing a situation from a 
variety of perspectives and holding interpretation and reactions somewhat lightly. 
            Researchers have explored the concept of “flexibility” in a variety of ways, in terms of 
flexible bodies (Martin 1994), flexible citizenship (Ong 1999) and flexible personhood Shir-
Vertesh (2012). Saul asserts that “[a]daptation following massive traumatic events requires both 
flexibly responding to changing circumstances over time and at the same time developing a 
positive vision of recovery” (2014:2). This perspective is similar to Tibetan notions of resilience 
and healthy coping.  
            In a section of her book titled, “Learning to Be Manic,” Martin writes on the dark side of 
flexibility: when it is cultivated to reinforce the oppressive constraints of markets (2007). She 
observed a retreat for members of a Fortune 500 corporation where 22,000 employees engaged 
in team building exercises, such as a ropes course. The objective of these activities was to 
cultivate flexibility, agility, and fearlessness—the challenge of the ropes course meant to mimic 
stressful and challenging situations in the workplace. Although these traits sound adaptive and 
healthy, Martin argues that these skills were purposefully cultivated to enable workers to rapidly 
adjust to continuously changing work conditions—most notably, downsizing (2007). She argues 
that in the United States, exuberant energy even to the point of mania is celebrated and admired 
among traders and others in high-pressure jobs struggling to get ahead.    
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In the Tibetan context of traumatic memory and resilience, the concept of flexibility 
refers to a capacity not to cling or hold too tightly to anything—including suffering. And 
although it might seem counterintuitive why anyone would hold onto suffering, as one lama 
explained to me: “even though we may be miserable, having big and very important problems 
gives us the feeling that we, ourselves, are big and important. Most people prefer that to seeing 
clearly that their emotions and fixations are not such a big deal.” This sense of spaciousness and 
flexibility within the mind, many Tibetans argue, is the best state of mind for approaching life’s 
ups and downs. 
 
Theoretical Model: Making Flexible Minds 
The model below is a graphic representation of the looping between selves and society in 
Tibetan practices of resilience. Resilience in this context is not a personality attribute, but a 
dynamic process in which one can train. Through socialization practices in childhood that lay a 
foundational framework for managing adversity later in life, cultural concepts of compassion, 
impermanence and karma create a synergistic buffering against what might otherwise become 
debilitating traumatic stress. Through the lens of these cultural values, the appraisal processes of 
assessing severity and longevity, as well as developing appropriate coping strategies, are done in 
an inner environment of openness, spaciousness and flexibility. As a process of looping, these 
aspects of resilience are mutually and reciprocally cultivated and reinforced through 






















Technologies of Resilience 
In this section, I explore how Tibetans actively deploy culturally meaningful frameworks to 
generate greater flexibility and spaciousness—efficacious ways to mitigate distress associated 
with political violence and resettlement. I also situate my findings within current literature on 




























Flexible Mind  
Practice as Expression of 




coping and resilience. In particular, I take note of a shift in resilience literature, which argues that 
resilience is not a static personality trait, but rather a process. The Tibetan forms of working with 
distress and suffering, particularly in cultural forms such as lojong, show how a sense of 
resilience is a gradual, learned, and active activity in which one can train.  
In theorizing the practices of resilience, I consider how individual actors use elements 
from the social world to (re)fashion the ways one relates to oneself. But whereas Foucault (1979, 
1980) articulates how structure acts as a technology of the self, here I use such concepts in an 
entirely different way: to consider how Tibetan refugees make deliberate use of cultural 
technologies to enhance (not to limit) agency and freedom.  
 At least one scholar has previously used the notion of “technologies” to make sense of 
Tibetan cultural practices. Kapstein (1995) uses this concept to describe transmission processes 
between master and disciple. The category of gdams ngag, “instruction” is not ordinary 
knowledge that can be obtained from readings religious texts. Rather, this special knowledge is a 
“product solely of the interrelationship between master and disciple; it is the non-repeatable 
discourse event in which the core of the Buddhist enlightenment comes to be manifestly 
disclosed” (1995:275). This direct transmission reorients the mind of a practitioner, flashing 
directly on spiritual realization. It is not through thinking or contemplation, but the technology of 
the gdams ngag that changes the self. 
 Other Tibetan Buddhist practices, such as sngon’ gro “ngöndro,” might be thought of as 
technologies to help one “become of a lineage.”  The ngöndro practices are considered 
“preliminaries” for more advanced meditation practices, for which one needs to purify negative 
karma, generate merit and receive the “blessings” of the lineage. There is also a class or category 
of what are known as “skillful means” (upāya in Sanskrit, thabs in Tibetan), sometimes called 
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“right action.” Within Mahayana, and particularly within Vajrayana traditions, skillful means are 
expedient methods used to help sentient beings. In these practices, if compassion is the view, 
wisdom is considered the method or skillful means used to accomplish beneficial actions in a 
single moment of awareness. Through simultaneously combining the perception of emptiness 
with visualization of deities, put more simply, the merging of bliss and emptiness, practitioners 
quickly generate the insight and merit that would have otherwise taken countless eons to accrue 
through reading sutras alone (Rinchen 1997). Such practices could be understood as technologies 
of the self in that they fundamentally reshape not only identity, but the phenomenological 
experience of transforming into a bodhisattva. In chapter six I discuss what is known as yeshe 
chölwa “crazy wisdom”; unusual or unorthodox methods used to help beings in need or to teach 
lessons, experientially.  
But while these Tibetan technologies are advanced and formal practices, I am interested 
in those technologies that emerge from the everyday. The technologies I describe are akin to 
what Geertz articulated in his writing on religion as a cultural system. Where “an historically 
transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions 
expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop 
their knowledge about and attitudes toward life” (Geertz 1973:89). My findings demonstrate how 
the lived experience of “religion as a cultural system” might also be conceptualized as a 
psychosocial system, or framework for managing one’s place in the world. 
            Most people are exposed to at least one violent or life-threatening situation in their 
lifetime (Ozer et al. 2003). At times, resilience is discussed as something that one either “has” or 
“does not have.” Fewer studies examine what it means for resilience to be a process, something 
that evolves and changes over time. There are other kinds of mental processes, as well that might 
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be better understood as a process that is learned. An example is “belief.” Anthropologists have 
long been interested in religious and psychological experiences across cultures, particularly in 
regard to extraordinary experiences.  
            Luhrmann in her work on prayer among Evangelical Christians in the United States 
investigates how otherwise rational people come to believe seemingly irrational things. And 
while there is a tendency to approach the study of extraordinary experiences thinking that they 
just “believe,” Luhrmann argues that the process of coming to experience, is learned (2012). 
Indeed, Luhrmann and Morgain (2013) found in their randomized study that Christians who 
actively and purposefully trained to engage their imagination in prayer report more intense 
spiritual experiences than those engaging in religious activity without such training.  
Many Tibetans discussed how coping was more difficult when they were younger and 
had not yet learned how to cope properly. There are also certain kinds of coping that is seen as 
acceptable only before one learns how to more effectively deal with adversity. Coping through 
talking about problems with others is okay when young, but not highly valued as one matures. 
This does not mean that people never share their worries and concerns with one another. But the 
idea of processing and talking at length about distress is not thought to be very useful. What 
seems more useful are more active approaches, which create space and a new sense of 
possibility. 
 
Faith and Devotion as Coping Method 
Many Tibetan exile members rely on their Buddhist faith for managing difficulty in life. But 
unlike in many other religions, there is no external figure to whom one can appeal. Practitioners 
themselves must work with their minds to achieve enlightenment. And while this is daunting, in 
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another sense it is very empowering because the implication is that the capacity is actually 
inherent to each sentient being. The Buddha and his teachings remind practitioners how “one 
goes about achieving particular (and desired) states of mind” (Cassaniti 2012:308). Another way 
of looking at this is taking refuge in the Three Jewels (Buddha, Dharma, Sangha).  
Because ultimately we all have buddhanature, we rely on buddhas (not just the historical 
Buddha, Siddartha Guatama), but all those who have “gone before,” or “gone beyond” to show 
us the path. These religious teachings argue that no matter how many blessings one may have, 
ultimately each being needs to work with his or her own mind to become enlightened. Faith and 
devotion to a teacher is a method for revealing one’s own realized mind. 
 What does it mean to be a Buddha? A Buddha is a being who has purified all of their 
karma; with all of these obscurations gone, all that is left is a stainless mind. A mind that is free 
from negativity is actually what is most “natural” or “original”; anger and other disturbing 
emotions are based on a misperception of reality. Such perspectives may be difficult to grasp. As 
Farquhar said: 
As an American, though, one is inclined to ask, how can I help getting angry? When I’m 
angry, the emotion takes over, doesn’t it? Still, as I tried to imagine how I would prevent 
myself from getting angry, for the sake of my general health, I began to notice how angry 
most people are. I didn’t like what I saw. As I got better at bracketing violent feelings, 
containing social vitriol, holding the foolishness of others at a bemused distance—in 
short, as I learned to ‘not get angry’—I also wondered more pointedly why do many of 
my friends and neighbors had never learned this skill. Why do we let ourselves be 
victimized by our emotions? [Farquar 2013:109] 
 
Looking to teachers, lamas, and examples of buddhas and bodhisattvas, Tibetans feel inspired 
that they, too can learn not to get angry.  
I was once at a teaching in Dharamsala where someone asked the Dalai Lama if it was 
ever beneficial to angry. He thought for some time and then explained that “anger,” if it was used 
to fuel something righteous, such as fighting inequality, might be okay. But hatred, he said, is 
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never acceptable. The problem with hatred, he explained, is that it is based on a misperception; 
hatred causes you to see a person as completely negative. It is also said that when a practitioner 
becomes an “arya” being, someone who has had a direct perception of “emptiness,” he or she 
will never experience anger again. Like many negative emotions, Tibetan Buddhists argue that 
those who see reality clearly will see no reason to become angry. Instead, they will feel 
compassion for those who struggle with their minds. 
   
Lojong, Training the Mind             
The sections above describe the desire many Tibetans have to quickly and skillfully mitigate 
mental distress. I showed why negative emotions are seen as toxic and thought to only perpetuate 
negative karma. To avert their harmful effects, one is advised to create space in the mind. But 
how do Tibetan exile members generate more spacious and flexible minds when distress 
inevitably arises? 
            A common practice I observed was the use of “lojong” or “mind-training” techniques, 
whereby one uses Buddhist logic to deconstruct both the legitimacy and utility of negative 
emotions. When one becomes "stuck" in suffering, lojong is a technology used to create space 
and flexibility. These teachings have become part of the very fabric of moral life for Tibetans, 
which, in turn, is an important factor in strengthening resilience. Not all Tibetans are particularly 
religious. But, Buddhism is a central force in cultural life and these techniques pervade everyday 
sensibilities. Viewing any situation as workable, the teachings help one transform suffering.  
            Lojong (Tib: blo sbyong), translated literally as "mind-training," was first brought to 
Tibet by Atisha, an Indian pandit, who received the teachings from a meditation master in 
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Indonesia. But the teachings are often associated with the Kadampa master, Chekawa Yeshe 
Dorje (1102-1176), who is said to have stumbled upon the following lines of an open book:  
Give all victory to others; 
Take defeat for yourself 
 
Chekawa later wrote what is considered one of the most important works in the Tibetan Buddhist 
cannon: The Seven Points of Mind Training, a set of teachings routinely taught to lay 
practitioners. In a decidedly "fake it, till you make it" style, the lojong practice coaches ordinary 
people to respond to adversity as if they were bodhisattvas, realized beings whose sole concern is 
the wellbeing of others (Kongtrul 2005).  
            The teachings, despite their profundity, are written to appeal to common sense. They 
contain a set of 59 "slogans” (the traditional translation); a pith instruction one can call upon in 
moments of discomfort. These are aimed at cultivating two qualities: emptiness (the correct view 
of reality) and compassion. Buddhist sutras describe these qualities as two wings of a bird—
without both wisdom and compassion, the bird cannot fly. The lojong teachings show that 
putting others before self (like bodhisattvas) is not recommended just to "be nice," but rather is 
seen as the most efficacious way to mitigate suffering. Even if one is not in acute distress, this 
mindset of putting others before self is also considered the supreme method for being happy. As 
one woman described, “selflessness and taking care of others is the key to happiness. I think this 
really benefits self and others to think in this way. Then, if we practice contentment this is really 
beneficial to the mind. Then we will always think that all human beings are the same--what I 
want, you also want. This is beneficial and helps you with any mental suffering.” 
            Paradoxically, lojong coaches that to find happiness, we should "drive all blame into 
oneself." This does not stem from a sense of ethical obligation; rather, it is utilitarian for those 
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coping with difficulty and distress. Perhaps counterintuitively, Tibetans argue that by wishing 
happiness even for one's enemies, one is “liberated” from disturbing emotions. I often heard the 
Dalai Lama and other important lamas instruct community members to forgive the Chinese 
government—and not necessarily for the sake of the Chinese, but because anger and resentment 
are harmful to oneself.  
            There is a meditation practice connected to lojong known as tonglen, the practice of 
"giving and taking," where one wishes to take on the suffering and misfortunes of others. The 
practitioner imagines breathing in illness, evil, and pain in the form of black tar or smoke, 
absorbing it into his or her heart and rejoicing that now others are free from misery. One then 
breathes out freshness, space, and light, which are absorbed by all sentient beings without 
discrimination. In fact, there is even particular emphasis on practicing for those one most dislikes 
as a form of “training.” While the actual tonglen practice is very advanced, it is used even by 
ordinary people, particularly in difficult situations such as being with a dying relative. A young 
Tibetan psychologist (the only mental health “professional” in Dharamsala
i
) confided in me one 
afternoon: "When I don't know what else to do for people sometimes I just silently practice 
tonglen." Others mentioned it as an ideal, or a practice that exemplifies the mind-set many wish 
to possess. Those who can put “others before self” are considered exceptionally resilient—
indeed this way of thinking is at the very pinnacle of emotional health for Tibetans.  
            The key feature of lojong-style advice is to shift from criticizing or changing the external 
situation; instead, turning inward, seeing one’s own samsaric mind as the root of suffering. 
"Even if they don't know anything about Buddhist philosophy," explains Geshe Dawa, "when 
people begin to see their problems in terms of their own minds, and not out there somewhere, 
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they develop a broad and vast view. And this reduces suffering.” He offered the following as an 
example:  
 I went to Portugal and met a girl who broke up with her boyfriend. I told her because you 
are young you will find another boyfriend! I told her that she shouldn't contact the ex-
boyfriend or try to meet him again; just let it go. Then she said that they work in the same 
office. I asked her if she can change her job. She said that it was the best office and she 
had an excellent salary. As they worked together in the same office she would see him 
speaking with other girls and have even more suffering. Then I told her that I would teach 
her to practice lojong, which is something I used in prison. I explained that when I was 
very young in Tibet I caught some flies and put them inside a jar. I played with the jar 
and listened to the jar as if it was a radio with the flies buzzing. I put many flies in the 
same bottle. When I think back to this time, it is the same as prison. A few flies even died 
in the jar. I thought that really, it is my karma to stay in prison. This helped me to deal 
with suffering because I realized that I created it myself. Actually, I had a great 
opportunity to experience a lot of suffering, which meant I was purifying obscurations 
[karma]. Thinking like this, my mental problems gradually diminished. Like this, in many 
past lives, you must have done something negative to your boyfriend. If you did negative 
actions, then this is the result. If you experience the result now, you won't get this 
suffering later. The best would be if you could wish happiness for your ex-boyfriend. 
You could even think, okay, just like me, the new girlfriend just wants to be happy. If 
you can think very deeply then you will see it is not so difficult. One day she told me she 
no longer had these problems, even working side-by-side with the ex-boyfriend.  
 
This example is interesting because it contrasts conventional worldly advice with lojong. Perhaps 
because she was a foreigner, he begins by making suggestions on how to change the external 
environment. When he switches to lojong, there is a shift from problematizing the situation, 
itself, to the girl and how she creates her own suffering. The moment of success comes when she 
does not have to modify the situation, because instead has modified her thinking about the 
situation. This also shows how Tibetans use lojong-informed advice in a rather informal way. 
Certainly most Tibetans do not walk around repeating lojong slogans to one another. But rather, 




            This project stumbles into a number of concerns within the anthropological study of 
religion, namely, the distinctions (and overlaps) between religious scripture and everyday 
practice. Within the Tibetan Buddhist case there are even more vexing questions about whether 
one can be said to practice Buddhism at all, if he or she does not name it, as such. Many Tibetans 
living in Dharamsala do not consider themselves particularly religious, and yet cultural concepts 
of health and healing and shaped by Buddhism to such a degree that it is impossible to divorce 
Tibetan medicine from religion. When community members in Dharamsala use compassion as 
method or a technology for cultivating resilience, they do not do so, necessarily, with the aim of 
being a good Buddhist. Rather, it is an efficacious way of managing suffering—something that 
one ought to do in the face of difficulty. I note some of the religious textual sources of practices 
like lojong to render their description; but most of the influence I describe in this research comes 
not from studying scripture, but through learned cultural values. 
            The question of how Tibetans come to incorporate lojong into everyday beliefs is an 
important one. Anthropologists have long been interested in the question of "internalization"—
that is, how and why particular cultural ethos and beliefs are adopted by individuals (Carlisle 
2008; Obeyesekere 1990; Spiro 1997; Throop 2003). Shore (1996) argues that through ritual and 
repetition, semantic codes are created to interpret events. Many Tibetans—monastic and lay 
alike—learn about cultural values through anecdote and allegory. Religion scholars, such as 
Hallisey and Hansen (1996), argue that stories and narratives are typical means for shaping 
moral life across Buddhist cultures. This style of teaching is found not only in Buddhist 
scriptures, but also in everyday life. Many lamas with whom I visited answered my questions 
through story-telling.  
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            Likewise, older people give younger generations advice through allegory. Many of these 
stories and anecdotes describe great bodhisattvas—realized beings who work only for the benefit 
of others. There is also particular fondness for trickster yogis who act in seemingly outrageous 
ways, but through “skillful means” are actually working to benefit beings. Some rather lovingly 
refer to the Kagyu tradition (one school of Tibetan Buddhism) as the “mishap lineage,” in that 
through great wisdom and compassion they use chaos and confusion as an opportunity to “wake 
up” (Trungpa 2009). Such tales inspire courage, acknowledging that it is in some sense 
outrageous to put others wholly before self.  But while most people do not meet the ideal of 
acting tirelessly for others (this would be to make the mistake of romanticizing Tibetans that 
Donald Lopez [1998] so wisely warned against), these stories show what Tibetans value most. 
           In the face of profound loss and sorrow many Tibetans, regardless of their overt religiosity 
conceptualized their experience in a way that Obeyesekere (1985) has argued is typical of many 
Buddhist laypeople across traditions; they automatically “generalize their despair from the self to 
the world at large” (140). Although these sentiments are linked undoubtedly with Buddhist 
values of compassion, these ethos are not considered explicitly religious in nature. Many 
community members explained to me that just by virtue of “being Tibetan,” they learn about 
compassion and mind-training through their culture. Specifically, there was a sense that “good 
Tibetan families” would necessarily teach their children to put others before self.  
A young man named Ngawang who recently finished high school in Dharamsala said the 
following: 
When I was living in my village in Tibet, I didn’t know that actually Tibetans are pretty 
kind.  But when I went to many places in China and came to India I saw many different 
people from all over the world. I realized that actually Tibetans are quite compassionate 
and kind to others. Therefore, I think that these qualities are inherited from our ancestors. 
The real meaning of Buddhadharma is to use mind training to work with our minds for 
the benefit of others. Therefore, if we believe and practice Dharma, this creates peace. 
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Moreover, it is beneficial to others. If we work for others with compassion and love, then 
others whenever they see us, will smile and respect us. Also, we don’t need to worry that 
someone will harm us and want to hurt us.      
 
Parents strive to teach their children that a meaningful life is centered around working for the 
benefit of others. An older monk spoke similar sentiments: “Some of my relatives came to me 
for help, but mostly they were very young and were put into schools. However, from the bottom 
of my heart, I told them not to waste their time and to study hard in order to be a person who can 
help others. Other than that, I can’t advise others very well.” The idea of studying hard to 
become a compassionate person reflects the notion that one must train to put others before self. It 
is more of a skill than a personality attribute. 
            Another important way the lojong teachings are learned in Dharamsala is more direct, 
through religious teachings—an integral part of community life. Nearly all community members 
attend the Dalai Lama's frequent teachings—if only to don one's finest clothing and have a picnic 
with family. Lojong-style teachings on emptiness and compassion are among the most common, 
and were routinely referenced in interviews, certainly with monks and nuns, but with laypeople 
as well. For example, a 17 year-old student named Tenzin said, “we know from attending 
teachings by His Holiness [the Dalai Lama] that the best way to be happy is to put others before 
ourselves. But he knows this is hard to do, so we should start very small.” It is common when 
giving advice for lay community members and monastics, alike, to remind friends and family to 
hold the Dalai Lama as a model of decorum. More than just the spiritual leader of Tibet, the 
Dalai Lama is regarded as a realized being, the incarnation of Chenrezig, the bodhisattva of 
compassion. He is held as a point of reference and the devotion people have for him is not so 




The ‘Six Perfections’ 
When one takes a bodhisattava vow
24
, the wish to continue taking rebirth until all other sentient 
beings have attained enlightenment, one begins to train in the six paramitas, or the six 
perfections. The six paramitas are: generosity, discipline, patience, exertion, meditation, and 
prajna. The first five help to generate merit (good karma), and culminate in the last one, prajna, 
which is wisdom that comes through realizing emptiness. The idea is that one trains in the six 
perfections in order to become a bodhisattva. It is understood that this take many, many lives to 
accomplish. However the belief is that one who trains in the six perfections will eventually 
become a realized being on the path to enlightenment. The training in the six perfections in 
meant to take place “on the ground,” so to speak, in everyday situations. This is what people 
mean when they talk of taking adversity onto the path. Tibetans often joke that you don’t have to 
“look around for problems in order to practice”; because there are always difficulties in life, 
there are innumerable opportunities to practice to the paramitas.  
An older man, Dundrup, who looked somewhat rough in appearance, although dignified 
just the same, explained to me: 
We have to talk about two factors for being able to cope with problems. The first, is 
people who have knowledge about Buddhdharma and those who really practice. This 
kind of person, whatever the experience-beatings, torture, imprisonment-the suffering is 
only temporary. They might get angry temporarily, but then they will think that those 
who are beating me, probably they have families and need money for their children. 
Maybe they have to work in the prison to help their children. This helps them to cope 
with problems. Also if we can practice Buddhism and meditate on compassion and 
patience, it is very beneficial for our minds when we have problems and difficulties. 
Those who can practice, when they have problems, they can think that even if I have 
problems this means that maybe others won’t have the problem. And also, we all have 
problems, so it is only natural. If we can think like this, it really benefits our minds. 
 
                                                        
24
 While the meaning of the vow is rather extraordinary, many (if not, most Tibetans) take the vow. It is not reserved 
for those with special qualities or qualifications.  
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The values (generosity, patience, and so forth) are also important to maintaining a harmonious 
social world, but these values are not particularly moralistic as in Judeo-Christian virtue. If one 
does not practice generosity, one is not considered a sinner. It is just more skillful and more 
useful to be generous.  
In general, Tibetans tend to think of emotions not as bad or good, but as helpful or useful 
(or not). A young man named Rigzin said to me: “Because my parents are my dearest relatives 
and they were not friendly to one another, this made me very unhappy. If someone is angry and it 
is beneficial to be angry, then it is okay to be angry. But if it doesn’t benefit anyone, then it is not 
useful to be angry.” The extent to which someone is able to practice the paramitas is more 
indicative of their wisdom—not so much their moral character. Those who are stingy and 
impatient are seen as not very bright or skillful. There are countless Tibetan Buddhist texts 
dedicated to the six paramitas and their usefulness in developing compassion and a view of 
emptiness. Such ideas also permeate everyday cultural sensibilities. An abbot of a small 
monastery in Dharamsala said the following: 
The Dalai Lama always says that we can meditate on love and compassion in order to see 
all people as equal. From the practices of bodhisattvas, we see that we can stop negative 
actions. We all have this capacity, but we have to train. For example, some children 
behave very badly. There are constructive ways for parents to advise their children. 
Sometimes parents need to speak sweetly and sometimes they need to speak more 
wrathfully. Sometimes it is skillful to lightly beat them. But parents never look at their 
children as an enemy. Parents always wish for the best for their children; they want them 
to become good people. Mainly we need to avoid being angry very directly with 
someone, even if they perform very negative actions towards us. We must remember that 
the source of their behavior is afflictive emotions. If we remember this, then this would 
be very beneficial. This practice can be done by all people; not only monks and nuns. It is 
very possible for ordinary people to practice this. Mind training is a practice of a 
bodhisattva and all people can take bodhisattva vows. We need to try and generate 
bodhichitta. There is no distinction in capacity among people who are rich, poor, old, 




There is often this kind of juxtaposition. Such practices are accomplished by bodhisattvas, 
realized beings, and yet, it is always emphasized that all human beings (actually all sentient 
beings) have the same potential.  
Many classic texts draw on humor to teach these lessons, showing how illogical it is to be 
impatient and so forth. For example, the great 8
th
 century Buddhist master, Shantideva instructs 
practitioners who struggle with generosity to spend their lives practicing through taking a piece 
of fruit in one hand and giving it to the other hand. Until the practitioner sees being stingy with 
others as just as absurd as a reluctance to pass the fruit to one’s other hand, he or she is advised 
to continue this practice. This practice is an example of lojong, which is all about going against 
the grain; it is swimming up stream. Jetsunma Tenzin Palmo (2011), an important female abbot, 
once told me that lojong is like going to the gym. She said, “you don’t just keep lifting the 3-
pound weight all the time. That’s not good for training; it’s too easy. To develop your capacity, 
it’s good to strain just a little bit. That is how you develop your muscles. Developing greater 
compassion and the realization of emptiness is like that. You just train in both; little by little.”  
 
Emptiness  
Lojong teachings are very pragmatic in nature. Since life inevitably presents difficulty, the 
teachings show how adversity can be used as an opportunity to generate greater wisdom 
(realization of emptiness) and compassion. As one lama explained, there are different ways to 
work with suffering which bring the same result. "All people want to have happiness," he said, 
"however under the influence of attachment and desire they are not happy. Some practice 
emptiness as an antidote to attachment and become happy; some practice compassion and 
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cherishing others as a way to become happy.” But while it is easy to imagine how practicing 
compassion helps one to be happy, what does it mean to practice emptiness?  
Emptiness, or shunyata (Sanskrit), sometimes referred to as “voidness,” is the Buddhist 
view of reality. Rather than seeing reality clearly, ordinary beings tend to view phenomena (and 
oneself) as permanent, unchanging, and independent. Not understanding emptiness is considered 
the very foundation of suffering. The Buddhadharma teaches that people suffer because they 
resist the nature of reality and wish to solidify their possessions, relationships, and health—we 
want to make them permanent and unchanging, and when we resist change, we suffer.  
When difficulty arose, many Tibetans with whom I spoke, used lojong principles to try 
and reflect on impermanence. Reflecting on emptiness and impermanence as a way to cope with 
difficulty does not mean that people do not suffer. But they accept the Buddhist notion that 
suffering comes from the inside—from one’s own mind—and not from the outside. Tashi 
Dolma, a 35 year-old woman who left Tibet 10 years prior to my arrival in Dharamsala says: 
When my mother passed away I tried to think about no-self [doctrine] and emptiness. I 
thought how plants look beautiful, fresh and alive in summer. However, gradually 
seasons change and leaves fall on the ground. Likewise, my mother was 65 years old and 
she had become old and reached the end of her life. There was nothing that could be done 
and I just accepted it. I am a refugee and I was unable to see my mother before she died. I 
believe this is the result of previous karma. Thinking like this was of great benefit to me. 
Buddhist philosophy has influenced Tibetan habits so people think about karma and 
impermanence, which helps them cope with problems.  
 
Many community members described that when you are able to accept that things change and 
fall away, then we can just relax and actually enjoy the beauty of life. They say that if you are 
clinging and grasping, you aren’t able to really enjoy life. It is not that things are meaningless. 
Emptiness just means that there is no fixed or inherent meaning. And in this view, there is 
freedom and a sense of possibility. 
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             Another example comes from a lama, from whom many community members seek help 
in times of difficulty. When I asked him how he helps those who come to see him, he explained 
that most people cannot look at their own faults and shortcomings, and this is why they suffer. 
He said: 
There are some difficulties in helping someone with a very negative attitude; it is hard for 
them to change because they are used to being very bad. Shantideva in his text, The Way 
of the Bodhisattva, said that some people want to cover the entire earth in leather. But 
there is never enough leather to protect us from things we don’t like. Another way is to 
make leather shoes! For example, if you want to cover the entire area of Dharamsala with 
leather, even this, you could never get enough. Another method would be to cover your 
own feet with leather so wherever you go, you are okay. In these times it is very difficult. 
In society if other people make us angry or unhappy we don’t have to react very 
suddenly. We have to think that after coming into samsara it is only natural that we 
would have problems! And it is better to react patiently and with compassion. Then all 
the causes and conditions of anger and unhappiness automatically diminish. If we can 
think about selflessness and emptiness then when other people do something negative 
towards us, such as using harsh words, we don’t need to react. There is no person to hate. 
We think that the person exists. But if we meditate on emptiness and selflessness then we 
will realize that the person doesn’t exist as we think they do. If thinking about emptiness 
is too difficult, then there is an easier way [practicing compassion]. 
 
In Buddhist doctrines, it is shown that both the self and external phenomena are empty and 
impermanent, meaning they are the result of something else—meaning they are interdependent. 
The lojong teachings describe how the more one understands the relationship between emptiness 
and interdependence, the more compassion will naturally arise.  
            In her ethnographic work, Schröder asked a lama what can be done to help those with 
serious psychiatric illness. He described that those with mental illness often believe that their 
suffering will be permanent; they “make the suffering bigger and will experience more 
suffering” (2011:87). He goes on to say that another way of creating or increasing the problem is 
to think that you are the only one suffering, and that your suffering is much more severe than 
others. The practice of compassion is not just a nice value, but a powerful method for navigating 
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life’s difficulties. To experience feelings of sadness or even mild hopelessness is not always a 
negative experience in that it is seen as more in line with reality (Obeyesekere 1985). 
Remembering that “it is only natural” to suffer in samsara was a common idioms of coping 
among Tibetans coping with adversity. 
  
Compassion 
Compassion is a fundamental aspect of Mahayana Buddhism, of which Tibetan Buddhism is one 
stream.  Exemplified in the bodhisattva vow, the wish to continue taking rebirth until all sentient 
beings have attained enlightenment, compassion is considered the pinnacle of emotional health. 
Even scientists in the West are investigating its demonstrable health effects, hypothesizing that 
compassion meditation might go above and beyond stress relief (Leung et al. 2012; Lutz et al. 
2009; Pace et al. 2009). Nearly all these laboratory studies show that positive effects are 
mediated by gaining proficiency, suggesting that increased capacity for compassion is learned. 
Indeed, there is a sense in the Tibetan community that one needs to train in building compassion, 
which monks and nuns accomplish through study and debate. The heart of many debates is to 
logically deduce why compassion is a natural response if one is in accordance with reality. It is 
not necessarily about "being nice," but about "being real." A young nun who is currently training 
in debate explained to me how she uses what she learns on the debate ground in her everyday 
life: 
If we are not able to get what we want, we should think, “oh, no problem,” even if others 
have what we want. Also when we become unhappy or have problems with the mind, if 
we can think, “there is no problem,” and we don’t mind if we are unhappy and others are 
happy. The motivation in thinking in this way is very positive and we will not have the 
problem of not achieving happiness. In our life the biggest problem we face is desire and 
attachment. If we cannot get what we want, we have many problems. If we try to be 
content then we never have these problems. Others may make us unhappy and harm us 
and this disturbs the mind. This is where seeing the self as impermanent and empty [of 
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inherent existence] is helpful. If we think of egolessness than we won’t have these 
problems.  
 
If one understands the emptiness of self and phenomena, it is not a nihilistic view where nothing 
matters. Rather, this through this realization, a sense of connectedness and compassion would be 
the logical result. 
            Many Buddhist teachings, and the allegories based on them, use a style of humorous 
logic to show why getting angry or harming others is illogical. It is not necessarily wrong, in a 
moral sense, but is actually nonsensical. An older monk, Tashi Rabten conveyed the following: 
Sometimes very close friends get angry with each other and use very harsh words as a result of 
afflictive emotions, even though they really love each other. If people can think or understand 
the situation broadly, they will feel compassion and see that the nature of this person is really 
nice. But in this moment he or she doesn’t have freedom because he or she is controlled by 
disturbing emotions. For example, if someone beat you with a stick then you don’t get angry 
with the stick or the hand of the person because the stick and hand cannot think for itself. You 
get angry with the person and not the stick! In the same way, you get angry with the disturbing 
emotions and not the person, himself. There are reasons to think about this. The person doesn’t 
have freedom for their afflictive emotions. We see there is no reason to get angry. If we can 
distinguish between the subject and the action, then we don’t get overly upset and can focus on 
solving the problem.   
 
There is a sense of empathy, which is also quite pragmatic. Tashi Rabten went on to describe 
how illogical it is to become upset with those who are impatient; or to become angry with 
someone else for being angry. Rather than forcing oneself to “be nice,” he suggests that one 
should use logic and reason to develop compassion. In addition to this orientation being more 
“sane,” he describes that it also promotes health and longevity. 
            As Ozawa de-Silva and Ozawa de-Silva (2011) note, not simply a cultural value, 
compassion is taken literally to be a defining feature of health and wellbeing. They explain, “[i]n 
Tibetan medicine, by way of contrast, the cultivation of compassion and empathy is seen as 
central to the logic of health itself, because such psycho-physical states are the very opposite of 
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the negative emotions that give rise to the imbalances…that lead to disease” (2011:99). A mind 
that is compassionate and calm is more highly valued than the capacity to express a range of 
emotion (which is highly valued in the West). 
            A sense of compassion for others was present in nearly all the stories I collected about 
hardship and coping. Many community members described how talking too much about their 
problems and dwelling on negativity is not only harmful for oneself, but can also create problems 
for others. A young man named Sonam tells the following story.   
When my best friend died on the journey to India, I was extremely sad. I was only around 
22 years old, but I had studied in a monastery, so I was better equipped to deal with it. 
When I considered what had happened, I thought that he was the only one of forty people 
to have died. This was clearly the result of his karma. Therefore I tried to deal by simply 
accepting it, and I thought that crying and being unhappy would just make things difficult 
for others. If I cried loudly my companions would have had difficulties. At this point we 
were in mountain passes and hadn’t had food for days so we were exhausted. We were in 
a dangerous position. Secondly, Tibetans believe that if we make a lot of noise in 
desolate places, local deities and nagas
25
 will harm us. For these reasons I thought there 
was no benefit in crying.  
 
While others would expect Sonam to be sad after losing his best friend, he expresses concern that 
overt emotionality might harm his companions.   
An important lojong strategy used to “train” in compassion involves thinking about 
others in one’s same situation. I often observed community members coaching friends who were 
going through difficult times to think “more broadly” about all the others in the world 
experiencing similar (or worse) problems. As one neighbor reminded me: “We can always learn 
about people who are worse off than us. It is good to remember those who are doing even worse 
than us. It helps us remember that we are not doing so badly. These are usual methods for coping 
with problems.” Diminishing and downplaying adversity in life is not seen as repression. Rather, 
                                                        
25
 Nagas are harmful spirits that are associated with bodies of water. They are easily disturbed by not respecting the 
land and cause ailments such as skin diseases and mental illness if angered. 
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it is seen as skillful, as well as realistic. Remembering that others around you are also suffering 
seems to help Tibetan exile members cope with even severe events. Zraly et al. (2013) found 
something similar in their work on motherhood and resilience among genocide survivors in 
Rwanda. Women described how thinking about how others lost their children, reminded them 
that things could always be worse. It was the sense of gratitude that comes from such realizations 
that seemed to bolster resilience and strength.   
When talking with, Pema, a 45 year-old woman who has lived in Dharamsala for twenty 
years, she described how coping with her mother’s death prepared her for when she was 
imprisoned. Having been arrested by border police when trying to leave Tibet, she was sentenced 
to 9 months in a Chinese prison. During that time she was raped (along with a group of nuns) by 
the prison guards. She explained: 
when my mother died, I didn't really have the same coping methods, or way of thinking, 
that I do now. During this time I was small so didn't understand Buddhism, although I 
was influenced by it. However after thinking carefully, I understood that when someone 
dies, there is no way to bring them back. I understood that no matter how much I cried or 
called my mother, she wouldn't come back, so I thought there was no benefit in doing so. 
Thinking like this, I consoled myself. Also, I wasn't the only motherless child, there were 
others in the same situation. I thought we were the same and gradually the suffering 
decreased. Likewise, when I was violated and raped in prison, I just tried to think about 
the poor nuns. And also all the other women in the world who have been raped. It was the 
only thing that helped me—trying to send good prayers to all the others. 
 
Many go a step beyond just acknowledging that others are also suffering by making aspirations 
to take on the pain of others; particularly those who are even worse off.  
Thubten is a 58 year-old street vendor who left Tibet as a monk in the 1980s. He says: 
I joined a monastery in Lhasa after being in school. But because I knew how to read and 
write in Chinese, I had to work in the monastery office, meaning I could not attend 
classes with the other new monks. I had finally made up my mind to become a monk, but 
it almost didn't matter because I just had to sit in the office. I was very depressed. But one 
day I realized that if it wasn't me here, another monk would be sitting here in my place. 
Thinking that doing this work allowed someone else to practice the precious Dharma 
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filled me with joy. My mind suddenly felt very spacious and I was very happy to remain 
in the office on behalf of the others. 
 
 The lojong teachings advise people to look at irritating or upsetting situations in life as precious 
opportunities. As one lama told me, “discomfort should be regarded as a great teacher. It shows 
you the work you need to do—where your mind is still obscured by ignorance.”  
Soon after my arrival in Dharamsala people around town learned that I was interested in 
mental distress. From time to time members of the community would say to me, “oh, you are 
interested in mental illness? You should talk to Ani Dawa.” Ani, being the honorific term for 
“nun,” is a 69 year-old Tibetan nun who has been living in Dharamsala for almost twenty years. 
“She has problems,” people told me. It wasn’t clear to me what kinds of problems she was 
known to have; it seemed to be a mix of physical illness, mental illness, and spiritually-based 
concerns. I went to see Ani Dawa, a plump woman whose cropped hair was a bit too long and 
unruly for a nun. She spoke very openly about her problems. She did not live in the nunnery, but 
rather stayed in a small rented room with another nun who helped care for her. This was slightly 
odd, but not unheard of. Most monks and nuns stay in the monastery and nunnery for the 
convenience of housing and food, but it is not a requirement. She explained that she often blacks 
out and has many problems which disturb the other nuns. Her young attendant sat nearby, 
nodding, as if to confirm the details.  
I asked them what kind of treatments she has tried over the years, and what she thinks she 
needs to recover. To this, Ani Dawa replied: 
gradually, I started to think that everyone [doctors, lamas, and others inside the nunnery] 
had helped me as much as they could, but with no real benefit. I thought that my illness 
and suffering in this life were the result of negative actions committed in previous lives. 
Right now I make aspiration prayers and practice virtue with the view of helping clear the 




She went on to explain that one has problems, one should not pray for oneself alone. Instead, it is 
better to make healing aspirations for all those in the world with the same problem. Focusing on 
yourself, she reiterated, makes you miserable.  
Some of the narratives I collected are in a certain sense, extraordinary. It is difficult to 
understand how someone develops aspirations to take on the suffering of others. But rather than 
deducing that these must be extraordinary people who simply “possess” these traits, Tibetans, 
themselves argue that these capacities can be learned by anyone. The training can be intentional, 
as in lojong practice, or it is developed through exposure to the culture of resilience engineered 
in exile culture. But rather than transcending from “broken” to “whole” through aligning with 
God (Lester 2005), Tibetans learn to align with their inherent Buddha-nature through letting go 
of fixation and purifying negative karma.  
 
Karma as Doxa 
Karma is not an esoteric “belief.” For Tibetans, it is just the way the world works. Bourdieu’s 
concept of “doxa,” is a useful way to understand the ubiquity and unarticulated nature of karma 
in the Tibetan worldview. This is an instance where the natural world and the social world 
appear as self-evident. Bourdieu distinguishes doxa from orthodoxy or heterodoxy, which imply 
that there is “awareness and recognition of the possibility of different or antagonistic beliefs” 
(1994). While karma is considered (by outsiders) to be a religious belief, it is more accurate to 
consider it a basic and fundamental ordering principle of reality. It is taken for granted as an 
unquestioned assumption, even among those who do not consider themselves to be religious. 
Naturally with exposure to other cultural ideals and practices, Tibetans (especially those 
in exile) recognize that Christians and people of other faiths do not believe in karma. But until 
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they are met with someone who does not “believe” in karma, many would not think to question 
it. Some of my interview participants who grew up as nomads in remote parts of Tibet described 
how amazed they were to learn (some quite late in life) that there were other countries beyond 
Tibet and China, as well as other languages and ethnicities. As Bourdieu asserts: 
the stabler the objective structures and the more fully they reproduce themselves in the 
agents’ dispositions, the greater the extent of the field of doxa, of that which is taken for 
granted. When, owing to the quasi-perfect fit between the objective structures and the 
internalized structures which results from the logic of simple reproduction, the 
established cosmological and political order is perceived not as arbitrary, i.e. as one 
possible order among others, but as a self-evident and natural order which goes without 
saying and therefore goes unquestioned, the agents’ aspirations have the same limits as 
the objective conditions of which they are the product. [1994]  
 
Likewise, Kirmayer and Sartorius (2007) note that implicit cultural beliefs may be difficult to 
identify and articulate not only because they are second nature, but also because such knowledge 
is “distributed, that is, not held by any single individual but parceled out among many actors and 
emergent from their cooperative interaction” (2007:833). Karma is an important element of 
many areas of social life. 
            In Cassaniti’s work in Northern Thailand among Buddhists and among Christians, she 
noticed something curious. She observed that while the notion of “belief” is paramount to a 
Christians, for Buddhists, they seem not to “conceptualize their relationship to their religious 
ideas as one of belief” (2012:297). She explains, that “in the Buddhist context agency is 
constructed by accessing what is conceptualized as a cosmologically natural self, and belief is 
hence rendered unnecessary” (2012:297). After seeing the movie Da Vinci Code, which has a 
Christian storyline, Cassaniti and some Thai friends chatted about differences in Christianity and 
Buddhism. Another American asked: “do you believe in the Buddha?” They somewhat reticently 
answered yes, but later told Cassnaiti they were perplexed by the question. One said it would be 
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strange to say “I believe in the Buddha” because it would put her ‘in a personal relationship with 
the Buddha that is not there” (2012:300).  
            Thai people may talk about practicing Buddhism, or having respect for Buddhist 
teachings. But “whatever will happen will happen, you don’t have to believe” (Cassaniti 
2012:301). She gives examples from a popularly cited sutra (Kalama Sutra) where the Buddha 
instructs his disciples to adhere only to what is experienced directly, rather than “believing” in 
something told to them by others: “Jesus said you have to believe in God,” one Thai interlocutor 
explained. “The Buddha didn’t say anything like that’ (2012:302). In this worldview, karma and 
other Buddhist laws simply articulate the workings of reality.  
Concepts of causality have been fruitful sites of inquiry for cultural and medical 
anthropologists. In Evans-Prichard’s classic research among the Azande, he notes that while 
Westerners often ask “Why me?” for the Azande, the most important question in health and 
healing is: “Why now.” When Tibetans evoke concepts of karma to explain causality in illness, it 
is not in the fatalistic sense. Although someone can have the karma to get sick, they might also 
have the karma to get better. At the same time, unlike illness caused by spirits, or an imbalance 
in the humours, illnesses that are caused largely by karma are known for being particularly 
intractable and long-lasting. Until the negative karma is purified through religious rituals, or is 
exhausted by running its course, the patient will not recover. 
            If asked to explain karma, most Tibetans will suggest consulting a high lama. Yet at the 
same time, it shapes the ontological worldview of Tibetans regardless of their religiosity. One 
may struggle with what happens in one’s life, but ultimately karma allows people to accept what 
life brings them. Lester (2013) raises a complex issue that she has encountered as a 
psychotherapist working with trauma survivors. Although much of this work focuses on 
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convincing patients that they are not at fault for traumatic events that have happened in their 
lives, she notes that there is often some ambivalence in doing so. She asserts that people often 
have difficulty “accepting that they did nothing at all to provoke or elicit what happened to them, 
that their participation, such as it was, was entirely ‘innocent. They often strain against the notion 
that they were powerless and at the utter mercy of something or something outside themselves” 
(2013:757). When Tibetans acknowledge that painful events likely occurred because of their 
negative karma, they are not saying that they “deserve it”; their formulation is metaphysical 
rather than moral. 
            A number of my interview participants lost friends and family members in a major 
earthquake in Tibet in 2010. As one soft-spoken young man, Tashi, age 24, told me: 
Most of my family died; seven of us died. Only me and my younger brother survived. 
This is karma. It was their karma to die and it was our karma to live. There were also 
many Chinese killed. The Chinese were frantic and wailing in the streets. Tibetans were 
much calmer. I don't think we were any less sad, but we accept death as a part of life. We 
also believe that it does not help the situation to become very upset. This can prevent 
those who died from moving on through the bardo [intermediate state between death and 
rebirth], and it doesn't help us either. My brother and I joined some others from our 
county and made prostrations to Lhasa [some 750 miles away]. We made offerings along 
the way and dedicated the merit [good karma], to our family. I felt at peace knowing that 
we were doing something to help our loved ones.   
 
There is a sense that life circumstances are earned. Negative events in the present are understood 
as the result of negative actions in the past. To fully understand how Tibetans cope with 
suffering, it is essential to recognize that their view extends much wider than the present; what 
happens in this lifetime is only one small piece of a much larger picture of past and future lives. 
            A Russian colleague working in Dharamsala, Kuba Bobrzynski, once told me he met a 
Tibetan man in his seventies who had his arms and legs bound while being held at a Chinese 
prison. With time he learned to pull his hands out of the binds. But after some time he rebound 
his own hands thinking that otherwise he would not be able to "repay his karma" if he finds a 
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way to suffer less (letter to author, July 3, 2012). While Tibetans do not typically seek out pain to 
purify karma, many maintain daily practices aimed at purifying negative karma and generating 
merit (e.g., circumambulating stupas and temples, prostrations, reciting mantras, making 
offerings), and older generations as they draw nearer to death, often devote the remainder of their 
lives to these practices. They also view difficult life events as an opportunity for purification. 
Friends and relatives console one another with reminders that karmic seeds or imprints have been 
purified. “It is over now,” they say. The seeds are “extinguished,” and one is advised not to 
ruminate or cling to negative emotions. Disturbing emotions that lead one to perform negative 
actions, are thought to only reproduce suffering by strengthening karmic imprints. One 
essentially re-creates a propensity to generate negativity.  
            Life’s difficulties are painful, but in a sense they are not wholly unwelcome. Once my 
wallet was stolen in New Delhi; when I mentioned it to my friend, Yangzom, she replied 
cheerfully: "oh, that's good! You purified the negative karma you had with the thief." This 
perspective stems in part from the Buddhist ideal of achieving enlightenment, which is more a 
process of clearing away than needing to acquire something. Even among Tibetans who cannot 
explain the metaphysical workings of karma, most seem to have a built-in sense that difficulties 
in life also contain great potential and can be weathered to benefit. 
            As I will argue more fully in Chapter 4, Tibetan concepts of memory and temporality are 
central to their practices of resilience. The laws and working of karma are an important aspect of 
the architecture of Tibetan concepts of time. These metaphysical realties intimately shape the 
experience and formulation of traumatic memory. This is true across all cultural contexts; as 
Young argues, time and temporality is an important feature of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.  
The DSM theory of PTSD is simple…it is simply taken for granted that time and 
causality move from the traumatic event to the other criterial features and that the event 
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inscribes itself on the symptoms. Because the traumatic event is the cause of the 
syndromal feelings and behaviors, it is logical to say that it precedes them. If this were 
not true, if it were acceptable for syndromal features to occur before the traumatic event, 
then the term “reexperience” would lose its accepted meaning. [Young 1995:115-116] 
 
Among my Tibetan interlocutors in Dharamsala, it was not typical for those exposed to political 
violence to struggle with persistent triggering, nightmares, and flashbacks. This does not mean 
that Tibetans never experience these symptoms; some certainly do. But this feature of 
reoccurrence in the understanding of traumatic memory is not a prominent feature; I argue that 
this might be, in part, due to concepts of karma. 
            Many community members in Dharamsala understand after a difficult life event that they 
have purified a karmic debt. Put crudely, negative action of body, speech or mind create a karmic 
seed in the mindstream; if not purified, the imprints of this seed will eventually ripen. For 
example, the experience of anger creates a seed for anger. Later on, usually in future lifetimes, an 
event happens (say, someone cuts a line) and because that seed for anger is in the mindstream, 
the imprint of that seed ripens and anger is experienced again, perpetuating more karmic seeds. 
Therefore, from this perspective, when a negative event occurs one should try their hardest to 
avoid reacting negatively. If someone cuts in front of you in line and you do not react with anger 
(you might even generously allow them to pass), then that particular seed is purified and will not 
be experienced again.  
            Most Tibetans do not necessarily think in such technical terms. Rather there is a built in 
sense of reality, which dictates that one should feel a sense of relief when something negative 
happens. Although there are Tibetans who struggle with nightmares and intrusive thoughts 
following stressful events, I found that this sense of the event being “over now,” and “purified” 
was much more prevalent than experiences of it being stuck.  In exploring how Buddhist-shaped 
cultural values and social practices enhance resilience, this project also speaks directly to 
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changing paradigms within the study of resilience that assert collective notions of resilience are 

























Chapter 4) Theories of Mind, Memory and Temporality 
Anthropological studies on the self and theories of mind have long been a topic of interest to 
medical and psychological anthropologists. Many of these works demonstrate how disparate 
concepts of self seem to be across cultures. Even within cultures, concepts of mind shift and 
change over time. This has certainly been the case in Euro-American contexts (Scheper-Hughes 
and Lock 1987). Over the last few centuries as the Judeo-Christian notion of soul loses relevance 
as an “explanatory trope” (Farman 2013), concepts of self and mind have replaced what had 
previously been delineated as the soul.  
            This project contributes a new theory of self through expanding concepts of resilience. 
My Tibetan interlocutors describe how suffering is inevitable; but more than simply accepting 
that “life is suffering” the most resilient people go a step further by using difficulties in life to 
connect with their own humanity and the humanity of others though compassion. To dwell on the 
self is counterproductive and even destructive if one becomes “stuck” in traumatic memory. 
Whereas psychoanalytic approaches to trauma insist that we must “go back” and work on 
psychic wounds through generating narrative, the Tibetan concepts of healing argue that this is 
an ineffective approach that will only recapitulate suffering. Managing trauma in this context is 
less like dealing with a meteor that shatters, leaving an imprint, and more like escape artistry. 
The blow may well be felt; but it is expected, perhaps lessening its impact. From there, the trick 
is to “hold lightly,” and look flexibly at negative emotions and distress. Focus on its empty and 
impermanent nature. Use it as an opportunity for connecting with the suffering of others. In this 
way, suffering becomes a moment of connection rather than isolation, as is seen in zones of 




            The implications for these findings contribute new theory in the areas of temporality, 
time and memory. From the Tibetan perspective, emotions, time, memories, and even the 
coherence of the self are impermanent and changing moment-by-moment. When we resist and 
refuse to accept this metaphysical reality, we experience tremendous suffering. Therefore, 
solidifying traumatic narrative and going back to “work through” past events only keeps us stuck 
in illusion. At the same time, past events have very real consequences through karma and rebirth. 
The Tibetan cultural concept of time in relation to the person is highly complex in that past, 
current, and future lives are at once, impermanent, illusory and intimately connected. This 
chapter explores how these concepts shape the function of memory and the work of resilience.  
The history of experience is not merely about a personal story but about a long project of being 
in the world that predates one’s birth and extends on beyond death to future lives.  
            But how do everyday, regular people in the Tibetan exile community relate with such 
seemingly esoteric metaphysical concepts? I argue that to appreciate the illusory nature of self 
and also be a functioning person in the world, the epistemological logic of flexibility becomes a 
highly adaptive practice—particularly in the realm of managing traumatic memory. Flexibility in 
this context—what I understand as a new theory of self—refers to the capacity to avoid clinging 
or holding too tightly to anything—including suffering. And although it might seem 
counterintuitive why anyone would hold onto suffering, as one lama explained to me: “even 
though we may be miserable, having big and very important problems gives us the feeling that 
we, ourselves, are big and important. Most people prefer that to seeing clearly that emotions and 
fixations are not such a big deal.” It is recognized that solidifying and holding tightly to negative 




Trauma and Memory Studies  
What this project tries to argue is that the cultural landscape of this community is well suited to 
accommodating, and perhaps even crafting resilience. This is not to say that all Tibetans are 
resilient. In fact, it may be argued that those who are not particularly resilient may indeed face 
stigma or have difficulty coping if the social expectations favor resilience and wellbeing over 
prolonged debilitation. Although it was not within the scope of this project to investigate these 
questions, future research in this area would be an important area for consideration. 
I hypothesize that a contributing factor to the Tibetan style of resilience is their cultural 
understandings of temporality and memory. Trauma and memory scholars, such as Hirsch 
(2011), conceptualize aspects of trauma as a kind of postmemory, asking how legacies from the 
past shape public and private identities of the present. How, in diasporas for example, do acts of 
reparation, nostalgia, and reclaiming, fashion a desire for “the return”? (Hirsch and Miller 2011). 
Although the acts of remembering (and forgetting) seem like personal experiences, these modes 
of experience are always mediated by interactions with the social world. Connerton (1989) 
argues that to make sense of this, it is helpful to draw distinctions between social memory and 
what he terms historical reconstruction. He understands historical reconstruction as a process of 
inference, or gathering knowledge about events only through knowledge of their traces: 
that is to say the marks, perceptible to the senses, which some phenomenon, in itself 
inaccessible, has left behind. Just to apprehend such marks as traces of merely making 
statements about the marks themselves; to count something as evidence is to make a 
statement about something else, namely about that for which it is taken as evidence. 
[1989:13] 
 
Historians are their own authority; “their thought is autonomous vis-à-vis their evidence, in the 
sense that they possess criteria by reference to which that evidence is criticised” (Connerton 
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1989:13-14). He argues that the processes of historical reconstruction are not dependent on social 
memory.  
 Social memory, Connerton asserts (1989) is preserved through the processes of testimony 
and narrative. However, even eye-witness accounts of recent events are not sufficient for 
historical reconstruction. “Historians do not continue to question the statements of their 
informants because they think that the informants want to deceive them or have themselves been 
deceived” (Connerton 1989:14). But they see their craft, their scientific method of collecting and 
assessing evidence to exist somewhat independently from these data themselves. However, since 
this publication in 1989 historians have come to critique stark oppositions between memory 
(subjective accounts of the past) and history (objective accounts of the past), which can 
“foreclose more nuanced understandings about the particular ways all narratives of the past are 
produced through forms of forgetting in the present” (Makley 2005:44).  
 There are certain ways that social and political institutions manipulate, reshape, and use 
personal and collective memory for gain. As Connerton argues, “[a]ll totalitarianisms behave in 
this way; the mental enslavement of the subjects of a totalitarian regime begins when their 
memories are taken away. When a large power wants to deprive a small country of it national 
consciousness it used the method of organized forgetting” (1989”14). The People’s Republic of 
China’s discourse emphasizing that Tibet has always been a part of China (and corresponding 
modification of maps over the last few decades) comes to mind.  
The debates on “historical trauma,” often used in reference to descendants of Holocaust 
survivors and native groups in North America, are varied and complex. Scholars such as 
Shoshanna Felman argue that the practice of testimony became political tools when survivors of 
Nazi Germany were asked to testify as witnesses in war crime trials (1992). As Makley recalls, 
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Elie Weisel stated that “our generation invented a new literature, that of testimony” (cited in 
Felman and Laub 1992:6). These practices become even more complex when “passed down” to 
future generations. “As trauma descendants take upon them a new form of cultural memory-
identity work, one cannot help but ask how descendants can access silenced ancestral memories. 
Once accessed, how can a traumatic event, occurring decades or even centuries ago, be regarded 
as the causal event that produces descendant present-day psychosocial ills?” (Kidron 2004:515). 
Groups such as Holocaust descendant support groups (2004), First Nations communities (Gone 
2013), members of native groups in the United States, such as the Navajo (Csordas 1999), have 
identified as survivors of historical trauma, somewhat paradoxically, to reclaim their social and 
personal agency.  
There are also ways that citizens through their own agency fashion their own 
relationships to memory and past events, through stances of refusal and “forgetting.” This is how 
Makley made sense of the “dodges and silences” of her Tibetan interlocutors in Labrang when 
she asked about the past. “I don’t know anything! I’m too young, you know! (Tib: ngas shes ni 
ma red, nga lo chung gi mo)” some would say. Or they insist that she seek old men who knew 
about early times (2005:40). During this fieldwork trip in 1995, Makely first interpreted these 
utterances to mean that as uneducated lay women, they were not legitimate narrators of history. 
It was not until later that she realized these moments were exposing “something crucial about the 
category of ‘history’ itself” (2005:41). She argues that a “vigorous alternative historiography” 
flourished here as an act of resistance to post-Mao Chinese tactics to shape memory and 
forgetting. Rather than revealing a process of communal repression, she understands the 
reluctance to create narratives of past suffering as a highly agentive form of refusal against the 
genre of testimony, itself. 
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To approach the study of memory in the Tibetan context I make use Makley’s assertions 
about resistance to creating fixed narrative, along with Antze and Lambek’s premise: “that 
memories are never simply records of the past, but are interpretive reconstructions that bear the 
imprint of local narrative conventions, cultural assumptions, discursive formations and practices, 
an social contexts of recall and commemoration” (1996:vii). These scholars are fundamentally 
concerned with time and temporality through an exploration of a past revisited. Studies on the 
nature of memory reveal and act as fruitful sites of inquiry in understanding connections between 
mind, persons and culture.            
            Using the anthropologies of temporality and memory to understand the phenomenon of 
resilience in the Tibetan exile community, I argue that the flexible and spacious minds that 
Tibetans describe as “resilient,” are also made possible through cultural understandings of 
“emptiness” and “impermanence”—qualities of space and time. Scholars concerned with 
memory and narrative need necessarily to grapple with questions of temporality (DelVecchio 
Good et al. 1994), and the work or project of constructing narratives is a means by which to 
organize and make sense of the past: what Ricoeur (1981) might call “narrative time.” Narrative 
identity also explains the appearance of the continuity of identity over the discontinuity of time; 
it explains how identity can at once include the discontinuity of change and the continuity of 
sameness. Because many of my interlocutors seemed to resist constructing solid interpretations 
or narratives of suffering, this raised a number of questions about the function of memory and its 






Going back, Staying Present, Moving Forward 
Within the Tibetan concept of healthy coping and resilience there is emphasis on the futility of 
focusing too much on the past and what has already happened. It is recognized that events from 
the past do play an intimate role in the present and future (specifically in terms of karma), but 
engaging with the content and solidifying descriptions of the past, or narratives, is not seen as 
particularly skillful ways of managing the difficult emotions associated with traumatic events. 
For example, when Honey Oberoi Vahali asked older people in Dharamsala to talk about their 
past, many said: “The past is past, why unravel it now?” (2009:6). It is necessary to address 
briefly how these Tibetan cultural views differ from what we understand in the West as 
repression. In a certain sense, their propensity for not seeing the utility in processing and talking 
about traumatic events could be understood as a defense mechanism. But although these 
concepts might in the strict sense by a form of defense mechanism, this might not be the most 
ideal framework within which to analyze the complexity of these cultural processes. 
            Within psychology, researchers have articulated the ways that resilience is different from 
defense mechanisms (Cramer 1998). Defense mechanisms were defined early on as mental 
mechanisms that alter veridical perception and protect the person from excessive anxiety. The 
source of anxiety might be the perception of a disturbing event or the presence of a disruptive 
internal psychological state, such as a wish, drive, or fear (A. Freud 1936 cited in Cramer 1998). 
For example, many scholars have written extensively on how it was possible for Germans in the 
early 1940s to “not see” the Holocaust. Psychologically, this kind of “not seeing” might be 
adaptive; as with coping, which can be healthy or unhealthy, just because something is adaptive 
does not mean it is necessarily healthy or desirable. Cramer (1998) suggests using the term 
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“adaptational process” to refer to overarching process of responding to adversity. Within this 
framework, both coping and defense are ways of adapting to a stressful situation.             
            Whereas defense mechanisms are largely without conscious awareness, coping 
mechanisms involve purposeful action. Denial was included among coping mechanisms in 
classic research by Lazarus and Folkman; in their questionnaires on coping there they ask things 
such as “Went on as if nothing happened” and “Refused to believe that it had happened” (1984). 
But in these cases, it implies that the respondent cannot handle the stress.  
            It would be an egregious error to argue that Tibetans unconsciously push away past 
events because they cannot handle it. Rather there is intentional effort not to dwell on hardship. 
In the West we usually consider healthy coping to be highly active and process-oriented. Cramer 
highlights the importance of “intentionality” in different kinds of coping and defenses. She uses 
an example of “suppression,” arguing that there is a decision made to defer paying attention to 
difficult feelings. Suppression might sound negative and unhealthy, but for Tibetans this would 
actually be applauded and considered skillful. Choosing not to “buy into” difficult feelings is not 
the same as denying their existence. 
            A number of studies find that despite a high prevalence of potentially traumatizing events 
(imprisonment, torture, religious and cultural persecution, mass displacement), rates of 
psychological distress in the Tibetan exile community are extremely low, and that coping 
activities (primarily religious) appeared to mediate the psychological effects of trauma exposure 
(Holtz 1998; Ketzer & Crescenzi 2002; Lhewa et al. 2007; Ruwanpura et al. 2006; Sachs et al. 
2008). Despite the robustness of these findings, some question whether these Tibetan 
respondents are truly “resilient,” or if they simply avoid identifying symptoms of mental distress 
or fail to report them in interviews. Researchers note that Tibetans often do not express much of 
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their physical and emotional pain, even when asked directly (e.g. Servan-Schreiber et al. 1998). 
Other scholars are skeptical about just how genuine these low levels of psychological distress 
might be, arguing there is response bias (Sachs et al. 2008)—seen as the only logical explanation 
for calm and cool recounting of severe adversity, such as torture and imprisonment.  
            Other, more critical researchers, such as Makley (2005) in her account of why Tibetans in 
Labrang avoid “speaking bitterness” in relation to the Chinese occupation of Tibet, assert that 
purposeful omission or non-disclosure of traumatic experiences should be viewed as an 
“alternative practice of time” where in their view, a reshaping of cultural memory is at once an 
act of self-protection and political resistance. Makley argues that to view a Tibetan propensity to 
avoid recounting stories of political violence as “repression,” is to grossly misrepresent cultural 
values and the function of memory.  
            Here, too, rather than ascribing to binary reasoning (e.g. either Tibetans are extremely 
resilient and “bounce back” in the face of difficulty or they repress emotions and deny pain), I 
take a more nuanced look at processes of coping and resilience, coming to see resilience as a 
learned process and moral practice. Tibetans actively deploy shared cultural understandings, 
often infused with Buddhist doctrine, to reframe the mental distress associated with loss, 
violence, and other distressing experiences. These cultural practices encourage letting go of 
distress rather than holding on or solidifying it. 
 
The (im)persistence of Memory 
The function and the architecture of memory is experienced as self-evident, despite the ways 
they have been shown to be at least in part, culturally constructed. The ways that concepts of 
memory shift and change across cultures is perhaps no more evident than in studies of how 
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individuals and communities manage and talk about trauma. For many Euro-American cultures, 
traumatic memory is something specific; a kind of “pathogenic secret” (Ellenberger 1993; Young 
1995) that causes psychiatric disorders. As Young argues, the element of “secrecy” has long 
been a core feature of trauma: “hysteria in the late nineteenth century, post-traumatic stress 
disorder in the late twentieth century—and ‘secret’ because they are acts of concealment” 
(1995:28). The crux of these changes in categorical representation over time he goes on to argue, 
directly relates to changes in modes and meanings of concealment. Whereas those suffering from 
hysteria conceal their threatening thoughts from others (expressing them unconsciously, instead 
through hysterical paralysis and other somatoform conditions); those with PTSD want to conceal 
traumatic memories from themselves (Young 1995).   
 
Emptiness of Time in Tibetan Buddhism 
As articulated in the previous chapter, the nature of reality within Tibetan culture (stemming 
from Buddhism) is that all phenomena are ultimately “empty” of inherent existence. Seeing 
things with an attitude of flexibility also means recognizing that people, objects, situations, and 
emotions are constantly changing and in flux. The Tibetan attitude of resilience appreciates that 
clinging or wanting things to remain static can only, by definition, yield disappointment and 
suffering. Like the self, materials objects, and reality, itself—time is considered “empty.” There 
is a distinction in Tibetan Buddhism between relative or conventional truth and ultimate truth. 
The concept of time is a good example of these distinctions. Although time is ultimately empty, 
it very much exists on the relative or conventional level. When things are described as ultimately  
“empty” of inherent meaning this does not mean that they do not exist; but they do not exist in 
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the way that we perceive them—as solid, as independent, and as permanent
26
. Likewise, time 
works because of consensual reality. It is functional and “real” on the conventional level. 
 The stance of flexibility is, I argue, a way of appreciating the illusory nature of things and 
at the same time, functioning in the world. It is appreciating a certain kind of paradox. There are 
anthropological works, particularly in science and technology studies that have considered other 
meanings of flexible time. One example is Farman’s ethnographic work on “Immortalists” in 
America, such as cryonicists who freeze their bodies at the moment of death so when science 
advances they can be brought back to life (2013). This research is concerned with concepts of 
death and personhood, but it also has implications for thinking of the emptiness or flexibility of 
time. Similarly, studies of organ transplantation and new medical technologies that extend life 
(e.g. Lock 2002; Sharp 2007, 2014) raise questions about the seemingly natural categories of life 
and death. In this secular landscape, the debates are not related to the existence, or not, of a soul; 
but rather, the notion that death of the person may be somewhat flexible. For Tibetans, the 
continuity of personhood in some sense extends into past and future lifetimes. 
 When a traumatic event occurs, from an ultimate perspective there was nothing solid that 
happened, and there is no solid self to which the acts were done. Such an orientation might seem 
like there is “no grip,” or nothing to hold on to or be sure about; a lack of “ontological security” 
(Giddens 1991). Giddens postulates that when there is disruption of our values or the things that 
give us meaning in life, this produces insecurity. So wouldn’t such a slippery hold on reality and 
events in one’s life produce anxiety? Why would this produce resilience?  
As is argued in the previous chapter, Tibetans maintain that the more we can let go of a 
conventional hold on things, and really see the self as “empty,” the more content we will be. 
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They say that when we abandon fixation—often manifested as hope and fear—a natural sense of 
confidence and radiance is free to shine. Seeing reality clearly, which means holding lightly and 
seeing everything as changing, impermanent and not solid, means that you are not caught in 
illusion; you recognize the mirage. Seeing the illusory nature of things, they argue, does not lead 
one to become despondent. Actually, they argue that the opposite happens; one is more in the 
present moment because one is not attached to particular outcomes.  
I recently attended a conference on resilience and heard a presentation given by Richard 
Davidson, a neuroscientist at the University of Wisconsin-Madison (2013). Davidson has worked 
on meditation and the brain for decades, and knows the Dalai Lama quite well. He described how 
sometimes the Dalai Lama will burst into tears when hearing about a sad event. And then in the 
next moment, he is laughing and joking. Davidson says it is quite remarkable to witness someone 
who is so fully present, and at the same time, his emotional states are never fixed. Indeed, one 
interesting finding in studies investigating the effects of meditation on the brain shows that 
people who learn to meditate will recover from negative emotions faster than control groups. 
What is known as emotional plasticity may be a significant factor in managing stress (Davidson 
et al. 2000). There seems to be no significant differences in how often meditators versus non-
meditators experience negative emotions, but there are significant differences in how long they 
last.  
From this perspective, negative or difficult emotions are not bad in and of themselves; 
they become problematic only when their duration and intensity become fixed in time, taking up 
too much psychic space. An additional burden occurs when we understand traumatic memories 
to be hidden, suggesting that the only way to heal is to find the destructive memory and extract it 
like the surgical removal of a malignant tumor. As Young asserts: 
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Ordinary memories fade. They are eventually confused and conflated with other ordinary 
memories and are assimilated into webs of remembrance. They belong to the past. When 
they penetrate into the present, it is as nostalgia, regret, and a desire for things now gone. 
In each of these respects, the pathogenic secret is different. Years after its creation, it 
remains unassimilated, a self-renewing presence, perpetually reliving the moment of its 
origin. An ordinary memory is a trace, the pathogenic secret is a mental ‘parasite.’ 
[1995:29]  
 
In thinking through exactly how Tibetan refugees manage to “hold lightly” to difficult emotions 
it is important to remember that resilience is a considered a process in which one can train.  
 
Freedom from Fixation 
Recent studies in psychiatry have shown that mental health interventions that focus on promoting 
greater “flexibility” within the mind, are very effective in helping patients manage anxiety and 
trauma (Hinton et al. 2011; Kashdan 2010). Kashdan (2010) defines psychological flexibility as 
the ability to distance from current or habitual mindsets and consider other possibilities; he also 
argues that flexibility is absent or diminished in many forms of psychopathology. Hinton and 
colleagues (2011) developed “Culturally Adapted Cognitive Behavioral Theory (CA-CBT)” 
which asks patients diagnosed with PTSD to replace distressing thoughts with culturally-relevant 
images while making “self-statements of flexibility” (e.g. “May I flexibly adjust to each situation 
just as the lotus flower is able to adjust to each new breeze”) (349). The common theme in these 
studies is that a flexible mind—one that accommodates change, openness, and new 
possibilities—allows one to transform suffering. 
 In the current study, when asked to identify the characteristics of a resilient person, 
participants described someone who is compassionate, humble (does not exaggerate their 
problems), and has a flexible, vast and spacious mind. I suggest that what some researchers have 
referred to as the Tibetan propensity not to disclose emotion, or to repress, may actually more 
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closely resemble what they call “broad thinking” (sems pa chen po). Self conscious about not 
exaggerating or solidifying negative emotions, many community members argue this is an 
effective way to approach problems. As one older woman named Dekyi explained: 
some think, 'oh, this is a small problem and it is only natural to experience some 
difficulties in life.' Then they just ignore the problem and move on. These people are very 
skillful because they don't disturb others with their many problems. It doesn't mean they 
are like cows who feel nothing! But they don't disturb or harm others when trying to 
cope. Anyway, whether people can cope well or not depends on individual ways of 
thinking. 
 
Comments such as “just ignore it,” “try to move on,” or “it’s not a big problem,” is not about 
repressing the problem, but about not “buying into” harmful emotions. Within this cultural sense 
of playfulness, there is a strong sense of not taking oneself or the situation too seriously.  
 During my fieldwork I encountered many Tibetans who had experienced extraordinary 
suffering. Some were ex-political prisoners and torture survivors. And all, now living in a 
refugee settlement in India, knew they would likely never return to Tibet. Because of these grave 
conditions, I was initially perplexed, much like Scheper-Hughes in Death Without Weeping 
(1992), in the diminished affect among those telling their story. While there was fervent and 
passionate political activism at the social level, when speaking about personal distress and 
difficulties in life, many Tibetan exile members with whom I spoke seemed somewhat detached. 
Often downplaying the severity of their plight, many seemed to hold rather lightly (or not at all) 
to their past and current struggles without resentment. For example, a 34 year-old monk named 
Lhundrup said: 
When the Chinese authorities and the police came to the monastery and tried to harm the 
monks, firstly I felt very angry. I even felt hatred for them. But when they came again, I 
tried to be a little more patient. I tried to think that the president and prime minister of 
China have a very negative motivation and wrong view. I prayed and wished their wrong 
views and negative motivations would be purified. I also tried to think that we have these 
problems as a result of previous lives. Therefore we have to accumulate merit and virtue 
in order to purify our negative karma causing these problems. Also, I pray and wish that 
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all the problems between Chinese and Tibetans will soon be resolved and we can all 
enjoy our lives.  
 
In this passage, Lhundrup does not deny the suffering of the Tibetan people. But there is a 
certain amount of space around his portrayal of the situation. Taking a wider view, he 
acknowledges the influence of negative karma and recognizes that everyone in the situation 
(including the Chinese) are suffering in this situation. 
Many lamas and others in the community to whom people go for help in times of 
difficulty, described to me how important it is to encourage people to quickly let go of distress. 
The major objective is to become “free” of negative emotions; or, free from fixation. One 
important method for “letting go,” was humor. Perhaps best exemplified in the Dalai Lama's 
(sometimes startling) exuberant, joking demeanor—many religious teachings and cultural 
sensibilities emphasize that a certain “lightness” and sense of humor is required for effective 
coping. One well-known high lama, Dzigar Kongtrul (2009), states:  
having a sense of humor doesn't mean laughing or being cheerful all the time. It means 
seeing the illusory nature of things—and seeing how, in this illusory life, we are always 
bumping into the very things we meticulously try to avoid. Humor allows us to see that 
ultimately things don't make sense. The only thing that makes sense is letting go of 
anything we continue to hold on to. [131]  
 
With a relaxed or even humorous stance towards suffering, resistance to the feelings lessen—the 
difficult situation may remain, but a flexible attitude helps one cope. In the Western world, 
Hacking (1995) argues, a survivor’s experience of trauma (also called the “trauma loop”) is 
fueled by feedback from the social world. But in the Tibetan community, the loop seems to lose, 
rather than gain, momentum. When Tibetans minimize their pain, others do not accuse them of 
repressing their feelings. Rather, they applaud their humility and broad-mindedness. 
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 A common theme among those coping with difficulty was the notion of maintaining 
mental stability or equilibrium, often more highly valued than expressing emotions. In 
Schröder’s (2011) study of post-traumatic stress in another Tibetan refugee community, she 
gives an account of talking with a ritual healer, or onpo, about depression and sadness following 
a traumatic event. She described a woman who was imprisoned in Tibet and now living in exile; 
she is sad, not interested in anything, and does not care for her children even when they are 
crying. The healer explained that this can happen when someone loses control of the mind. He 
emphasized that the imprisonment is not the cause of the woman’s problems. In a similar vein, 
when Schröder asked another monk-healer to discuss a checklist of PTSD symptoms, he 
explained that the major problem among those with fear and fright is that they cannot control 
their mind (sems ma ‘dzin pa). Again, the primary problem is not necessarily the fright itself, but 
rather the ‘no-control,’ which results from an unstable mind. This a very different perspective 
from what is observed in some parts of Latin America where conditions such as susto and ataque 
de nervios are directly caused by fear and fright. 
Many Tibetan contemplative practices are aimed at helping people to develop their 
capacity to tolerate the stress that comes from unstable outer (and inner) environments. 
Psychological health in this context is not having “positive thinking” or being happy all the time. 
Indeed, it is also ill-advised to be too exuberant when something good happens, getting swept 
away in elation. Rather, emotional health is marked by the capacity to remain someone content 
no matter the external circumstance. Practices such as meditation are considered opportunities 
for “training” in order to increase such capacities in everyday life. 
In meditation, as you work with your breath, you regard any thoughts that arise as just 
your thinking process. You don’t hold on to any thought and you don’t have to punish 
your thoughts or praise them. The thoughts that occur during sitting practice are regarded 
as natural events, but at the same time, they don’t carry any credentials. The basic 
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definition of meditation is ‘having a steady mind.’ In meditation, when your thoughts go 
up, you don’t go up, and you don’t go down when your thoughts are down; you just 
watch as thoughts go up and thoughts go down. Whether your thoughts are good or bad, 
exciting or boring, blissful or miserable, you let them be. You don’t accept some and 
reject others. You have a sense of greater space that encompasses any thought that may 
arise. [Trungpa 1988:67] 
 
There were many instances during my time in the field that I observed such moments of 
equanimity in action.  
It is not uncommon for Tibetans living in India to be badly treated by Indian visa offices 
and government officials—never knowing if their documents will be renewed or denied. On a 
few occasions I witnessed such discrimination. But rather than becoming very upset or hostile, 
they remarked how important it was to maintain equanimity. “It is not worth it, getting upset,” a 
woman named Drolkar explained. “It does not help. It only hurts one’s own mind—we are the 
ones who lose out if we become upset.” Many community members (lay and monastic, alike) 
would be told to wait on a wooden bench outside the visa office, often waiting six or seven hours 
for a single visa stamp
27
. Myself a foreigner, I had to do the same.  
Waiting hours on end while the visa officers drank chai and sat around doing nothing, I 
found it extremely difficult not to become upset (and often I submitted to my frustration). 
Several times I could not resist going up to the window and pointing at my passport just sitting 
idly on the desk. Please sir! Can you just give me the signature? While my Tibetan neighbors 
teased me for my impatience, I wondered why everyone except me would wait all day without 
complaint. Was this internalized oppression? Or just the reality of Indian bureaucracy that I 
could not accept? The advice from Tibetan onlookers was always the same. “Sara-la,” they 
would say. “If we get angry it doesn’t hurt them. We just make ourselves upset.” While my own 
                                                        
27
 All Tibetans are required to check in to the Foreign Registration Office at the police station every six months to 
renew their documents. 
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cultural tends to value things like “justice,” and “fairness,” (not to mention feeling entitled to 
efficient service), Tibetans often put equanimity above other concerns.    
            But certainly, not all Tibetans maintain calm equilibrium in the face of difficulty. During 
interviews, I asked participants to describe why some people do better than others in difficult 
situations. A 54 year-old man named Wangdu who came to India six years ago said the 
following: 
Two people may have the same problem yet feel very differently. Some people even if 
they have many problems, say nothing, but they are very stable and cope easily with their 
problems. I think the people who don't say anything are happy inside. It is not important 
to express every problem you have. It is more important to remain stable no matter what 
is happening. The reason people cannot deal well with problems is that they don’t have 
the quality of spaciousness or vastness in their minds. When that person encounters any 
problem it exhausts everything and they have no space to deal. They become unhappy 
and sick. The person who is ready to face difficulties will not have many problems even 
if they are a political prisoner sentenced to 17 or 18 years, or even a death sentence. They 
can deal with these problems because they have the patience to cope with anything. If 
Tibetans are compared with people from other countries, they can deal with things much 
better. Around here there are many ex-political prisoners. Their bodies are very weak and 
exhausted because they were tortured and beaten severely in prison. But mentally they 
maintain a sense of dignity and confidence. Others would become upset very easily. 
 
In thinking this, I began to wonder why it seemed important not to talk about problems with 
others. Why is there such an emphasis on keeping negativity to oneself?  
            Perplexed, I asked my neighbor, Tashi Wangyal, a 52 year-old mother of four to help me 
understand. Often teasing me and referring to foreigners as “big complainers,” she was not 
surprised by my questions. Although, she seemed equally perplexed as to why it was so difficult 
for me to understand why talking about one’s problems is not particularly helpful. She explained 
that rather than going around talking about difficulties, one would be more successful in working 
with distress through changing one’s inner relationship to emotions. She continued: 
coping depends on individual thinking. If someone has good thinking, then if they have 
problems with finances or health or legal, and so forth, then it is not important for them to 
go around making trouble. It is best to keep your problems to yourself and instead think 
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very widely and spaciously. Bothering many people with your problems will also bring 
others difficulty. It is best to cope with it on your own, through making your mind 
spacious and open. It depends on one’s thinking. 
 
Not liberally expressing one's problems is commonplace, and this was coupled with the notion 
that coping through changing the way you think is effective in making the mind more spacious, 
open and flexible—qualities associated with resilience and wellbeing.  
            To cultivate this flexibility, instead of resisting the situation, one works to transform 
one’s relationship to what is happening, even in the face of severe outer and inner chaos. 
Consider the following narrative from a monk: 
I was arrested in 1988. Those in prison have great suffering because they have no 
freedom and are put in small cells. The guards use harsh words and torture inmates 
relentlessly. After we die, some become hungry ghosts and hell beings. We don't know 
their suffering, but here on earth, the worst suffering is prison. When the youth couldn't 
tolerate their hunger and thirst I would give them advice according to Buddhism. Many 
masters of the past made great efforts to become bodhisattvas despite many hardships. 
When I think of this, I didn't feel my suffering in prison was very great. When I went to 
prison I had one small mala around my wrist. The guards asked me what I would do with 
it. I told them I would recite mantras. I had to stay as a prisoner, but I just thought of it as 
a retreat house. I was given food and other than that, all I had to do was practice. If we 
have too much food we feel sleepy; since I had only had a little food, actually this was 
much better for practice! I was there were for one year and was able to recite 100,000 
mantras each of Guru Rinpoche and Chenrezig. There were many monks there like me, 
using it positively as an opportunity to practice. Some said: 'since we are monks, if we 
have to stay our whole lives here and die in prison then it is not really prison because we 
are here practicing the Dharma.' It is good to have all this suffering now in this life 
because then it is purified and we won't experience much later.  
 
This passage foregrounds a number of typical coping strategies among Tibetans. He 
acknowledges, “I have to be here anyway,” so he tries to accept the situation and transform his 
mind to think more broadly. During my time in Dharamsala I often heard people recite the Dalai 
Lama’s perhaps, favorite piece of advice: “if you can’t change the situation, why worry? And if 
you can change the situation, why worry?” The monk does not deny pain and hardship. Yet he 
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changes his attitude or the way he relates to the situation, using his time in prison as a “retreat 
house.”  
            While at first glance, stories such as these may seem like internalized oppression, or 
merely accepting one’s fate. The difference seems to be the location of agency and exercise of 
reflection. With enough space in the mind to accommodate such thinking, one maintains his or 
her power even in unthinkable situations.  
 
Theory of Self and Mind  
There is a sense that the self can “work” on itself. But are the possibilities endless or are there 
constraints? This question drove Das and Das in their research among the poor in New Delhi. 
They were interested in how those in severely limited material situations negotiated illness, and 
understood the marginalization of these groups to be chronic and multiple. And yet, their 
interlocutors were able to seek treatment for their ailments. But more than that, it was the shifting 
self-understandings and self-awareness in the face of adversity, which provided Das and Das, 
with the greatest insight into local experience. “Technologies of the self intersect with objective 
points of power and constraint as the poor deal with illness: they engage their illnesses neither as 
heroic fighters nor as pure actors of cultural scripts. Such is the texture of the ordinary” (Das and 
Das 2007:92). The articulation of “the ordinary” suggests something compelling with regard to 
temporality. In a sense, something utterly ordinary may be so un-noteworthy that it seems 
timeless, or seamless. It is pervasive, and always there. 
 Perhaps this is why Garcia (2010) characterizes her fieldsite as a landscape of 
“melancholia.” Unlike sharper forms of suffering, melancholia is almost so chronic and 
unchanging that it feels natural, and not dependent on external or internal conditions. Heroin 
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addiction is both a cause and a consequence of this geography. With the ubiquity of death from 
overdoses, Garcia questions the notion of “mourning as repair,” as might usually be the case. 
While for Americans in other parts of the country their everyday state of mind might be one that 
is relatively happy and content, such that when they experience a loss that disrupts such 
harmony, the process of mourning is restorative. But in this wasteland of misery, Garcia argues, 
the disruption is much less stark. As Scheper-Hughes argued (1992), to understand a lack of 
affect one must look to the social world. “Emotions are social engagements with the cultural 
world; therefore, from an anthropological perspective they cannot be understood through a focus 
on individuals alone” (Postert 2012:453).  
The question here remains: why is it that Dharamsala does not become a similar 
“landscape” or “geography” of melancholia? Garcia asks: “Can one live a melancholy life that is 
meaningful on its own terms? (2010). To me, this seems plausible. But as I will argue below, a 
melancholic life—that is, one that is fixed in time and marked by past loss and suffering—would 
lnot be seen as particularly meaningful by Tibetan exiles. The problem, I will demonstrate, is not 
the negative feelings; they do not insist on being cheerful all the time. The problem comes from 
identifying with moments past. Stemming from what could be called Buddhist habitus (Bourdieu 
1980), is the notion that accepting change and impermanence is the only way to truly be content. 
Defining oneself by past trauma and holding on to suffering indicates that there is a 
misperception of reality. The emotions are not permanent and fixed—but they are experienced 
this way, causing even more suffering. 
            In her recent studies on the “everyday,” Das (2007) invites readers to consider the 
possibilities of time in a different sense. Her concern is with the “work” of temporality in the 
creation of the subject. She notes that anthropologists have long considered ways of reading 
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culture through a study of time, investigating “the relation between natural rhythms and social 
rhythms, synchrony and diachrony, cyclical time and linear time, and repetition and 
irreversibility” (Das 2007:95). Anthropologists, and indeed, philosophers, have also written 
extensively on differences between phenomenal time and personal time—an area, which for Das 
(2007), is ripe with potential for exploring subjectivity. She states, “[t]he attempt to give a 
structure to these differences often revolves around the difference between the time of 
occurrence and the time of telling, sometimes conceptualized as the difference between historical 
truth and narrative truth” (2007:96). These differences reveal the fluidity of memory and the 
impact of structural factors on personhood and identity. 
            Despite adversity, it is understood among Tibetans that the mind (sems), more 
appropriately translated as “heart-mind,” needs to be kept stable and calm. Elsewhere, 
anthropologists (e.g. Craig 2012; Desjarlais 2003; Kohrt & Harper 2008) have described how 
negative events are potentially dangerous—not in and of themselves—but in terms of how they 
occasion intense or uncontrollable emotion to arise. In Dharamsala, those who experience 
difficulty are advised to quickly let go of disturbing feelings; a psychologically healthy person is 
not someone who assertively expresses a range of feelings. Rather, Tibetans tend to view 
negative emotions as toxic.  
   Tibetans do not readily talk about their problems. This is, in part, because they believe 
that talking about them too much will only prolong suffering, making things worse. But there is 
also tremendous value in being humble, perhaps over and above other desires, such as voicing 
one’s concerns. Talking to others about one’s problems is seen as something one does when one 
is young, and not yet mature enough to cope. When I asked interview participants to describe 
how they coped with problems, only a small handful mentioned coping through sharing problems 
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with others. Those who did tended to be young women under the age of 25. This does not mean 
that seeking social support is never a coping strategy. But it suggests that talking about one’s 
problems is not highly valued. 
  I conclude this chapter by engaging Byron Good’s recent call to action (2012), which he 
accomplishes through a systematic critique of his own work on subjectivity over the last twenty 
years. He argues that anthropology as a discipline needs to attend more to what is not overtly 
said by our interlocutors; to that which is “unspeakable and unspoken” (2012:24). Although 
Tibetans on whole do not seem to verbalize much of their personal trauma histories, do they use 
other modes of communication to express their pain? To locate these alternative forms, Good 
suggests looking to “that which appears at the margins of formal speech and everyday 
presentations of self, manifest in the Imaginary, in dissociated space and the apparitional, in 
individual dream time and partially revealed affect, coded in esoteric symbolic productions 
aimed at hiding as well as revealing” (Kakar 1989 cited in Good 2012:24).  In the next chapter I 
demonstrate how while talking openly about personal trauma history is not generally culturally 
sanctioned, the Tibetan community publically uses narratives and images of torture and violence 
for political aims. Are there ways that political activism serves psychological functions, as well? 
Does this engagement create an alternative space for expressing what individuals cannot 
articulate? 
  To understand that which appears in “spectral form or that which is only partially 
articulated,” Good suggests that psychological anthropology in particular, might draw on 
Derrida’s concept of “hauntology,” to consider the “remainders of political violence in subjective 
experience of individuals” (2012:32). As this project develops beyond the dissertation I wish to 
return to my data and think-through these ideas. Where might these remainders be found? 
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Typical areas of non-verbal expression have been art, drama, dance and other artistic modalities. 
Specifically, as I advance this work I wish to consider how the institutions of medicine and 























Chapter 5: Globalizing Mental Health 
Medical anthropology occupies a somewhat tenuous relationship to the growing field of Global 
Health, an interdisciplinary approach to medicine and public health. Anthropologists have 
critiqued these approaches for attending to culture in a rather cursory way, sometimes treating it 
as a “variable.” In this chapter I consider the ways that global mental health research and their 
interventions, along with NGOs and international human rights campaigns interface with 
Dharamsala—as a community space and site of international intrigue.  
            Drawing on Chapters 3 and 4, I articulate why Tibetan notions of mental health, 
particularly in relation to traumatic memory is incommensurate with the many foreign research 
projects and humanitarian projects that are initiated in Dharamsala. And yet, with this 
incommensurability something intriguing has occurred. The exile community has appropriated 
foreign practices of testimony, disclosure and the public circulation of trauma narratives for their 
own political aims. As I argue in this chapter, cultural concepts are not fixed and static. So while 
so-called Tibetan traditional practices of health and healing generally do not rely on exposing 
and “working through” past trauma through narrative, such practices are now prevalent within 
exile culture and their forms of activism (although the therapeutic effects remain to be seen). 
International human rights campaigns across the world are dependent on exposing trauma as 
evidence for why political, legal, or humanitarian intervention is needed; indeed, Tibetans in 
exile are eager to gain support from the international community who may question the veracity 
of human rights violations at the hands of the Chinese government.  
            The ways in which Tibetan refugees have taken these foreign practices and adapted them 
for their own use, is itself an example of how they approach life with a certain degree of 
flexibility. Tibetans can be quite pragmatic (Craig et al. 2010); a value that requires an openness 
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to new ideas. Fixed, rigid and static concepts only limit possibilities. As Kirmayer and Sartorius 
suggest, “[c]ultures function as both resources for and constraints on individuals’ constructions 
and construals of experience” (Kirmayer and Sartorius 2007: 832). In this spirit, this chapter is 
not merely a critique. Using the creativity and openness that Tibetans, themselves have used in 
relating with foreign NGOs, research projects and interventions as inspiration, I also explore how 
my research might contribute new knowledge and possibilities within a critical global mental 
health.      
 
Volunteers and NGOs 
There are many people who want to help Tibetan refugees. Some are politically motivated, and 
others have a certain fondness for the Tibetan cause because of their admiration of the Dalai 
Lama and Tibetan Buddhism. Stemming from these (mostly altruistic) motivations, there is a lot 
of effort on treating trauma—particularly when foreigners discover that there is no mental health 
system in Dharamsala. Over my 14 months in the field I talked with many of the individuals who 
came from France, Australia, Germany, Canada and the United States to help. Not surprisingly, 
most of them maintained a very unquestioned or unexamined stance to trauma and human rights. 
Among those who recognized that the psychiatric or medical models of mental health may not be 
relevant in Dharamsala, tended to adopt a rather romantic view of Tibetan Buddhism, such as 
positing that meditation treats trauma.  
In Chapter 3, I argued that trauma is not as a natural category, but a dynamic and 
contextual one that moves reciprocally among individuals, institutions and broader social forces. 
But it is worth pointing out that while trauma may be at least in part, a social construction, this 
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does not suggest that individual experiences are insignificant. As Young (arguably the most 
influential scholar in anthropology writing on the social construction of PTSD) writes: 
To say that traumatic memory and PTSD are constituted through a researcher’s techno-
phenomena and styles of scientific reasoning does not deny the pain that is suffered by 
people who are diagnosed or diagnosable with PTSD. Nothing I have written in this book 
should be construed as trivializing the acts of violence and the terrible losses that stand 
behind many traumatic memories. The suffering of PTSD is real. But can one also say 
that the facts now attached to PTSD are true (timeless) as well as real? Can questions 
about truth be divorced from the social, cognitive, and technological conditions through 
which researchers and clinicians come to know their facts and the meaning of facticity? 
[Young 1995:10]  
 
My objective for this chapter however, is less about debating the veracity or ontological status of 
PTSD and more about the utility of foreign mental health interventions in Dharamsala.  
Counseling and other talk therapies are ubiquitous within biomedicine. Often it is 
unimaginable how else “trauma” and traumatic memory would be addressed, if not to talk about 
it. Many NGOs and other organizations developing international interventions aim to integrate 
so-called traditional or local medicine with biomedical approaches (Ager 1997). It is unclear the 
extent to which such integrations are useful. It is also difficult to evaluate their effectiveness, 
because evaluation measures tend to be based on biomedical constructs. There are many ways of 
overcoming distress and illness that exist outside the realm of what Euro-Americans might 
consider therapeutic; how do evaluations account for these alternative practices? 
A pitfall of many interventions is that when they aim to “integrate” local practices, they 
look only to modifying the content, versus the actual forms or structures of therapeutics. For 
example, some interventions ensure that counselors speak the local language and instruments 
include a smattering of local idioms of distress. However, these approaches fail to appreciate that 
sometimes the practice of counseling, itself may have only limited cultural utility. Some cultural 
communities include families, neighbors and groups of practitioners in healing rituals; they 
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might find the sterile and “professional” practice of psychotherapy unnerving (see Calabrese 
[2010] and DelVecchio Good et al. [1994] for discussion on Euro-American bias toward one-to-
one clinical dyads). Those wishing to develop culturally-appropriate interventions and research 
study designs would do well to conceptualize culture as an embedded process rather than a 
variable with which to tackle. As Kleinman asserts:  
[C]ulture is not a thing; it is a process by which ordinary activities acquire emotional and 
moral meaning for participants. Cultural processes include the embodiment of meaning in 
habitus and physiological reactions, the understanding of what is at stake in particular 
situations, the development of interpersonal connections, religious practices, and the 
cultivation of collective and individual identity. Culture is inextricably caught up with 
economic, political, psychological, and biologic conditions. [2004:952] 
 
It should be noted, however, that funding bodies such as the National Institutes of Health (NIH) 
require highly systematized constructs, for which conceptualizing culture not as a “thing” but a 
“process” is decidedly more difficult to accomplish.  
An example of a project that took great care to think-through local cultural concepts and 
yet ultimately failed, was the Transcultural Psychosocial Organisation (TPO), established in 
Dharamsala in 1995. The TPO (now known as HealthNet TPO) is a Dutch organization that has 
worked across the world (Nepal, Uganda, Thailand) to help train and empower local people to 
set up mental health systems in contexts and settings where they do not yet exist. Their mission 
is to merge evidence-based interventions with “local knowledge.” Indeed, they spent four years 
engaging various stake-holders in Dharamsala with the intention to work collaboratively to plan 
and implement a mental health program. The group conducted a needs assessment by 
interviewing community members about whether or not they thought mental health services 
would be beneficial for those with mental illness (Ketzer and Crescenzi 2002). An immediate 
limitation I see is that depending on translation, mental illness usually refers to psychosis. Mood, 
anxiety, and other “less severe” problems are not necessarily categorized as mental illness in the 
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same sense (Mercer et al. 2005). So while many Tibetans in Dharamsala responded to the needs 
assessment indicating that people “with mental illness” could benefit from services, it remains 
unclear if they were responding to the questions that the researchers assumed they were asking.  
The objective of the TPO project in Dharamsala was to integrate Tibetan cultural beliefs 
into Western-style counseling, using a “complimentary” approach. They spent approximately 
two years translating the Harvard Trauma Questionnaire into Tibetan so they could assess 
symptoms of PTSD. The idea was that this instrument could be used at the refugee reception 
center in Dharamsala so those in need of mental health services could be identified upon arrival. 
The TPO trained a number of Tibetan nurses, health outreach workers and other community 
leaders (Ketzer and Crescenzi 2002). Before the foreign team left Dharamsala they conducted 
more community interviews and reported that locals found the initiative very helpful. However, 
the program did not continue to run. During my time in the field I located some of the Tibetan 
individuals who had been involved in the project. They identified two major problems: 1) the 
foreign researchers did not take seriously enough their assertions that many people visit lamas 
and would not think to visit the Department of Health (where the program was affiliated) for 
problems with mental distress; and 2) the form of psychotherapy: sitting one-on-one with a 
professional talking about one’s problems. Despite the TPO spending nearly five years to use an 
integrative or complementary approach, local people did not use the services because they were 
not perceived as efficacious.  
The failure with the TPO and similar programs is not merely a problem of East versus 
West. In Dharamsala, many people quite happily and without conflict utilize the Delek Hospital 
(a Western medicine clinic) and the Mentsikhang (Tibetan Hospital); often in tandem. “Bod 
smen” (Tibetan medicine) is good. “Outside smen” is good!” The issue here is not with Western 
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psychology, per se, but with categorization. There are some kinds of mental distress for which 
Tibetans seek the help of a lama, and might be concurrent with a medical problem, such as a 
rlung disorder. In these instances, Tibetans visit both lamas and Tibetan medicine practitioners 
without problem. However no one would think to visit the Delek Hospital, where they go to get 
antibiotics, obstetric care, and chest x-rays
28
. During interviews I asked Tibetans if anyone ever 
goes to the Delek Hospital for sems kyi na tsa (mental illness). Generally, they would give me a 
strange look and ask why mental distress might be treated this way when the problem has to do 
with one’s own thinking. 
At this time, psychopharmaceuticals are not being used in Dharamsala. However, I got to 
know a Canadian physician who was volunteering at the Delek Hospital for three months, who 
told me that the hospital pharmacy contained several dozen boxes of expired medication. 
Apparently for some years now the hospital has been a recipient of aid from a non-profit, which 
included medical supplies, such as bandages and stethoscopes, along with discarded medications 
of various sorts. The medications that were not stocked at the pharmacy were put into a back 
storage room. The Canadian physician discovered several boxes containing Haldol, Prozac and 
Paxil; but we don’t use those, he was told with a shrug. It seems that there was not a strong 
ideological opposition, but rather a sense of indifference among the Tibetan clinicians (including 
Tibetan clinicians with Western medical degrees).    
 
Human Rights Discourse 
Upon visiting the Central Tibetan Administration’s Department of Health, I was told there was a 
clinic for torture survivors. However, when I later visited the clinic I found that in the last year 
                                                        
28
 There are very high rates of tuberculosis in Dharamsala, likely made worse by people living in close quarters in 
boarding schools, monasteries and nunneries. 
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they had provided services (a few home visits) to only two Tibetan torture survivors. In my many 
formal and informal discussions with community members, the clinic was rarely mentioned. 
Instead, a prominent community organization started by and for ex-political prisoners was 
considered the best place for torture survivors to seek help in the form of housing, material 
assistance, and language or vocational training. “Why would they go to the hospital?” asked a 
young woman named Lhamo. “They are not sick!” The organization is social and political in 
nature, rather than clinical. 
            In addition to providing services, the organization is actively involved in the international 
human rights campaign. Inside the center one finds the walls covered by gruesome photographs 
of torture victims and corpses—bloodied and disfigured. These images displayed as “proof” for 
visitors, ask them to bear witness to the bloodshed; they also galvanize political sensibilities 
within the community. Those who run the organization and hang the photos are themselves 
former political prisoners. Similar photographs are displayed at the new arrivals center, where 
the Tibetan government-in-exile provides medical services and housing for new refugees. The 
practice of displaying graphic images may also be motivated by psychological factors; they are 
artifacts of not speaking about what one has witnessed. As Saul (2014b) points out, there are 
forms of expression other than the verbal or emotional variety to communicate group experience; 
displaying graphic images is one such form—and is a type of witnessing. 
            Many scholars have written on the performative aspects of commemoration as healing 
and a form of community resilience. As Antze and Lambek suggest: 
[w]hen memories recall acts of violence against individuals or entire groups, they carry 
additional burdens—as indictments or confessions, or as emblems of a victimized 
identity. Here, acts of remembering can often take on a performative meaning within a 




But when we speak of community “identity” it is important to recognize that meaning and 
identity are not static or uniform. As Walker (2013) describes in her work among squatters in 
Porto Alegre, identities are fashioned and re-fashioned over time. Just as Garcia (2010) shows 
how heroin addicts in New Mexico are presented with “new opportunities” to view themselves as 
patients or prisoners, the most resilient in times of crisis do not make sense of their world in 
isolation. “Selves are always orchestrating the voices of others and, in this sense, reframing 
figured worlds. This reframing is never the result of individual creativity alone, but rather arises 
from a dialogic process between inner speech and social discourse; between the author and 
external voices” (Walker 2013:206). With near constant protest marches, candlelight vigils and 
political signs being hung around town, in some sense, the concept of what it means to be a 
“political refugee” has been refigured with exposure to foreign concepts of trauma and human 
rights. 
But what does it mean for an individual to identify as a political refugee? Within the 
Brazilian slum where she worked, Walker (2013) observed that most residents described by 
others as squatters, do not identify themselves as such (squatters are those who are much worse 
off). In this same way, most Tibetans—unless speaking in a politicized forum—do not usually 
identify themselves as trauma survivors. This might be, in part, due to cultural values of 
humility. Because political prisoners, activists and others (such as those who self-immolate) are 
seen as heroic, it would be somewhat arrogant to speak publically in a manner that suggests one 
has undergone severe torture or imprisonment. The utterance of “it wasn’t so bad for me, others 
had it much worse,” was a common idiom among those with histories of imprisonment.   
Although the veracity of torture and human rights abuses need not be questioned, there 
are some researchers who find evidence of exaggeration within the exile community. For 
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example, Ward (2013) in her study of discourses of reproductive practices found that Tibetans in 
exile have shifted not their actual practices, but rather their narratives about reproduction. She 
found that many young women discussed reproduction in terms of their “right” to bear children, 
which is seen as resistance to Chinese control of their bodies. While forced abortions and 
sterilization are not typical, discourses circulate within the exile community (reciprocally 
perpetuated by exile members and foreign human rights activists), which suggest that such 
practices are common place (Ward 2013). Such accounts do not diminish the severity of the 
Tibetan political situation. Rather they reveal the ways that exile members use their new-found 
political citizenship.  
            Political posters are strewn around town and local restaurants host talks with ex-political 
prisoners, aimed at educating young foreign travelers. At these talks, Tibetans give graphic 
accounts of their imprisonment, rallying support for the Tibetan cause. As Adams (1998) asserts, 
"[f]irsthand accounts ‘count’ for everything in human rights discourse"(82). But as she goes on 
to argue, the Tibetan experience of suffering is in many cases inconsistent with human rights 
discourse (1998), particularly insofar as cultural beliefs like karma predominate the experience 
of difficult life events. The testimony practices found among Tibetan political activists appears in 
stark contrast with the customs of everyday life.  
            Anthropologists have described similar phenomena elsewhere. For example, Breslau 
(2000) in his study of international mental health aid in Kobe, Japan following the earthquake, 
describes how foreign mental health professionals encouraged the practices of testimony and 
debriefing, despite the dissonance with local concepts of recovery. Likewise, McKinney (2007) 
found that among mental health services in the US and Denmark aimed at helping survivors of 
political violence from around the world, the dominate form of therapeutics seemed to be helping 
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people find their “trauma story.” It is assumed, she argues, “that every client holds some sort of 
traumatic memory, a memory that by definition disrupts the continuity of identity or self” 
(2007:270). While biomedical perspectives portray the acts of “telling,” “processing,” 
“debriefing,” and “testifying,” as inherently therapeutic, these notions are in some ways 
antithetical to Tibetan notions of healthy coping. 
 Narrative and cinematic representations of traumatic events, what Pandolfo calls 
“biographical artifacts” (2008) are integral to the construction of evidence. Such evidence is 
important because there is so much at stake; not only in terms of “enabling, or disabling idioms 
within larger logics of the state, as grounds of appeal, compensation, recognition, or inclusion” 
(Pandolfo 2008:65), but in deploying strategies of global power. Rather than seeking to find the 
“true” narratives (Makley 2008; Das 2010) I aimed to cultivate in my fieldwork practices what 
Pandolfo calls “a peripheral vision and a peripheral listening,” (2008:65). This approach is one in 
which everything “counts” as data. Sometimes the discourses that are not seen as legitimate 
evidence of suffering are more telling than those that do. Whose voices are silenced?  
 In the “ethics of listening” (Pandolfo 2008), translation is always a practice of alterity 
(see also Taussig 1993; Gardiner 1996). To take seriously the voices of my interlocutors and to 
practice an ethical sort of writing, I allow for multiple kinds of “truths” to exist simultaneously. I 
recognize that my positionality (reflexivity) as a researcher shaped the stories people shared (and 
those they did not). I once conducted an interview with a young Tibetan man who told me that 
his “greatest suffering in life” was in his youth. He was born to a nomad family in Amdo, and 
early in the morning before sunrise he and his two older brothers had to begin herding the 
family’s yaks. Because he was the youngest, his brothers made him walk in front so he would 
“catch” all the morning dew and they would stay dry. “Every day,” he said forlornly, “my chupa 
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(Tibetan wrap-around cloak) would be so wet. It was very uncomfortable.” He went on to tell me 
that he came to Dharamsala in order to “study the precious Dharma.” I found this interview to be 
quite sweet. But later my research assistant said: “maybe that guy did not want to tell you about 
his life. Everyone knows that he left Tibet because he killed someone.”   
The question of “telling the truth” is a concern for both qualitative and quantitative 
researchers across disciplines. There are numerous forms of reliability and validity tests, and 
methodological procedures for managing social desirability and other bias. But ethnographers 
take a complex stance on such concerns (Yanos and Hopper 2008). We might be curious, and 
indeed view it as useful data, to learn more about why people say things, when they say things, 
and to whom they say things. For example, in health care settings, the admission (or omission) of 
particular symptoms might directly affect a person’s access to care and security” (Pinto 2011). 
And particularly in contexts where humanitarian aid is available, the services themselves may 
shape the experience and trajectory of illness (Fassin 2012; Redfield 2013). Sometimes people 
who are interviewed find the experience to be therapeutic; do such instances make those data any 
more or less reliable than instances when interviewees feel uncomfortable? This “peripheral 
vision and peripheral listening” (Pandolfo 2008) may reveal important details of the inner worlds 
of study participants. 
In a psychiatric ward in Morocco, a woman who has been admitted asks Pandolfo (2008) 
to interview her. Although she is known as a “mad woman” she wishes to make a proclamation 
that she wants to be married and have a normal life. By stating her intention, tape recorded by a 
foreign researcher, this somehow solidifies and authenticates desire. It becomes public and 
official. Elsewhere, in Brazil, a woman named Catarina used her infamous notebook, and 
subsequently Biehl’s investigative ethnography (2005), to empower her (disempowered) voice. I 
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found something similar; whereas I assumed it would make them nervous to learn that my work 
may be published, I found that instead it made people more likely to agree.  
Many Tibetans, and particularly woman, were somewhat shy and reticent to be 
interviewed. The major source of hesitation was that “they were not an expert.” I explained that I 
was not interested only in experts, but in the lived experiences of everyday people; however this 
rarely seemed convincing. My experience is analogous to Makley’s (2005), whose interlocutors 
in Tibet spoke to her about the past at great length, over meals and on walks in the village; and 
yet, they vehemently declined her requests for interviews. Not because they did not want to 
speak to her, but because they resisted the practices of testimony. 
Unlike what might be expected, when I explained what I would do with the information, 
specifically that it would be published, many changed their minds and were eager to participate. 
There seemed to be two reasons for their eagerness. Many Tibetans believe that they are, in fact, 
more resilient than other refugee communities. When I explained that the articles or books I 
might write could be read by researchers working with other refugee groups around the world, 
many were quite enthusiastic to share their experiences. Secondly, some saw participation in the 
study as an opportunity to testify; to express publically “what is really happening in Tibet.” Their 
desire to act as political (or helpful) subjects seem to supersede their usual resistance to 
testimony and narrative. Another possibility might be that speaking for political aim legitimizes 
the telling of personal trauma stories.  
I conducted several interviews at the refugee reception center among Tibetans who had 
come to India only a few days prior. One woman was Tsekyi. 
Tsekyi is a 55 year-old woman whose three children already live in India. She and her 
late husband paid to send them into exile a decade ago with a group of monks from their village. 
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The two daughters live in the Tibetan Children’s Village (TCV) boarding school in Bir (another 
Tibetan settlement, some 3 hours south of Dharamsala, and her son is a monk attending the 
shedra (monastic college) at Mindroling monastery in Dehradun. She held my hand and cried 
during most of her interview. I asked her a number of times if she wanted to stop the interview. 
She did not. We talked about my parents and she wanted to know if they were worried about me 
living in India. I said that they were, but that my mother had recently come to visit and we had 
the chance to meet the Dalai Lama together at his residence. I opened my laptop computer to 
show her a photograph of our meeting. She was overcome with emotion.  
In seeing the photograph of my mother she remarked, “very clean, bright face. Very 
white! Sonam chenpo dug, (great merit).” Tsekyi was not referring to the actual whiteness of my 
mother’s skin. Rather, many Tibetans explained that a person who is suffering will have a very 
“dark” appearance. It is also said that a dark tongue or darkened face is an ominous sign of death. 
A bright, clean, or white appearance is, again, not as much about the color of one’s face, but 
rather its radiance. “Very good virtue. Very good merit,” she repeated. What she means, is that 
my mother appears to have good karma.  
I asked Tsekyi why she decided to come to India now. Her eyes again filled with tears. 
She had not let go of my hand. Back in Tibet she was diagnosed with “kidney problems” and had 
been in and out of the hospital. In addition, she has many problems with rlung (inner winds), that 
seems to exacerbate her poor health. Tsekyi described matter of factly that she was not expected 
to live a long life. What can I do?, she asked, rhetorically. She told me that she had had a very 
difficult life. She came from a farming family and they never had enough money. As a young 
woman she had lost two children, and more recently, her husband. All of this, she attributed to 
her karma. Tsekyi wanted to spend the remainder of her life making religious pilgrimages to 
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Buddhist sites in India. She also came to meet the Dalai Lama. “It is okay that I suffered so much 
in this life,” she said. “Going into my next life it will be better because those karmic seeds have 
burned.” This kind of attitude about karma is not fatalistic or self-pitying. Often, chronic and 
serious illness is seen simply as a result of something negative that was done in a previous life. It 
may still be difficult to accept, but there is a sense of order behind what happens. Very little is 
considered to be “unfair,” let alone inexplicable or baffling. 
 It is somewhat difficult to understand how Tibetan refugees can at once believe that 
something is unjust but not unfair. The system of karma does not lead Tibetans to believe that 
they deserve their suffering in a punitive sense. Rather they view situations of oppressors and the 
oppressed as intimate karmic moments of interdependence. No one has come to their life’s 
circumstances by chance; and yet, the actions of harm and violence are undoubtedly considered 
wrong. As Adams describes, Tibetan political prisoners are “as concerned with the effects of 
karma on their oppressors, their actions on all living beings, their next lives, turning their enemy 
into their greatest teacher, and freeing all living beings from suffering, as they are with making 
sense of their experience in the terms of the United Nations or Geneva Convention” (1998:93). 
In coming to see the complexity of these views, scholars and practitioners need not abandon 
international human rights discourse. But rather allow for a complexity and diversity of concepts 
on what it means to be a human being; and particularly a human being who is suffering. 
The concept of karma is very difficult for non-Buddhists (or non-Hindus) to understand. 
This is an interesting to parallel to the ubiquity of such understandings in India. When working 
in Chicago, Taussig (1980) interviewed a woman with a terminal rheumatoid disease. She 
constantly asks “Why?”; “Why me, Oh Lord, why me?” The problem that Taussig describes is 
not with her reaction, but rather her dissatisfaction with what her doctors provide in “[h]er search 
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for explanation and meaning” (1980:6). Within Tibetan communities, the concept of karma as an 
explanatory model for illness and healing is shared by both patient and physician.  
When studying Tibet there are certain topics that are rather predictable areas of inquiry: 
trauma, torture as well as meditation, mindfulness. Why is this? I hypothesize that this 
juxtaposition of extraordinary equanimity with extraordinary suffering is irresistible as an object 
of study. These synergistic moments of trauma and tenacity challenge the bounds of what we 
imagine it is to be a reasonable or even average human being. The fact that Tibetans do not see 
their orientation to suffering as remarkable only further creates a sort of perfect storm for 
intrigued researchers.   
 
Thinking Locally, Acting Globally? 
In 2010 the National Institute of Mental Health began the “Grand Challenges in Global Mental 
Health,” an initiative that aims to direct research priorities over the next decade. The major goals 
identified by a large and fairly diverse team of experts were to: 1) Identify root causes, risk and 
protective factors; 2) Advance prevention and implementation of early interventions; 3) Improve 
treatments and expand access to care; 4) Raise awareness of the global burden; 5) Build human 
resource capacity; and 6) Transform health-system and policy responses (Collins et al. 2011). 
 While these goals are reasonable, even laudable, there are a number of problems. Perhaps 
most significant, is that signs and symptoms indicating that “something is wrong” are not 
universal. Therefore, raising awareness and implementing early intervention, begs the question 
of what exactly it is that the NIMH hopes to prevent. Many scholars consider this problem to be 
one that is reminiscent of colonialist projects (Calabrese 2008; Pandolfo 2008); this perspective 
casts a more cynical valance on the push for “mental health literacy” across the world (Watters 
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2010). The symptoms and presentation of mental disorders looks different across cultures, but 
perhaps more significant, is the deeply embedded social context upon which health and illness is 
conscribed. 
In the American mental health system, very few symptoms of pathology on their own are 
sufficient for diagnosing a mental disorder. Illnesses such as mood disorders and schizophrenia 
not only have a list of criteria one must meet to warrant the diagnosis, but there must also be 
significant impairment in work, school, or relationships over a specified period of time. And, 
indeed, in many cultures, difficulty with work or relationships would indicate that something is 
the matter. For example, Das and Das (2007) argue that the despair their study participants in 
New Delhi slums experience when they are ill is intimately connected with the inability to 
work—and thus, their lack of self-worth and perceived worth by others. The fear of illness is 
better understood in many cases as a fear of being able to earn a living and maintain one’s role in 
the household. 
 An ability to work despite adversity is also a sign of resilience across many cultures. I 
might go so far to argue that this concept is taken to be self-evident as an important attribute of a 
resilient person. However, in my analysis of the Tibetan concept of “resilience,” I did not find 
“the capacity to continue working” to be a particularly salient attribute or characteristic. Many 
mentioned how problematic it was to find work in Dharamsala, particularly for young students 
graduating from the Tibetan Children’s Villages. But the capacity to work and be productive is 
not in itself, evidence of psychological health in this context. It is more indicative of structural 
problems at the community level. 
 When Jack Saul, Sophia Banu and colleagues started a support group for Tibetan political 
asylum-seekers at the Bellevue clinic for torture survivors in New York City, a series of 
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interesting events occurred. Not surprisingly, the group members discussed difficulties in life 
such as finding work and other financial problems. But because they were not necessarily 
seeking mental health services (a clinical diagnosis and psychotherapy would be requisite for the 
group to continue meeting), the group requested assistance in forming their own group within 
their local neighborhood. As Saul recounts: “[f]or many members, their priority was not just to 
receive support from the group; they also wanted to help other recently arrived refugees and 
asylum seekers…[they] valued helping others as an adaptive way of dealing with the trauma and 
loss they had experienced as a result of torture and migration, and separation from their families” 
(2014:34). This style of cultivating resilience through helping others is emblematic of healthy 
coping from the Tibetan point of view. Focusing on one’s problems alone is not particularly 
wrong, but it is not particularly effective, either. Compassion is a powerful tool in this context 
for building resilience and working through adversity.    
 When Saul and colleagues travelled to Dharamsala they asked a Tibetan nurse who was 
an established and prominent member of the community to assemble a group of Tibetan torture 
survivors. She gathered a group of nuns from a few of the local nunneries; most did not know 
one another and were not aware of their common history of having been tortured. The aim of the 
group was not to process trauma, but rather to form a support group and to share strategies that 
have helped them to adapt to life outside of Tibet. The nuns were very keen to share their ideas 
when they learned of Saul’s work with Tibetans back in New York City. They were also curious 
about how other groups around the world have managed oppression, loss of homeland and 
environmental destruction; they took particular interest in the historical experiences of Jews. 
Saul recalls (2014b) that while they were not particularly interested in processing details of their 
torture experiences, some made connections in their meetings that had not occurred to them 
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before, such as how being made to stare directly at the sun while in prison might explain current 
vision difficulties.  
This cultural vignette highlights another problem with the “project” of global mental 
health: the assumption that everyone who meets the criteria for mental illness identifies as such. 
Little attention within the global health literature is paid to thinking-through the ways that 
potential service users will be identified. At the beginning of my study it seemed like a fruitful 
idea to compare the experiences of those who were ex-political prisoners and those who had not 
been political prisoners. However, I quickly found that even among some who told me they were 
not ex-political prisoners, later in our conversation mentioned that they had been imprisoned for 
some time. I think this was due to humility; to identify oneself as someone who had been 
exposed to severe events might be to aggrandize oneself.  
It never occurred to me in developing this project that I would have difficulty in 
distinguishing the political refugees from the non-political refugees; even those who had been 
imprisoned and even tortured do not necessarily identify as an ex-political prisoner. Although it 
is likely that others might speak of them in this way. As Pandolfo remarked, “I realized that the 
conversations I had had with my interlocutors indexed a completely different set of realities and 
conceptual possibilities than those represented in public discourses” (2007:338). This also speaks 
to distinctions between disclosing collective suffering and personal histories of suffering, which 
brings with it a highly moral implication. 
It is no wonder that when immigrant and asylum seekers across the globe come into 
contact with foreign mental health services that there can be a schism between what service-users 
feel they need, and what service-providers think is most beneficial. As Saul recounts, many 
torture survivors from around the world—Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, 
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Afghanistan, Tibet, China, the Philippines—are not accustomed to talking about their 
experiences as is done in psychotherapy. Many who find their way to Bellevue Hospital are not 
seeking mental health services, per se (Saul 2014). Rather they needed legal assistance, housing, 
and medical care.  
It is very difficult to conduct psychotherapy with someone who does seem to experience 
any benefit. Calabrese writes (2008) that in many healing systems across the globe, intervention 
is communal and utilizes dramatic rituals rather than rational conversations (as is propagated in 
psychotherapy). The endeavor of psychotherapy requires a buy-in from both clinician and patient 
that talking about what is matter, will by definition, be of some use. It also “assumes that the 
client is willing to disclose and rationally discuss his or her deepest emotions to a professional 
stranger” in clinical contexts (Calabrese 2008:342).  
The social service organizations in Dharamsala are not aimed at emotion work. Rather, 
they provide material support, job training and education. The focus is on helping people to re-
establish themselves and build a stable new life. Rather than processing and disclosing details of 
violence, social service organizations help people to focus on starting over. Friends and relatives 
also encourage one another to swiftly “get over” or “move on” from negative emotions. This 
might be called repression in the West, but I argue that in this community this sensibility of 
health is connected to what Tibetans call “broad thinking.” By focusing too much on trauma 
narratives, Tibetans fear that they will solidify emotions. Therefore, they try to reflect on 
impermanence and compassion and may even demonstrate a playful sense of humor. The 
healthiest and most resilient people understand that emotions are dynamic; they are not solid and 
permanent. It is not considered healthy to “process” or talk at any length about negative emotions 
or distress, which they believe will only make them seem more solid, long-lasting, and real. 
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Contribution to Critical Global Health 
This study is not out to discredit the “existence” of PTSD despite my argument that its utility 
seems rather limited in this cultural context. Rather I seek to explore the local processes and 
idioms of distress within Dharamsala. Within the global mental health context, a number of 
clinicians have conducted pragmatic and thoughtful research that draws on anthropological 
methods and theory. For example, work on Ataques de Nervios (Lewis-Fernández et al. 2002), 
Kyol Goeu (Hinton et al. 2001), and Jhum-Jhum (Kohrt 2005) considers how practitioners in 
clinical settings can more effectively assess the cultural expression of mental distress.  
            There has also been significant effort to incorporate cultural idioms of distress into the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). The authors of DSM-V include a 
descriptive list of common “cultural idioms” in the appendix, as well as the Cultural Formulation 
Interview (CFI), an open-ended interview guide to assess cultural idioms among those who 
present for treatment (American Psychiatric Association 2013). However it remains somewhat 
unclear how clinicians, particularly in public mental health settings will make use of these 
idioms. They likely still need to generate an Axis I diagnosis for billing and insurance purposes. 
Whether these additions to DSM-V are meant to serve cultural psychiatry researchers or whether 
they will be used in clinical settings remains to be seen. 
            There has been a lot of emphasis across contexts to try and “match” local idioms of 
distress with the list of criteria for Axis I mental disorders, including PTSD. For example, 
Schröder (2011) in her work among Tibetans in Ladakh had a discussion with an onpo (religious 
healer) about shock and startle response. He agreed this is a problem of the mind and heart, but 
emphasized that “the problem comes from the inside [the patient himself], because it comes from 
the mind” (2011:74). It was common in the current study, as well, for exile members to describe 
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the worry in the mind as the main problem. It is the emotions that result that cause the problem, 
and these negative emotions come not from external events directly but because of our appraisal 
and reactions.  
Similarly, as Hinton et al. (2012) point out, while Cambodian refugees present with some 
symptoms that mirror those listed in criteria for PTSD, other items such as “dizziness, orthostatic 
dizziness, neck soreness, and ‘heart weakness,’ are of equal or more concern to traumatized 
Cambodians” (385). Studies such as these exemplify a call from Kirmayer and Sartorius for 
research to: 
go beyond conventional group labels to examine the specific biological, psychological, or 
social mediators of cultural difference…if cultures differ in the categories and concepts 
they provide to interpret and explain physical symptoms, we need to examine 
individuals’ use of these attributions directly rather than simply using ethnocultural 
identity as a proxy for the specific cultural factors that underlie attribution. [2007:832] 
 
Tibetans do not necessarily understand there to be something special or unique about suffering 
that comes from political violence or highly disturbing events. We separate out, for example, the 
kind of suffering we expect when someone loses a loved one, than we expect if they go to war. 
There does not seem to be such a distinction here. Those who demonstrate extraordinary 
resilience in prisons are the quintessential example of how one ought to cope. But there are not 
specific idioms of distress that are unique to trauma. As well, the methods for coping with 
exposure to violence are the same that are recommended for managing loss and other difficulties 
in life. 
There are vast discrepancies across studies in their findings on rates of mental disorders 
among Tibetans. There are also major differences in the quality and rigor of studies. Some, such 
as Benedict et al. (2008) rather flippantly state a majority of Tibetan monks exposed to violence 
develop mental disorders. They proclaim that at a mental health treatment center in Boston, “the 
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monks present with almost every symptom of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) comorbid 
with generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), and major depressive disorder (MDD)” (2008:486). 
However, Benedict (a law student) and her colleagues only interviewed 8 Tibetans. They also 
rather simplistically equate PTSD with rlung problems. These researchers considered their study 
to be a sensitive approach to cultural differences by suggesting that what “we” see as PTSD, 
“they” see as srog rlung. 
Within global mental health paradigms, there are ubiquitous approaches to “culturally 
sensitive” interventions, predicated on “cultural competency.” There are many such programs 
that attempt to incorporate so-called local beliefs in (the real) treatment, no doubt biomedical in 
nature. It is not uncommon for researchers to argue for “dual diagnosis”; the benefits of 
presenting the PTSD model to those for whom such categories are not native are unknown. It is 
not just that such initiative might lack efficacy, but they may actually be harmful. Even within 
American culture, some have argued that processing and debriefing do not necessarily provide 
cathartic relief (Seeley 2008; Young 1995). It is important to take seriously that such 
interventions descending on Tibetan refugees may truly bring harm by disrupting the “resilience 
imaginary” or the shared conventions in how one ought to approach suffering in life. 
In a recent New York Times opinion piece titled The Value of Suffering, Pico Iyer (2013) 
states that wise men of all traditions say that suffering brings clarity and illumination. Profound 
pain seems to reveal a sense of basic humanity, and in many cases, he argues, basic decency. It 
forces us to confront reality, and we are humbled. Immediately after the tsunami which claimed 
thousands of lives north of Tokyo, Iyer was struck by the lack of panic in Japan. The deep 
suffering and grief were palpable. But it seemed that there was some acceptance of the 
impermanence in life, in which survivors took solace:  
184 
 
My neighbors aren’t formal philosophers, but much in the texture of the lives they’re 
used to — the national worship of things falling away in autumn, the blaze of cherry 
blossoms followed by their very quick departure, the Issa-like poems on which they’re 
schooled — speaks for an old culture’s training in saying goodbye to things and putting 
delight and beauty within a frame. Death undoes us less, sometimes, than the hope that it 
will never come. [Iyer 2013] 
 
The phrase in this passage, “an old culture’s training in saying goodbye to things,” speaks to the 
heart of this project. That through literal training, Tibetan exile members learn to transform 
suffering into opportunities for generating wakefulness. 
            The notions of what it means to relate with distress and suffering are not often considered 
in the global mental health paradigm. This might be an area in which my project makes a 
contribution. The practices that are involved in mind-training, such as thinking of taking on the 
pain of others, demonstrates the extent to which culture shapes our beliefs and practices. Such 
ideas seem to give those (particularly in seemingly hopeless situations) a sense of purpose and 
resolve in the face of difficulty. A 76 year-old man named Jampa was hospitalized in Tibet for 
diabetes-related problems. 
I told them, even if it meant death, I didn't want my leg amputated. If I stayed in hospital 
on medication, it would cost 10,000 Chinese Yuan so I never took medicine. During this 
time, I suffered a lot, but always prayed and recited the Medicine Buddha mantra. This 
benefitted me both physically and mentally. I also tried to remember that all human 
beings experience the four sufferings [birth, old age, sickness, death]. Since I had to 
experience this suffering no matter what, I took the Dalai Lama's advice and tried to be 
patient and cheerful. This helped make my mind more spacious. With this more spacious 
mind I made strong aspirations that nobody else would experience this pain, and I had 
strong motivation to help them if they did. 
 
Researcher: Would you say that you were practicing lojong? 
 
Jampa: Oh, I'm not a very good practitioner. As Tibetans we are just taught by our 
parents to think like this.  
 
Jampa's comments raise an important question about identifying lojong as a coping strategy 
among those who may not necessarily see themselves using the practice. Most Tibetans value 
185 
 
humility as an important virtue, so will generally deny that they have much compassion or an 
understanding of emptiness. Even high teachers, such as the Dalai Lama deny understanding 
emptiness despite giving advanced teachings on the topic. 
For studies in global mental health using brief methods, it might be difficult to ascertain 
the underlying meanings of what people say. As might be expected, monks and nuns often refer 
explicitly to the use of Buddhist practices in coping with difficulty, whereas many lay 
community members seem to draw on Buddhist-influenced cultural values without concern for 
where these ethos stem. I asked an abbot of an important monastery about this tension who 
explained: 
They might give it a different name. But thinking in this way and practicing lojong is 
exactly the same. If people cherish others then within the society at large, our problems 
lessen. The practice of lojong can be done by monastics, lay people, as well as non-
Buddhists. This is the best way to solve problems. The great masters said that lojong is 
the source of a great city of happiness. It is good to compare ourselves with people who 
are worse off. We can see how easy it is to get problems in life. Even if you become very 
happy you should think that there is nothing to be proud of. It is simply a result of 
accumulating merit in a past life. Anyway, we must keep our mind very stable and equal. 
If something bad happens we shouldn't get so surprised. We must keep equanimity in our 
minds. Like this, suffering will be resolved if you can think in this way. And will also 
benefit others.  
 
The principles of “mind-training” are moral in nature, but are not merely moralistic; those who 
lack compassion are not necessarily bad people, but rather they lack skills to navigate their social 
world. Practicing lojong can be thought of in rather utilitarian terms.  
 The significance of studies within global mental health is sometimes measured by the 
applicability of findings across contexts. As I discuss more extensively in the next chapter, I 
harbor a certain ambivalence about whether the concepts I describe in this project, such as lojong 
could be utilized elsewhere. Are there benefits to using cross-cultural studies as a means by 
which to expand or broaden how we understand what it means to live and be human?  
186 
 
Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusion: Agency and the Open Sky of Mind 
This dissertation aims to contribute to the growing body of literature on cultural idioms of 
resilience and coping associated with political violence. By attending to the cultural specificity of 
this community, I try to show not only how Tibetans view suffering and distress, but importantly, 
how they work through adversity. In consequence, this study raises important questions about the 
utility of trauma perspectives across cultures. I do not deny the existence of PTSD 
symptomatology, rather I argue that the Tibetan exile community in Dharamsala uses foreign 
concepts of narrative and testimony to fuel its 50-year political campaign for Tibet. And at the 
same time, these practices of generating or working through trauma narratives are inconsistent 
with typical methods for managing distress and building resilience. I argue that the concept of 
“flexibility,” and the practices that help to cultivate a mind that is spacious and open, promote 
resilience in this community.  
This anthropological project is put into conversation with ongoing debates in global 
health, including how foreign humanitarianism, medicine, and human rights paradigms have both 
challenged and enhanced local healing practices. I explore how cultural systems, such as karma, 
may be incommensurate with global health interventions, but look to promising examples of 
researchers seeking to understand culture in all its depth when engaged in clinical work.  But 
unlike in other communities exposed to violence, displacement, and oppression, Dharamsala—
although not without its problems—is better understood as a landscape or geography of 
resilience, than of despair and melancholia. Finally, in this chapter I consider the ways that this 





Review of Therapeutic Uses of Meditation/Mindfulness 
In the discussion below I consider briefly how my project contributes to research on the clinical 
application of meditation and mindfulness. Over the last decade, studies in this area within 
medicine, psychiatry, psychology, social work, public health and other fields have rapidly gained 
popularity, even becoming somewhat mainstream. Mindfulness practice involves non-
judgmental observation by simply noticing and identifying one’s thoughts, feelings, and 
experiences. Studies suggest these interventions reduce aggression through developing the 
capacity to “step back,” observe, and healthily regulate difficult emotions. Specific meditation 
and mindfulness techniques that help practitioners to “train” in building compassion appears to 
stimulate brain activation associated with empathy and well-being (Engstrom and Soderfeldt 
2010). These practices share common goals: to increase mental, emotional, physical and spiritual 
capacities for wellbeing.  
Researchers find that mindfulness and compassion training can be adapted across a 
variety of populations. Mindfulness programs are effective for healthy adults, incarcerated adults 
(Bowen et al. 2010), college students, and others. Mindfulness-based interventions are shown to 
be effective in treating depression and substance abuse (Leigh et al. 2005, Wupperman et al. 
2011); they may be particularly helpful with co-occurring disorders (Brewer et al. 2010), and 
studies show they can be used to help youth manage stress, develop compassion, and improve 
overall wellbeing (Burke 2010, Jones 2011, Oberle et al. 2011). Meditation and mindfulness 
practices are sometimes used to augment medical therapies, such as those used in treating 
chronic pain (Monroe et al. 2008) and cancer.   
Many researchers are beginning to recognize that contemplative practices can improve 
basic mental functions, such as memory and concentration (Mrazek et al. 2010), along with 
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emotional capacities like empathy. These studies show that increased capacity for compassion 
can be developed; rather than understanding compassion as a personality trait, meditation and 
mindfulness studies demonstrate that it seems to be much more like a skill that can be developed 
and strengthened (Tirsch 2010). This was also reported by Davidson et al. (2000) in their study 
of the plasticity of emotions. In translating these research findings into therapeutic practices, 
there are now mindfulness-based programs being used in a wide variety of contexts. 
Perhaps the most well-known practice modality in the United States today is Mindfulness 
Based Stress Reduction (MBSD), developed by Jon Kabat-Zinn, founding director of the Stress 
Clinic and Professor of Medicine emeritus of the University of Massachusetts Medical School. It 
is an 8-week course that brings together meditation, mindfulness and yoga, and has been known 
to promote health and wellbeing, particularly among those with chronic illness. There are a 
number of past and current NIH studies investigating the effects of MBSR on HIV side effects, 
cancer, and rheumatoid arthritis (see clinicaltrials.gov). The MBSR program has also been used 
among Olympic athletes, corporate executives, and military personnel. The modality is marketed 
as a secular program and does not claim to have any direct connection to Buddhism. 
A program that does, however directly trace its roots to Buddhism, although it also has 
been developed for secular-use, is Dialectical Behavioral Therapy (DBT). This program was 
developed Marsha Linehan, a psychologist who specializes in the treatment of Borderline 
Personality Disorder, sexual abuse, and self-harm behaviors. This population is considered 
extremely difficult to work with due to their struggles with emotion regulation; talk therapy has 
not shown to be particularly effective. Rather, DBT is a “skills based” program used in an 
intensive group setting, which emphasizes mindfulness, distress tolerance, emotion regulation 
and interpersonal effectiveness (Linehan 1993). In addition to mindfulness techniques, DBT 
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draws on aspects of Zen Buddhism to help patients put some distance between themselves and 
their thoughts. The therapy is “dialectical” in that it acknowledges that there are always multiple 
perspectives, and a number of ways to view a situation (Robins 2002). The focus is on creating 
more flexibility and space in the face of intense emotion so that one can see a range of behavioral 
choices and strategies for managing stress.  
There is also a practice of “radical acceptance” that is used in DBT as well as other forms 
of cognitive therapy. A psychotherapist, Tara Brach (2003), suggests using a perspective of 
radical acceptance to generate compassion. Just as in meditation where the practitioner accepts 
any mental state as “workable,” so too, are DBT therapists trained to accept and validate patient 
behavior (no matter how outrageous) as reasonable and logic. For example, cutting may be one 
choice among many that a young girl can take; and this would be understandable for someone 
who is overwhelmed with distressing feelings and has found cutting to be a relief. The DBT 
therapist starts from that perspective of “radical acceptance,” but helps to explore and coach their 
patients in developing the capacity to consider other possibilities. These treatment modalities in 
many respects do not at all resemble how Buddhists living in Asia approach suffering and 
resilience; which begs the question: does it matter?  
 
Can Tricks of Culture be on Loan? 
In the current study, many of the resilience practices I describe are instances of “culture as 
treatment” (Gone 2013) where cultural beliefs and practices are themselves, forces of healing 
that bolster community resilience. It is unclear how many of the concepts I describe in this 
project would benefit those exposed to trauma in other cultural contexts. I argue below that, in 
fact, many core concepts, such as karma, emptiness, and “crazy wisdom” are not easily 
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translatable into Western culture. Contemplative practices stemming from Buddhism have been 
modified and adapted for use in the United States and elsewhere to such an extent that they 
sometimes only vaguely resemble their previous cultural forms.   
 It comes as a surprise that “meditation” is not a particularly salient way of coping with 
mental distress among Tibetans. Because of the veritable craze associated with meditation and 
mindfulness in North America (everyone from Oprah to Google upper-management seem to be 
seeking meditation instruction), it is assumed that Tibetans surely practice the techniques that 
have now become evidence-based practices in the United States. And while not to this extent, 
there has long been a fascination with Tibetan Buddhism in the West. This culture and others 
from the “mystical Orient” (Said 1972; Lopez 1992; Trungpa 1973), are thought to necessarily 
engage in peaceful spiritual practices like meditation. But meditation—especially a sitting 
meditation focusing on the breath—is rarely, if ever, recommended for treating mental distress. 
In fact, some forms of mental illness, such as srog rlung can actually be caused or occasioned by 
long periods of meditation. Even in most monasteries and nunneries, sitting meditation is not 
routinely taught; some receive the practice once they complete their shedra (monastic college) 
training if they aspire to complete the traditional three or four-year retreat. 
 But while these practices in the West may bear little resemblance to what is practiced in 
Tibet, adaptation and modification of Buddhist practices as they travel across cultures is not a 
new phenomenon. The forms of Buddhism that are practiced in Sri Lanka, China, Thailand and 
Japan are in many respects, quite different. When King Trisong Detsen established Buddhism as 
the official religion of Tibet in the 8
th
 century, it changed from the form in which it originated 
(coming from India), once mixed with the traditional shamanistic religion of Tibet known as 
Bön. Still today, there are major debates among all the Buddhist lineages, and some do not even 
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consider the forms of Vajrayana or tantric practice used in Tibet to be authentic. Therefore, 
although in this section I discuss the ways that the practices I describe in this project may be 
difficult to adapt to Western use, I do not categorically see a problem with Buddhism and its 
various practices being adapted in the West. Although there are particular core tenets of 
Buddhism that identify them as such
29
, there is no pure or authentic form of Buddhism that needs 
to be preserved.  
Of course there is a limit to what may be recognized as authentic, or not. Although 
researchers like Benedict and colleagues (2008) recognize that meditation is ill-advised as a 
therapy, they suggest that clinicians in the United States who treat “traumatized Tibetan monks” 
use alternative methods, such as “singing bowl therapy,” citing personal communication with a 
lama who explains that “the sound has a direct connection to the heart” (2008:492). Singing 
bowls are hand-crafted metal gongs sometimes struck to signal the beginning or ending of a 
spiritual practice. In Dharamsala I observed them more often in Tibetan shops to sell to foreign 
tourists than in monasteries, and they certainly were not used for relaxation or therapeutic 
purposes. Studies like these, which articulate combining Western psychotherapy to treat PTSD 
with supposed cultural practices like “singing bowls” as a way to make clinical treatment 
culturally salient, lack rigor and complexity. When cultural concepts clash with Western 
psychotherapeutic principles, these schisms cannot be overcome through shallow modifications 
like those described above. Often the “cultural differences” are at the level of fundamental 
worldviews and concepts of reality.  
 
                                                        
29
 Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche argues that the “Four Seals” are what makes Buddhist beliefs, “Buddhist”; not 
peaceful practices of meditation, peace and nonviolence as many Westerners imagine. The four seals are: 1) all 
compounded things are impermanent; 2) all emotions are pain; 3) all things have no inherent existence; and 4) 




In his book What Makes You Not a Buddhist, Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche argues that a refusal 
of the concepts of emptiness, impermanence and non-duality, are what would make someone 
most unlike a Buddhist. And yet, these are the very concepts that are plucked out of Buddhist 
practices that have been adapted by use in clinical settings. Whereas concepts like compassion, 
nonviolence, and contemplation are found in other religious traditions, the view of emptiness and 
impermanence are distinctly Buddhist. Although practitioners and clinicians in the West are 
ready to fully explore and adopt the practices of compassion that are found in lojong, the aspects 
which focus on cultivating a view of “emptiness” are left behind. I would argue that lojong is just 
as much about emptiness as it is about compassion; so it may be problematic to speak of using 
lojong if only relying on compassion. For example, in personal communication I was told by the 
first author of an experimental study (Condon et al. 2013) that they compared lojong practice 
with mindfulness meditation to investigate whether differences were observed in compassionate 
responses to suffering. When I asked the author if they used aspects of lojong that focus on 
emptiness, he explained that they were “only interested in compassion.” 
 I do not necessarily aim to critique studies such as these. Rather, I argue that it is fruitful 
to explore exactly why concepts of emptiness and impermanence seem to lack cultural salience 
outside of Buddhist contexts. In my recommendations for how the current project might 
contribute something promising to literature on the clinical applications of meditation and 
mindfulness, I argue that there are aspects of Buddhist beliefs on emptiness that might actually 
promote wellbeing, despite this seeming paradoxical.  
 In chapters 3 and 4, I explored the concept of repressed memories, which serve as 
evidence for traumatic rupture among Euro-American cultures. In the West, a highly bound, 
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discrete, and intact “self” is the one of the hallmarks of emotional health. Traumatic memories 
that threaten to disrupt the cohesion, or continuity of self and identity are indicative of 
psychopathology. This assertion is somewhat more complex in the Tibetan context. From a 
strictly Buddhist perspective, clinging to the notion that there is a fundamentally cohesive self is 
actually the hallmark of samsara, not of emotional health. The direct realization that one’s self is 
in the nature of emptiness is not attainable by everyday Tibetan people. To accomplish such 
realization connotes transformation into an “arya” being—a highly realized person who has 
reached the first stage on the path to enlightenment. I mention this because it is important to 
emphasize that concepts such as the emptiness of self are ideals. So while not attainable for most, 
nonetheless, most Tibetans understand that a clinging and grasping to a false continuity of “the 
self” only brings misery.  
The various practices in Tibetan Buddhism that coach even ordinary people to 
contemplate death, impermanence, and emptiness are really an inversion of what psychotherapy 
promotes in the West. As stated by Epstein: 
[i]f we can make the ego stronger, the expectation is that emptiness will go away. In 
Buddhism, the approach is reversed. Focus on emptiness, the dissatisfaction, and the 
feelings of imperfection, and the character will get stronger. Learn how to tolerate 
nothing and your mind will be at rest. Psychotherapy tends to focus on the personal 
melodrama, exploring its origins and trying to clean up its mess. Buddhism seeks, 
instead, to purify the insight of emptiness. [1998:19-20] 
 
The concept of an “empty self” might be among the most difficult of all Tibetan cultural 
concepts to understand; and yet, I argue it is one of the most important in bolstering resilience in 
this cultural context.  
 In her ethnographic work on heroin addicts, Garcia (2010) considers what it means when 
her interlocutors explain they their aim is to lose themselves through their drug use, to disappear 
from the world. They want to become numb and not feel anything. She asks: “what does this 
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form of self-exile communicate in terms of the (broken) interdependencies of self and other?” 
(2010:11). This kind of broken or empty self is not analogous to what my Tibetan interlocutors 
describe as the emptiness of self. Rather, such contemplations actually help them develop a felt 
sense of interdependence and a more realistic or grounded approach to suffering. Emptiness does 
not mean that things do not exist (which would be a nihilistic view); rather, that they are not 
inherently or independently existent. Everything (including oneself) is dependent on other arising 
phenomena. This sense of what is known as tendrel, or dependent origination, demonstrates how 
through karmic causes and conditions, everything is interdependent.    
 
Crazy Wisdom 
There is a particular approach to Buddhism found in some strains of Zen and Tibetan Buddhist 
traditions known as yeshe chölwa, crazy wisdom. These approaches use unorthodox or 
sometimes even rather outrageous methods to shake students from fixed and habitual views. In 
particular, these sorts of teachings challenge overly puritanical or rigid worldviews that prevent 
practitioners from experiencing non-duality (Khyentse 2008; Trungpa 1973). Crazy wisdom 
teachings often appear in allegory and traditional folk tales, but even today there are certain 
contemporary lamas who are known as “crazy wisdom masters”; often they are ngakpas (yogis) 
or “house-holder” lamas who may reside in or outside of monasteries.  
For example, a 30-year old tulku (high incarnate lama) named Phakchok Rinpoche often 
writes provocative yet inspiring quotes on his Facebook page, such as: “Genuine practitioners 
don't run from their emotions, they chew them, they eat them, and they transform them”; Hope is 
going to kill you!”; and “Next time you are angry, turn all that energy into something beautiful.” 
These pith quotes are examples of everyday lojong, or mind-training, of taking suffering onto the 
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path and transforming it. Another lama, Dzongsar Khyentse Rinpoche, is not only the head of 
major monasteries and highly respected shedras (monastic colleges) in Bhutan and India, but is 
also an award-winning film maker and has been known to show up to important religious events 
wearing wigs or silly sunglasses. He teaches through action and by example the qualities of 
“non-duality,” where form (or appearance) and emptiness are inseparable. He is also known for 
periodically ignoring and even insulting his close students out of “kindness,” to break them out 
of habitually seeking praise and external validation.  
There is a story about a beloved lama named Patrul Rinpoche (1808-1887), a renowned 
yogi who often used crazy wisdom methods. One day Patrul Rinpoche went to visit a hermit 
known for his austerity who had been practicing in a cave for twenty years. Patrul Rinpoche 
showed up at the cave, and the hermit humbly and sweetly welcomed him in. He asked, “Tell 
me, what have you been doing in here?” The hermit replied, “I’ve been practicing the perfection 
of patience.” Putting his face very close to the hermit’s face, Patrul Rinpoche taunted him 
relentlessly: “but a pair of old scoundrels like us, we don’t care anything about patience, really. 
We only do this to get everyone’s admiration, right? We just do this to get people to think we are 
big shots, don’t we? I’ll bet they bring you a lot of gifts, don’t they? Well?? Do they?” 
At this point the hermit stood up and screamed, “Why did you come here? Why are you 
tormenting me? Go away and leave me in peace!” And then Rinpoche said, “So now, where is 
your perfection of patience?” 
Many crazy wisdom stories take on a humorous tone, such as this one. The sense of being 
“crazy” also connotes something like the outrageous courage or confidence that is needed to act 
fully for the benefit of others. It is understood that those who are truly selfless, are somewhat 
fearless and even a little outrageous. Tibetans admire these qualities, greatly. They also 
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recognize the tremendous mind needed to experience atrocities such as imprisonment as 
opportunities for mind-training; it is somewhat inconceivable. While these qualities are 
associated with extraordinary and highly realized individuals, there is at the same time, if only an 
intellectual knowledge, recognition that every person is born with the inherent capacity to 
become selfless and compassionate. This recognition stems from an understanding of Buddha-
nature, tatagathagarba (Sanskrit). Whereas Catholics believe in “original sin,” Buddhists believe 
the exact opposite; that the true nature of mind is all-knowing, compassionate and stainless. No 
matter how much negative karma obscures the mind (even to the extent that one becomes an 
animal or a hell-being), the true nature of every being is in a sense, already enlightened. We are 
also all in the same predicament: we are trapped in samsara.  
When designing this study I took great care to construct my sample in such a way that 
reflects the diverse population of Dharamsala. I criticize previous researchers who treat the 
Tibetan exile community as if it were static and uniform. I show how there is derision across 
various subgroups based on regional, generational, and class differences. Therefore, I expected to 
find significant differences in the methods of coping and resilience across the population. 
Somewhat to my dismay, I was not able to discern any notable findings across subgroups. I 
found that as might be expected, monks and nuns use more formal Buddhist methods to cope, 
whereas lay people relied on more everyday notions of emotional health. But I found no 
evidence that formal Buddhist practices occasion enhanced resilience. Those who, for example, 
can recite many passages from lojong texts and describe the technical aspects of emptiness and 
compassion do not seem to do any better than those who claim that they are not advanced 
practitioners but use compassion as a way to work directly with negative emotions because that 
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is how they learned to approach problems as a child. I did not find significant differences in 
coping and resilience among men and women; or among new arrivals and old-timers. 
Initially, I assumed that perhaps I did not adequately diversify my sample. Although this 
remains a possibility, I have come to consider alternative explanations. Looking to the practices 
themselves as clues, such as contemplating the ways that we are the same, that we are 
interdependent, and that we all want to be happy and avoid suffering, I have come to wonder 
whether such an orientation might actually take effect to the extent that noticeable differences 
across the population are not easily observed. The contemplative methods for recognizing this 
“sameness,” an aspect of lojong, are a common technology to mitigate suffering. Incidentally (or 
not), such recognition on an ultimate level is emblematic of enlightenment, itself. The devotion 
that Tibetans feel for their lamas is not merely worship. Rather, through observing the 
extraordinary qualities of their Rinpoches (literally, precious jewels), they should come to 
meditate on their own Buddha-nature in that the minds of ordinary people are fundamentally just 
as pure and stainless as bodhisattvas and buddhas. Despite one’s many problems, Tibetans are 
taught from any early age that beneath the stormy clouds of their bad karma and negative 
emotions is a vast and brilliant open sky of mind. A mind that is enlightened. 
During a teaching in Dharamsala I heard the Dalai Lama recount a well-known anecdote. 
He was at a conference in North American when someone asked about chronic problems with 
“low self-esteem.” His Holiness leaned over to his translator and asked for help; the translator 
tried to explain, but still he did not fully understand what this concept of “low self-esteem” was 
all about. When the Dalai Lama describes this conference, he recalls that he was astounded by 
such notions. He said that Tibetans may have many problems and can act in harmful ways; but 
they do not, he explained, question their inherent worth.   
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As Tsering Norbu, a 64 year-old layperson describes: 
We all have buddhanature. His Holiness the Dalai Lama always reminds us of this. The 
problem is that we don’t know it so we do all kinds of harmful actions. But underneath, 
just like the sun shining behind a sky full of clouds, is a vast, spacious and radiant mind. 
That is buddhanature. You asked me some questions earlier about what I do to cope with 
difficulties in my life. I am not a good practitioner. But if I were a better practitioner I 
would always try to meditate on my own buddhanature and the buddhanature of others. 
Many great lamas were thrown into prison by the Chinese. Some have been there for over 
thirty years. When I was in prison there was a very humble monk who always tried to 
help me. He advised me that when I was being beaten and tortured I should meditate on 
compassion for all beings. I told him I cannot because I am not a great lama. He 
challenged me and said that because of my buddhanature, I can! This immense 
compassion exists whether I can see it or not. This gave me great confidence. 
 
Others, as well, mentioned that just knowing—if only intellectually—that they already have 
Buddha-nature, a mind that is stainless and pure, was a source of great strength. While for most, 
Buddha-nature remains a lofty ideal, I argue it becomes something of a “north star,” an orienting 
principle for Tibetans in times of crisis.  
 
Exploring Therapeutic or Clinical Implications of Project 
Although it is unlikely that clinical interventions in meditation and mindfulness will embrace the 
concept of “buddha-nature,” there are ways in which this project might broaden existing research 
on the therapeutic potential of Buddhist-inspired concepts. I do not suggest that one needs to 
convert to Tibetan Buddhism to utilize these forms of resilience. A number of core concepts I 
described as being integral to Tibetan forms of resilience are being explored in the mental health 
literature. Important psychosocial factors that have become associated with resilience, include: 
humor, cognitive flexibility, acceptance, religion/spirituality, and altruism (Southwick et al. 
2005). I suggest specifically, that my project may further our understanding of the therapeutic 
potential of flexibility. 
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Some studies have explored the use of silence in the therapeutic encounter; an area that I 
argue might be combined with considerations of flexibility. Researchers in the area of palliative 
care have been concerned with highlighting the difference between “awkward silence” and that 
which is invitational or compassionate (Back et al. 2009). They emphasize the importance of 
clinicians training in the productive use of these techniques because pauses and longer moments 
of silence are not typical in everyday communication (at least in the West). Likewise, Carr and 
Smith (2014) write on the merit of silence in Motivational Interviewing, an approach often used 
in substance abuse treatment that relies on posing “open questions,” and contemplating a variety 
of choices. They found that therapists who train in utilizing “intra-turn silence,” or pause, create 
a highly client-centered approach to treatment. I would push Carr and Smith (2014) to go further 
in reflecting how silence in the therapeutic encounter might be of benefit. Does it promote 
grounded awareness of the body and the mind? Or occasion what Tibetans understand to be 
“freedom from fixation”? Is there anything to be gained by allowing psychotherapy clients to 
simply experience without articulating or verbalizing?  
An aspect of the productive or therapeutic use of silence also relates to the high premium 
my Tibetan interlocutors place on equanimity. In a series of conversations with leading clinicians 
and researchers interested in mindfulness, the Dalai Lama asked whether there is a school of 
thought within psychology that sees happiness and sadness as emotions, but does not see 
equanimity in this same way—as an emotion. The team was a little perplexed. One member said: 
“equanimity is not a word that Western psychologists have spent much time discussing.” Or 
experiencing! said another. The group laughed good-heartedly in agreement. As I described in 
earlier chapters, maintaining equanimity is considered much more important within Tibetan 
notions of healthy coping than is typically seen in the West. Perhaps because of beliefs in karma, 
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many describe how one should not become overly concerned with how fair one’s plight in life 
may be. Despite what is happening externally, maintaining stability and steadiness in the mind—
not becoming too upset (or too elated)—is a prominent sign of emotional health and wellbeing.  
Tibetans do not have the expectation that things will always turn out well. In fact, because they 
are in samsara, they expect that there will be difficulties in life. So when they encounter 
something negative, rather than reacting strongly, there is a sense of acceptance.  
Through consulting with Tibetan Buddhist lamas, Mark Epstein had an epiphany with 
regard to his psychotherapy practice: “stop trying to eliminate emptiness!”; this insight was in 
fact, so strong that he claims this is exactly where Western psychotherapy has going wrong 
(1999). Epstein asserts that psychotherapists are just as intimidated by emptiness as their 
patients. Desperately looking for the root of the problem, the hidden dynamics, and the solution 
for fixing it, he says that “[t]herapists were trying to get rid of emptiness by uncovering its 
cause” (1999:14). But through exploration within his clinical practice, he found paradoxically 
that by not trying to chase away or fix feelings of emptiness, people seemed to find what he 
describes as “their own voice.” This is similar to what D.W. Winnicott, an important figure in the 
psychoanalytic school of British Object Relations, writes in his seminal work, Playing and 
Reality (1971) on the pitfalls of “doing too much, being too little.”  
These perspectives aim to cultivate authenticity, which demand acceptance of the 
changing and impermanent aspects of life. Damasio argues: 
the illusion of an ongoing, unified self is created by the brain as it constantly and 
continuously represents fluctuating body and emotional states in interaction with a 
constantly changing environment. Secondary representation of these fluctuating 
body/environment interactions are then created, stored in memory, and can be drawn 
upon to construct yet other representations of the autobiographical self. [1999 cited in 




Could it be that in the West we are colluding with a mirage? For Tibetans, those who are 
healthiest are those willing to accept the changing and even illusory notion of a cohesive self. 
But rather than falling apart, those who are most resilient argue that accepting these realities 
bring about greater freedom. Although we may not need to subscribe to complex worldviews of 
karma and emptiness, it may be that greater acceptance of the impermanent and changing nature 
of life could be more beneficial than expectations of perpetual health and happiness.  
  
Moving Beyond Social Suffering 
Within the past two decades there has been a major paradigm shift in medical anthropology, to 
investigate “social suffering,” (Bourdieu 1999; Kleinman et al. 1997) and the structural causes of 
illness, war and misery (Farmer 2001, 2003; Link and Phelan 1995). And with time, while not 
rejecting this perspective, a number of key scholars have complicated the debate, asking how to 
conceptualize the role of subjectivity, agency, and individual experience (Biehl 2005; Biehl et al. 
2007). Many authors of foundational writings on social suffering have also been instrumental in 
developing new theory on subjectivity (Das 2000; Good et al. 2007; Kleinman 2011). Although 
these perspectives provided a launching point from which I theorized my study, I argue they 
provide only a limited framework for thinking-through suffering, as well as coping and resilience 
in the Tibetan exile community. These frameworks are limited because Tibetans do not 
understand their community to be victims. Despite political oppression, they have a collaborative 
sense (although not without conflict) of what it means to be a part of a society. 
            On a particularly wet day in August, I walked slowly up the hill with Tsultrim, a Tibetan 
friend in his late-20s who worked in a local café I frequented. It was monsoon, and at a certain 
point in the season you give up trying to stay dry. Although everyone carries large umbrellas, the 
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streets become so flooded that no one bothers to avoid sloshing through puddles. Despite what 
was going on with the weather, the pace on the streets was always slow, in part because in this 
hill station town you were always walking up or down a steep hill. We passed by a young Indian 
woman dressed in a dirty, torn sari, holding an infant. “Milk! No money. Milk!” she said to me 
in a pleading tone, holding out her hand and gesturing to her infant and a nearby shop. There is a 
well-known movement (some pejoratively call it a “beggar mafia”) where groups come largely 
from Rajasthan to engage in organized begging among foreign tourists. Living in a shanty town 
of tents and cardboard shelters nearby, small groups of young women walk into town every day, 
each carrying an infant. They approach unsuspecting tourists, sometimes very persistently, even 
aggressively, and convince them to purchase a large bag of powdered milk, which is then resold 
for a profit. Tsultrim clucked in disapproval, as if to say, tsk, tsk, what a shame. “You never see 
Tibetans begging, do you?” he asked me. 
            I sometimes heard ex-pats who lived in Dharamsala instructing new tourist arrivals not to 
give them money or purchase milk. “You know, some Tibetan monks started a foundation for 
them,” one German woman said. “So their children could go to school. But they won’t even let 
the kids go to school, they’re more of an asset to be used in begging.” It is true that I have never 
seen a Tibetan person begging in India. “Many Tibetans are very poor, we have nothing,” 
Tsultrim continued. “But we would never live this way or let a neighbor or family member live 
this way.” This was very evident at the Kalachakra Initiation in Bodhgaya where I witnessed 
thousands of Tibetan new arrivals, some covered in dirt and torn clothing. But unlike their poor 
Indian counterparts, there was never a question of whether they would be housed and fed.  
            One day my research assistant remarked that there were four people staying in his room. 
He explained that a small group from his county in Kham arrived six months ago and have not 
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yet found jobs. There was a strong sense of belonging and “clansmanship” connected to one’s 
county of origin in Tibet. Despite never meeting these individuals before, my assistant pointed 
out that they were “from my same county,” as if it would be obvious why he would host a group 
of men for six months or more in his one-room flat. When Tibetans talked about Indian beggars 
it was often with a sense of incredulousness. They did not necessarily look down on individual 
beggars, as much as the society or culture that does not look after its own (Ward 2013). As I 
became more integrated into the community and began receiving invitations to come to 
neighbors’ homes for dinner, I observed that Tibetans rarely dined alone. Groups of friends, 
classmates, neighbors, and families often pooled food and cooked a large meal together. This 
stretched not only food supplies, but also gas—a scarce resource in Dharamsala. “Why would 
everyone in the neighborhood be using gas at dinner time, all cooking alone?” a neighbor asked. 
However, in all my time spent in the homes of Tibetans, there was never an Indian person invited 
to dinner.  
 Although no one much liked to give to the Rajashtani “milk ladies,” there were often 
other sorts of beggars around town, such as those with serious disabilities, likely from polio. It 
was not uncommon for Tibetans, including monks and nuns, to offer money. This was especially 
true on Saga Dawa and other Buddhist holy days where good karma (merit) from good deeds is 
multiplied millions of times. The Tibetan cultural and religious sense of generosity and making 
offerings shapes many everyday practices. Making offerings to monks and nuns is a rather 
simple way to generate merit. Whenever I would come along with friends and neighbors to pay 
someone a visit—particularly if the host was a monk or nun—it was requisite to stop along the 
way and purchase some juice, biscuits, or fruit to offer on arrival.  
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Likewise, as a guest one is offered tea or food, without exception. This became somewhat 
of an amusing problem if I was conducting a number of interviews. By the end of a day I was so 
full of tea and biscuits I could not stomach anymore. But refusing an offering is considered 
extremely rude. There is a built in sense that generosity and good fortune are inextricably linked. 
Being stingy or miserly is dangerous; not only in the karmic sense, but as one woman remarked, 
“we never know when we might need the help, and if we don’t have the habit of helping others, 
they may not be there when we are in need.” Given these cultural norms, it seems very difficult 
to imagine what a Tibetan zone of abandonment would look like. The Tibetan government-in-
exile offers some support to new arrivals, but much of the assistance I observed was very 
informal among friends, neighbors, and “county-mates.” There seemed to be recognition that 
because misfortune and struggle are sometimes just a part of life, it is therefore important to 
construct a society that offers collective support. 
            In North America, there is a sense of entitlement to near constant health, happiness and 
wellbeing. Becoming sick, feeling unhappy, or losing a job or loved one feels not just painful, 
but somehow wrong. Why do bad things happen to good people, some ask. Taking seriously the 
notion that suffering is not a universal experience but one intimately shaped by culture, this 
research grapples with a culture that insists that difficulty, illness, and disruption is just a part of 
life. Within this community, no matter how bad things get, personal and collective karma 
provides an ordering principle to explain difficult life events. Far from implying that anyone who 
is imprisoned or violated somehow deserves it, the system of karma reminds this community that 
in the endless sea of past lifetimes, we have all been murders, rapists, and oppressors at one time.  
When my Tibetan interlocutors argue that constructing categories of “the oppressed” and “the 
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oppressors” misses something more fundamental—that suffering is a core human experience--the 
usual models of structural violence seems to lose some traction. 
            I argue that those accepting suffering as a natural part of life does not lead to victim 
mentalities or internalized oppression in the Tibetan exile community. In fact, I argue the 
opposite—that such perspectives actually promote agency and internal freedom. As Biehl and 
colleagues suggest, studies of subjectivity promise to help “disturb and enlarge presumed 
understandings of what is socially possible and desirable” (2007:5). So while Tibetans, of course, 
are not immune to the effects of suffering, those who accept that they have purified a karmic debt 
or potentially even look at how suffering may help to develop compassion for others in similar 
situations, seem to manage in unthinkable situations. The notion that there may be positive 
outcomes or opportunities for growth, what is sometimes called “bringing adversity onto the 
path,” is highly valued, but perhaps not as remarkable (or inconceivable) a notion as it is in the 
West where concepts of social suffering and structural violence were conceived. 
 
Freedom and Agency  
This dissertation contributes new theory to understanding agency by challenging notions of 
“freedom.” In recent years, the concept of agency has also become important in understanding 
the workings of culture. Kirmayer and Sartorius describe culture as “the dynamic interplay 
between individuals’ agency and social processes of discursive and institutional power, often 
expressed through the control of technical knowledge and professional authority” (2007:832).  
For Tibetan living in exile, feeling a sense of freedom within the mind might be what is most 
important, above and beyond other concerns. They do not believe that structural constraints such 
as oppression and discrimination are acceptable—evidenced by the fifty year political struggle 
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and international campaign for Tibet. However, there is at the same time an orientation to life’s 
happenings that are very pragmatic. As Tseyang, a 16 year-old student said, “I remember my 
Ama-la (mother) saying to me when I was little: ‘you always have a choice.’ No matter what, it 
is up to you. In a bad situation you should try to find a solution, but the most important is not to 
let it affect your peace of mind too much.” This is similar to my elderly neighbor whose advice 
to me no matter the situation always seemed to be, “self is the protector of self.” 
 Like with waiting all day on the wooden bench while the Indian visa officers drank chai 
and purposely ignored us, Tibetans do not view a flexible attitude as submissive. Rather, they see 
such an orientation to life as savvy, agile, and skillful. Such perspectives that purport that “self is 
the protector of self” might sound somewhat lonely and could even be misinterpreted as a 
neoliberal call for self-reliance. But many forms of coping and resilience in this community are 
generated in the atmosphere of compassion, the foundational basis for health and happiness. And 
while theories, such as structural violence and social suffering help to make sense of how the 
forces of inequity can create real suffering, I argue that these concepts can only go so far. An 
“ideal person” within the structural violence debates would be someone who is unconstrained by 
external forces, such that they have the freedom to act as highly autonomous and independent 
actors. But while certainly Tibetans do not necessarily want to be constrained by external forces, 
a highly autonomous and independent agent, free to act in the world however he or she wishes 
would not be considered “ideal.” 
 If Tibetans do not place a high premium on personal independence, liberty and autonomy, 
then what are the qualities they admire most? Tibetan cultural heroes seem to have a number of 
qualities in common. Perhaps most central, is that they willingly take on the suffering of others. 
They also act with humility and kindness. Those imbued with ideal qualities might consider 
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sickness and even severe adversity, such as imprisonment, as an opportunity to purify negative 
karma and generate compassion. A recent book review written by Geoffery Samuels on one of 
Tibet’s heroes, Gesar of Ling, the beloved enlightened warrior king of Tibet, points out that the 
Tibetan concept of “warriorship” is not about dominance and aggression, but about a willingness 
to face enemies with gentleness and intelligence. That is the meaning of bravery here. Being 
brave and confident does not suggest that there are no negative feelings or experiences. Rather, 
my interlocutors describe highly resilient people as those who take a very humanistic attitude 
towards suffering, understanding that they are not unique. They use painful experiences to 
generate compassion for everyone who might be experiencing something. 
 A modern day hero is Palden Gyatso, the Tibetan monk who spent 33 year in a Chinese 
prison and is often recalled as an exemplar of resilience for stating soon after his release that his 
greatest fear during his captivity was that he might lose compassion for his torturers. As he 
describes in his autobiography (Gyatso 1997), wishing compassion for those who harm you does 
not make you submissive; it makes you free of the toxic effects of hatred. While talking about 
traumatic experiences may not necessarily help the teller (Young 1995), it may be in this context 
that the listeners benefit. Gyatso has given talks across the world in human rights forums, often 
giving graphic accounts of his torture. Sometimes, as is depicted below, he offers a 
demonstration of how various implements of torture were used, such as how electric rods were 
put into his mouth. For Tibetans and foreign activists alike, this discourse juxtaposed with 
rhetoric of compassion and forgiveness challenges conventional notions about freedom and 
agency. As Schröder 2011 argues, “the categories of ‘culprit and victim’ do not necessarily fit” 
(153). From this perspective, true freedom is not measured against social constraint, but rather, 




Figure 10: Political Activist Palden Gyatso 
 
Photo Credit: www.in-nomine.org 
My interlocutors often described very resilient people as those with great confidence and dignity, 
and cited examples of very “humble” individuals, who could bear anything because they had so 
much compassion and expansiveness.  
 In her essay on Ordinary Ethics, Veena Das claims that healing is a process which occurs 
not through rising up to the transcendent, but rather, sinking down into the ordinary. I am 
reminded of how often my Tibetan interlocutors would say to me, “These are human problems, 
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we are all suffering.” Having the flexibility and space to see things from different angles helps 
Tibetans to work with suffering in their minds. From one point of view, Tibetans in a prison 
might be seen as the “victims.” But, as a man named Tashi pointed out, “the Chinese guards who 
maltreat prisoners are the ones accruing all this negative karma. So we should feel compassion 
for them. Taking the broad view, we can see that they are the real victims in this situation.” In 
coming to see the human infallibility of their oppressors, they feel a sense of interdependence 
through the system of karma. Karma is a social construct, showing how cause and effect brings 
people together in particular situations. Classic Buddhist advice suggests that those who are 
harmed should think, may I willingly take this on, to purify the karmic debt between us. 
The question of agency in relation to karma is an interesting one. One might expect that 
those who believe in karma could feel powerless. But actually I found quite the opposite. Among 
Tibetans in exile, it gives a sense of increased agency insofar as one can be certain that one’s 
actions will have demonstrable effects the future. In addition, there is always the possibility of 
purifying negative karma that has already accumulated. Through this spiritual effort and work, 
Tibetans experience increased agency or sense of self-efficacy.  
 
Conclusion 
While empirical findings suggest there is a low incidence of mental distress in Dharamsala, some 
scholars remain skeptical about the validity of these studies, asking whether the cultural 
propensity to avoid disclosing distress creates response bias. While the present study does not 
demonstrate that Tibetans are any “more” or “less” resilient than other cultural groups, the 
findings help to better understand local idioms of distress, as well as processes of coping and 
resilience. Specifically, my interlocutors understood difficulties in life as the ripening of karma 
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and were reticent to generate more negative karma and risk illness by reacting too strongly. 
Instead, they understood that they had purified a karmic debt and tried to let go of negative 
emotions. To do so, there was recognition that one needed to transform one’s relationship to 
difficulty. 
Many previous studies in medical anthropology have considered the difficulties inherent 
in attempting to equate mental distress that is spiritual or even existential in nature, with 
psychiatric diagnostic categories (Csordas 2008; Good 1994; Storck et al. 2000). In the Tibetan 
context, mental distress, including that which is occasioned by political violence, tends to be 
more of a “spiritual problem,” than a “medical problem.” However, there are overlaps, such as 
with rlung disorders. This dissertation raises questions about whether trauma should be 
conceptualized in the same way regardless of whether it is seen by the local community as 
psychiatric/medical or spiritual in nature. In a certain sense, the way that members of the Tibetan 
exile community view human suffering almost transcends the binary between “medical” and 
“religious.” The view is much more humanistic: understanding that all people are suffering, 
political violence and the suffering that ensues is emblematic of experiences in samsara. This 
reminds residents of Dharamsala that there is “nothing special” or notable about having even 
severe problems, particularly because all beings have suffered endlessly in samsara.  
In Karen Seeley’s ethnographic research in lower Manhattan during and after 9/11, she 
found that something occurred which surprised the mental health professionals who had come to 
help. Finding themselves in what she calls “simultaneous trauma” (2008), psychotherapists 
found it increasingly difficult to maintain professional boundaries, which usually discourage 
much in the way of personal disclosure or display of too much emotion. And yet, amidst the 
community-wide horror, many found themselves to be not only exposed to the same traumatic 
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events as their clients, but in fact, their psychological responses were the same. This became a 
source of struggle for many therapists who identities were built on their capacities for 
professional distance, and above all, the ability to effectively manage stress. 
 Whereas seeing their human qualities and infallibility for therapists in Seeley’s (2008) 
research was a source of discomfort, for Tibetans in difficult situations, contemplating the 
likeness of others in one’s same situation is considered a healthy method of coping. This not only 
helps to cultivate compassion but is an effective way to work very directly with difficult 
emotions. Rather than moving away and desperately avoiding pain, classic advice on managing 
negative emotions actually suggests that one should move in closer to their experience. It is often 
the resistance to experiences that make us suffer most. Particularly for Tibetans, they argue that 
the most resilient people do not seek out pain, but will use it as an opportunity to connect with 
their own vulnerability and tenderness, which automatically connects them to the humanity of 
others. This perspective is categorically different from how Taylor defines torture, which she see 
as acts that strip victims of their humanity.  
Torture deliberately inflicts physical or psychological pain on one’s enemies for 
information, coercion, or intimidation. It attacks personhood, suspends the rules, and 
unmakes the world of the victim by turning it into a strange and terrifying place. The 
practice of torture undermines all boundaries and conventions set up by societies to contain 
and rationalize violence. [Taylor 2007:710-711]  
 
For Tibetans in these unthinkable situations, it is only through seeing the humanity, even the 
ordinariness, of their torturers that allows them to maintain a sense of dignity. Rather than 
making Tibetan refugees feel even more despondent and hopeless, however, such attitudes 
among the community’s most resilient people, helps to generate compassion and feel a sense of 
interconnectedness with “the human condition.”  
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            To generate these forms of resilience, the dissertation explored how Tibetan exile 
members use lojong, a common practice or “technology” for managing distress. Swiftly working 
to challenge the utility of negative emotions, lojong transforms one’s appraisal and experience of 
distress, reducing the longevity of suffering associated with potentially traumatizing events. As 
one foundational lojong slogan advises (Kongtrul 2005): 
When misfortune fills the world and its inhabitants, 
Make adversity the path of awakening.  
 
These lines go beyond reminding Tibetans that suffering is part of life, or instructing them to 
have a positive attitude. Instead, it suggests that suffering and adversity can be used to “wake 
up,” to generate wisdom and compassion.  
The findings of this study challenge the notion that trauma is inevitable in the context of 
political violence. Understanding trauma as a looping process between the self and society, I 
show how because of cultural values (and practices based on these values), distress seems to lose 
its momentum. Yet while stories of oppression at the cultural level are widely discussed, at the 
personal level there is great incentive to quickly let go or transform distress. Tibetan community 
members encourage one another to move forward with confidence and dignity in spite of 
personal histories of violence. These stories contribute to a growing literature, which aims to 
understand not just those with clinical levels of distress and mental disorders, but to examine 
fully the broad range of reactions to political violence.  
 
Being Humble, Being Confident 
It is not a particularly notable finding to argue that religion helps people cope with adversity. 
Such a function might, as Weber (1930) argued, be a defining feature of a religion. But this 
inquiry has identified particularities of Tibetan Buddhism—sets of beliefs and practices that may 
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plausibly be argued to enhance resilience. In this section I explore the cultural ideals of 
“humbleness,” and “confidence,” and argue that these concepts, which are rather unique to 
Tibetan Buddhism, are integral to promoting resilience. In many ways, the practice of Tibetan 
Buddhism and notions of spirituality are radically different from theistic religions. As 
anthropologists working on Christianity (Corwin 2012; Luhrmann 2012; Lester 2005) attest, 
much of the spiritual work among Christians relates to employing a variety of technologies that 
bring one closer to God. Whereas in Tibetan Buddhism, there are no external agents who can 
“save you.”  
An American Buddhist nun named Pema Chodron describes an experience she had 
during some important teachings in Nepal. She was a guest of one of the high lamas who 
organized the empowerments. One minute she was ushered up next to the teacher’s throne and 
asked to come in a special door. The next day she was told, “oh, no, no, you go and sit with the 
other nuns on the floor.” This continued for days and she did not understand her status. Finally 
she said to her host: “I just don’t know who I’m supposed to be.” He said: “Well, you have to 
learn to be big and small at the same time” (Chodron 2001). These themes of humility, 
confidence and self-reliance provide Tibetans with particular “tools” for resilience. 
Tibetan Buddhism, known as the vajrayana, is quite different in many respects from Zen 
and the Theravadan traditions in Southeast Asia. Rather than slowly and methodically working to 
reveal an enlightened mind—the way that one might polish a tarnished piece of silver—
vajrayana practitioners start from a place of enlightenment from the beginning (also known as 
the resultant path). Although the shining silver is still covered with a lot of muck, there is great 
faith that the true nature of mind is nonetheless, there, shining underneath. A traditional analogy 
is to imagine the brilliant blue sky; even when it is covered by clouds—sometimes completely 
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obscured—the vast sky still “exists” behind the clouds. No matter what the weather, the nature of 
the sky, itself, does not change.  
 Tibetan religious beliefs, and the cultural practices based on them, instill a sense of 
confidence and faith, not in an external God, but in one’s own mind. In early August, I 
interviewed two nuns who had just days prior come out of a four-year solitary retreat in a cave 
shelter near Lahoul. They practiced in the Drikung Kagyu tradition, and while in retreat did not 
cut their hair. It was quite unusual to sit with two nuns with long hair. As depicted below, some 
stay for three or four years in a “meditation box,” so they can sleep sitting up. Many advanced 
meditation practices, such as “dream yoga,” involve working with rlung (winds), which can 
more easily be brought into the central channel if one’s spine is straight. Incidentally, 
practitioners at the time of death attempt to remain in the sitting meditation posture in order to do 
phowa, a practice that gives one more control in the rebirth process.  I recalled all the times that 
my Tibetan interlocutors explained that you will know someone’s inner state by their radiance. 
Indeed, the nuns had an uncanny glow, their eyes were shining and particularly their skin seemed 
almost luminescent. At the same time, there was an ordinariness in the way they carried 
themselves. And while I found it very impressive that they had just completed a four year 
solitary retreat, there seemed to be no trace of pride or accomplishment. I asked them, “what 
advice do you have for other women?” The answer that one of them gave was a bit unexpected, 
as I was anticipating her to say something about compassion or the benefits of devotion. She 






Figure 9: Nuns in long retreat, Gebchak Gonpa, Tibet 
 
Photo Credit: The Yogini Project 
The notion that one can develop confidence by “relaxing,” is also found in psychoanalytic 
literature.  
For instance, Winnicott articulated a concept known as “holding space” or “potential 
space,” a process he considered crucial for healthy development. He argued that parents 
(mothers) need to cultivate an environment that is loving, but also open or empty enough for 
children to discover who they are. Mothers who overly smother their children with love and 
attention rob them of opportunities for self-mastery. The kind of healthy aloneness that children 
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need to thrive comes from an environment that is “safe but unobtrusive” (Epstein 1998: 39). This 
way of thinking is another way of understanding the benefits of space within the mind. 
This advice that the nun gave me, of just relaxing, is something I heard frequently in 
discussions of coping and resilience. Although most Tibetans do not go off to meditate in a cave 
like these nuns, such ideas permeate cultural sensibilities of psychological health. It is only 
possible to relax when there is great inner confidence. It is identifying with the vast blue sky that 
is eternal, rather than the ever-changing clouds. An abbot of a monastery relied on this metaphor 
when explaining to me how to cope with adversity. He explained that if someone is very attached 
to every passing thought and every passing emotion, there will be great instability within the 
mind. But those who can learn to identify with the vast blue sky behind the clouds will not be 
swayed too much by the passing of difficult emotions. “You don’t have to ignore them, and 
pretend they are not there,” he said. “But you don’t have to identify with them either. We might 
have difficult emotions, but we wouldn’t say that we are them. It is not good to say, I am angry. 
It is better to think, okay, right now, at the moment, there is a feeling of anger passing by.” He 
said before giggling and handing me a cookie, “you can wave! Hello, and goodbye, anger!” This 
orientation to the self, helps Tibetans to view mental distress as something that comes and goes. 
It is just a part of being human. With this view, automatically solidifying distress in terms of 
“mental illness,” only makes distress seem more permanent than it really is.  
The focus is on cultivating inner equanimity. When Tibetans describe those who are very 
resilient as “very humble,” and also “very confident,” they mean that they do not have to build 
themselves up because they have trust in their own minds. Arrogance is a sign that there is a lack 
of inner confidence, because self-worth is dependent on external confirmation. This trust and 
inner confidence in their own minds is so strong that when they are faced with difficulty, their 
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negative emotions are not able to sway their confidence. Resilient people in this context may 
experience anger, fear, sadness, grief, or even rage, but they understand it to be temporary and in 
a sense, “not real,” or empty of inherent existence. In other words, the humbleness and 
confidence that resilient people in the Tibetan exile experience is unconditioned. Studies of this 
and other “resilience imaginaries,” may be a fruitful site for pushing the boundaries of how we 
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Appendix A: Community Members Interview Guide 
Migration from Tibet: 
1) What are some of the reasons people leave Tibet? Why did you leave? 
2) Can you describe what your life was like in Tibet? How long have you been a monastic/were 
you ever monastic? 
3) How did you come to live in Dharamsala? How was it adapting to life here? 
4) What advice would you give to someone who just came from Dharamsala from Tibet? 
 
Mental Distress: 
5) I understand there are some political prisoners in Tibet. Can you tell me why some Tibetans 
are arrested? 
6) Although many Tibetans faced political problems, there seems to be a lot of hope and social 
support here in Dharamsala. Can you tell me how people in this community get on with life after 
dealing with such problems? 
7) There are also people who are struggling after witnessing or experiencing disturbing events in 
Tibet. How can you tell if someone is not doing very well? 
8) Some people who have witnessed or experienced disturbing events will suddenly remember 
these events, sometimes as if they are happening right in this moment. Some other people have 
dreams about the events. Have you heard of people in the community having difficulty with this? 
9) Some other people will try hard to avoid places, people, things and activities that might cause 
them to think about the distressing events. Is this a problem in your community? 
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10) Some other people after being exposed to a disturbing event may have difficulties where they 
suddenly become very angry, have difficulty falling asleep, and become startled or scared very 
easily. Do you think this happens here? 
11) Some people say that when you are feeling troubled you may develop a lung disorder. What 
does this mean? 
12) If someone experiences mental distress will they first visit a doctor or a lama? (What can 
each do to help?) 
13) If someone in the community develops a mental illness, what do others think about that 
person? How do they treat him or her? 
14) Are these problems dealt with differently in monasteries and nunneries? 
15) What role do spirits play in causing illness? 
16) Have you been to the doctor for any reason since coming to Dharamsala? 
 
Coping and Resilience: 
17) Can you describe some difficulties in your life and how you have coped with these 
problems? 
18) Some people who have been faced with many problems seem to do better than others. How 
is this explained? 
19) Are there certain groups within the exile community who seem to be particularly 
resilient/tough in the face of adversity? What accounts for their toughness? 
20) Some people use alcohol or drugs to cope with problems. Is this a problem in Dharamsala? 




22) Some people say Buddhist practices, such as prayers or mantras, help you to work with your 
mind. Why is this? 
23) Can you describe the concept of karma and how this works in explaining the difficulties 
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Appendix B: Expert Informant Interview Guide 
 
Definition and Experience of Mental Distress: 
1) Sometimes people will seek out treatment if they are not doing well in exile. What brings 
community members in to see you?  
2) When people want to seek help for mental distress would they usually visit a lama or doctor 
first? (prompt: what do lamas do? What do doctors do?) 
3) A significant number of people in Dharamsala witnessed or experienced very disturbing 
events in Tibet. Some of them, I understand, are not doing so well following these experiences. 
How can you tell if someone is not doing well? 
4) Some people who have witnessed or experienced disturbing events will suddenly remember 
these events, sometimes as if they are happening right in that moment. Some other people have 
dreams about the events. Do you find that people in the community have difficulty with this? 
5) Other people will try very hard to avoid places, people, things and activities that might cause 
them to think about the distressing events. Is this a problem that you have encountered? 
6) Some people after being exposed to a disturbing event may have difficulties where they 
suddenly become very angry, have difficulty falling asleep, and become startled or scared very 
easily. Do you find that people come to you with these kinds of problems? 
7) How would you know if someone was experiencing mental distress? What are some of the 
signs?  
8) Some people have said that when you are tortured or imprisoned you may develop a srog-




9) If someone in the exile community develops one of these disorders what do others think of 
him or her?  How do they respond? 
10) Are people who develop an illness expected to continue working or engaging in their 
vocation?  How does that work? 
11) What role do spirits play in causing illness? 
12) Are these problems dealt with differently in monasteries and nunneries? 
 
Coping and Resilience: 
13) Although many Tibetans have faced very difficult experiences, there seems to be a lot of 
hope and strong support in Dharamsala. How do people in this community get on with life after 
dealing with such adversity? 
14) How else do people tend to cope with mental distress? 
15) Some people who have been imprisoned, tortured, or suffered very painful circumstances 
seem to do better than others. It is not always clear why some people seem to do okay even in the 
face of such extreme events. Have you witnessed this phenomenon? [if yes] what explains it? 
16) Are there certain groups within the Tibetan community who seem to you to be particularly 
tough in the aftermath of extreme events? What would you say accounts for their toughness? 
(prompt: generations, gender, religious ordination status) 
17) Buddhist beliefs and practices seem to be very important to many people in Dharamsala. 
Does this have anything to do with how people work through a difficult time?  
18) Can you describe the concept of karma and how this works in explaining the troubling things 
that happen to people in the course of their lifetime?   
253 
 
































ད་ལ་དྲན་གྱི་ཡོད་      ། 
255 
 
མཚམས་རེ་ཁོང་ཚོར་སྐབས་དེའྱི་རང་ལ་      དོན་རེན་     འཕྲད་པའྱི་སྣང་ཚུལ་ཡོང་གྱི་ཡོད་རེད། 
མྱི་སྣ་ཁ་ཤས་ལ་དོན་རེན་ཀྱི་གནས་བབས་དེ་ཚོ་རྱི་ལམ་གཏོང་གྱི་ཡོད་རེད། 
ཁེད་རང་གྱིས་སྱི་ཚོགས་ནང་དུ་དཀའ་ངལ་དེ་འདྲ་ཡོད་མཁན་ཧ་གོ་ཡྱི་ཡོད་དམ། 
༥༽ མྱི་གཞན་གྱིས་དཀའ་སྡུག་གྱི་དུས་སྐབས་ཡྱིད་ལ་འཁོར་བའྱི་རྒྱུ་རེན་གྱི་ཡུལ་དང་། མྱི། དངོས་པོ། 
བ་སོད་སོགས་ལ་གཡོལ་ཐབས་ཀྱི་འབད་བརྩོན་ཞེ་དྲག་བེད་ཀྱི་རེད། 
འདྱི་ཁེད་རང་ལ་འཕྲད་པའྱི་དཀའ་ངལ་རེད་དམ། 






མྱི་ཁ་ཤས་ཀྱིས་ལབ་སོལ་ལ་         ནར་གཅོད་དང་བཙུན་འཇུག་བེད་       སོག་རླུང་འཕར་གྱི་  





ཁོང་ལ་     ཚུལ་ག་རེ་ཡོད་རེད། ཁོང་ཚོས་རྣམ་འགྱུར་གང་འདྲ་སོན་གྱི་རེད།  
༡༠༽ 
ན་ཚ་ཕོག་པའྱི་     ཚོས་མུ་མཐུད་ལས་ཀ་བེད་པའམ་ཁོང་ཚོའྱི་ལས་ཁུར་ལ་ཞུགས་རྒྱུའྱི་རེ་ལྟོས་བེད་ཀྱི་རེད་ད
མ།  
༡༡༽ འདྲེ་གདོན་གྱིས་རེན་པས་ན་ཚ་ག་རེ་ཡོང་གྱི་རེད། 











པའྱི་བདེ་ཐང་                         
མྱི་ཁ་ཤས་                 ་ཟྱིང་དེ་འདྲ་ལ་       སེམས་ཁམས་བདེ་ཐང་             
          དེ                           
ཁེད་རང་གྱིས་འཆར་སྣང་འདྱི་དངོས་སུ་མཐོང་གྱི་འདུག་གམ།  གལ་སྱིད་འདུག་ན། 
དེས་འགེལ་བཤད་ག་རེ་གནང་གྱི་ཡོད་རེད། 
༡༦༽ 
                                                                     
                                            
                                                      ༼  






























Appendix C: Open Letter from 17
th
 Karmapa 
Reports have just emerged that three more Tibetans set themselves ablaze within a single day in 
eastern Tibet. This comes shortly after four Tibetans immolated themselves and others died in 
demonstrations in Tibet during the month of January. As tensions escalate, instead of showing 
concern and trying to understand the causes of the situation, the Chinese authorities respond with 
increasing force and oppression. Each new report of a Tibetan death brings me immense pain and 
sadness; three in a single day is more than the heart can bear. I pray that these sacrifices have not 
been in vain, but will yield a change in policy that will bring our Tibetan brothers and sisters 
relief. Having been given the name Karmapa, I belong to a 900 year old reincarnation lineage 
that has historically avoided any political engagement, a tradition I have no intention of 
changing. And yet as a Tibetan, I have great sympathy and affection for the Tibetan people and I 
have great misgivings about remaining silent while they are in pain. Their welfare is my greatest 
concern. Tibetan demonstrations and self-immolations are a symptom of deep but 
unacknowledged dissatisfaction. If Tibetans were given a genuine opportunity to lead their lives 
as they wished, preserving their language, religion and culture, they would neither be 
demonstrating nor sacrificing their lives. Since 1959, we Tibetans have faced unimaginable loss, 
yet we have found benefit in adversity. Many of us rediscovered our true identity as Tibetans. 
We rediscovered a sense of national unity among the people of the three provinces of Tibet. And 
we came to value a unifying leader, in the person of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. These factors 
have given us all great grounds for hope. China speaks of having brought development to Tibet, 
and when I lived there it was materially comfortable. Yet prosperity and development have not 
benefited Tibetans in the ways that they consider most valuable. Material comfort counts for 
little without inner contentment. Tibetans live with the constant suspicion that they will be forced 
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to act against their conscience and denounce His Holiness the Dalai Lama. The Chinese 
authorities persistently portray His Holiness as the enemy. They have rebuffed his repeated 
efforts to find a peaceful and negotiated solution to the Tibetan-Chinese problem. They dismiss 
the heartfelt faith and loyalty with which the Tibetan people universally regard His Holiness. 
Even Tibetans born in Tibet decades after His Holiness the Dalai Lama had gone into exile still 
regard him as their guide and refuge not only for this life, but for life after life. Therefore, 
constantly depicting His Holiness the Dalai Lama in hostile terms is an affront that benefits no 
one. In fact, striking at the heart of Tibetan faith damages the prospect of winning Tibetans’ 
trust. This is neither effective nor wise. I call on the authorities in Beijing to see past the veneer 
of wellbeing that local officials present. Acknowledging the real human distress of Tibetans in 
Tibet and taking full responsibility for what is happening there would lay a wise basis for 
building mutual trust between Tibetans and the Chinese government. Rather than treating this as 
an issue of political opposition, it would be far more effective for Chinese authorities to treat this 
as a matter of basic human welfare. In these difficult times, I urge Tibetans in Tibet: Stay true to 
yourselves, keep your equanimity in the face of hardship and remain focused on the long term. 
Always bear in mind that your lives have great value, as human beings and as Tibetans. With the 
prospect of the Tibetan New Year in sight, I offer my prayers that Tibetans, our Chinese brothers 
and sisters, and our friends and supporters across Indian and around the world may find lasting 
happiness and true peace. May the New Year usher in an era of harmony, characterized by love 
and respect for each other and for the earth that is our common home. 
Ogyen Trinley Dorje, 
17th Gyalwang Karmapa 
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Februrary 6, 2012 – Bodhgaya. 
                                                        
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
